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 Abstract 
In the last two decades, the study of postwar American cities has gone through a 
significant revisionist reinterpretation that overturned an older story of urban decay and decline 
beginning with the tumultuous 1960s and the notion that a conservative white suburban backlash 
politics against civil rights and liberalism appeared only after 1966. These new studies have 
shown that, in fact, American cities had been in jeopardy as far back as the 1940s and that white 
right-wing backlash against civil rights was also much older than previously thought. This 
“urban crisis” scholarship also directly rebutted neoconservative and New Right arguments that 
Great Society liberal programs were at fault for the decline of inner-city African American 
neighborhoods in the past few decades by showing that the private sector real estate industry and 
1930s New Deal housing programs, influenced by biased industry guidelines, caused those 
conditions through redlining. 
My case study similarly recasts the history of American inner cities in the last half of the 
twentieth century. It uses the Greater Kansas City metropolitan area, especially Kansas City, 
Missouri and Kansas City, Kansas, as a case study. I deliberately chose Kansas City because 
traditional urban histories and labor histories have tended to ignore it in favor of cities further 
east or on the west coast. Furthermore, I concur with recent trends in the historical scholarship of 
the Civil Rights Movement towards more of a focus on northern racism and loczating the 
beginning of the movement in the early twentieth century. In this study, I found evidence of civil 
rights activism in Kansas City, Missouri as far back as the late 1860s and 1870s. I trace the 
metropolitan area’s history all the way back to its antebellum beginnings, when slavery still 
divided the nation and a national railroad system was being built. I weave both labor and changes 
in transportation over time into the story of the city and its African-American population over 
time. 
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 Abstract 
In the last decade to fifteen years, the study of postwar American major cities has gone 
through a significant revisionist reinterpretation that overturns the older stories of urban decay 
and decline as beginning with the tumultuous 1960s and the notion that a conservative white 
suburban backlash politics against civil rights and liberalism appeared only after 1966 by 
showing that, in fact, American cities had been in trouble as far back as the 1940s and that right-
wing backlash politics itself was also much older than previously thought. This “urban crisis” 
scholarship also directly rebutted neoconservative and New Right arguments that Great Society 
liberal programs were at fault for the conditions of inner-city African American neighborhoods 
by showing that, in fact, it had been the private sector real estate industry and 1930s New Deal 
housing programs influenced by biased industry guidelines that had caused those conditions 
through redlining. 
My case study is in this vein of revisionism towards the history of American inner cities 
in the last half of the twentieth century, using the Greater Kansas City metropolitan area, 
especially as pertains to Kansas City, Missouri and Kansas City, Kansas, as my case study. I 
deliberately chose Kansas City as an additional iconoclastic move, since traditional urban 
histories and labor histories have tended to ignore it in favor of cities further east or on the west 
coast. Furthermore, I concur with recent trends in studying the history of the civil rights 
movement that focus more on northern racism and which moves the beginning of the movement 
back to the early twentieth century. In fact, in this study, I found evidence of civil rights activism 
in Kansas City, Missouri as far back as the late 1860s and 1870s. I trace the metropolitan area’s 
history all the way back to its antebellum beginnings, when slavery was dividing the nation and a 
national railroad system was being built. I weave both labor and changes in transportation over 
time into the story of the city and its African-American population over time.
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INTRODUCTION 
“What happens to a dream deferred? Does it dry up like a raisin in the sun . . . Maybe it just sags 
like a heavy load. Or does it explode?”—Langston Hughes, “Harlem,”(1951)1 
 
 The purpose of the following study is to illuminate Greater Kansas City in the twentieth 
century as an exemplar of the phenomenon known as the “urban crisis.” The term “urban crisis” 
has become the historiographical short-hand for the complex trend that pulled both capital and 
jobs from America’s central cities into the suburbs during the twentieth century.  The process 
accelerated following Wolrd War II, transforming those central cities into areas with decaying 
infrastructure, failing schools, high poverty rates, and majority African American populations. 
The result was a concentrated and racialized urban poverty.
2
    
As a topic of discussion, the urban crisis attracted little sustained attention until the 
rebellions of African Americans, typically referred to as the “riots,” jolted American cities 
between 1965 and 1968, beginning with the 1965 Watts uprising. The contours of the debate 
were set early in its appearance. In his 1965 report on the state of the black family, Johnson 
administration cabinet official Daniel Patrick Moynihan (citing the work of E. Franklin Frazier in 
the 1930s) was one of the earliest commentators to argue that a “crisis” in the African American 
nuclear family, manifested by an increase in single female-headed households, was responsible 
for the crisis in the inner cities.
3
 Neoconservative writers such as Charles Murray used 
                                                 
1
 Langston Hughes, “Harlem,” Selected Poems of Langston Hughes (New York: Random House, 1990) 
2
 Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1996), 4-5. 
3
 See Daniel P. Moynihan, The Negro Family: A Case For National Action (Washington D.C.:US Department of 
Labor, 1965) 
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Moynihan’s family structure arguments to scapegoat the inner city poor and justify right-wing 
political attacks on Great Society antipoverty programs during the 1980s.
4
 Other earlier 
interpretations centered on structural issues. William Julius Wilson, for example, argued that the 
shift away from manufacturing in U.S. and global capitalism was primarily responsible for the 
crisis in American cities in the late twentieth century.
5
 Still others, such as Gary Orfield, asserted 
that race discrimination in housing policy and suburbanization were at the root of the crisis.
6
   
Regardless of their strong disagreements over the cause of the crisis, almost all 
interpretations of the urban crisis appearing between the 1960s and early 1990s followed a 
narrative that assumed American cities were stable and prosperous throughout the early postwar 
decades.
7
 In doing so, these studies implicitly confused the “flash point” of the crisis – the rioting 
– with the crisis itself. This confusion reflected the broader assumption, rooted in the early 
postwar era, that the United States was a society of overwhelming abundance and social stability 
in which social problems had been solved either by New Deal social programs or by the promise 
of continual economic growth.  A corollary of this mythical postwar stability and shared 
prosperity was the notion that the United States was a society with a political culture based on 
consensus. When the events of the late 1960s and early 1970s rendered both assumptions 
untenable, notions that American cities had been stable and healthy in the 1940s and 1950s 
nonetheless held sway.  
                                                 
4
 See, for example, the main argument in Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-80 (New 
York: Basic Books, 1984), cited in Sugrue, 4. 
5
 William J. Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: the Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987), 12. 
6
 Gary Orfield, “Ghettoization and its Alternatives” in Paul E. Peterson, The New Urban Reality (Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institute, 1985), 161-93; see also Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: 
Segregation and the Making of the Underclass (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 1-5. 
7
 Sugrue, 4, 155; economist John Kenneth Galbraith admitted that he had failed to fully account for a trend towards 
worsening public services in the cities in his forward to the 1984 edition of The Affluent Society. See John K. 
Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin Co., 1984), xxii-xiii. 
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A notable exception was British historian Godfrey Hodgson, who wrote in his 1976 work 
America In Our Time that the 1950s and early 1960s were “a fool’s paradise” of “dangerous 
illusions,” with consequences far beyond urban policy.8  Hodgson was the first major historian to 
assert that the roots of multiple crises of the 1960s—including the urban crisis—dated back to 
the 1940s and to identify the root cause of the urban crisis as the combination of “the black 
migration from the South” with “the conscious, if veiled, efforts of middle-class whites, 
especially the real estate and credit interests” to surround black inner cities with predominantly 
white suburbs.
9
  This observation was his key argument concerning the urban crisis. Along these 
lines, Hodgson chastised the naivety of mid-century U.S. liberals for believing that “economic 
growth would generate the resources for solving social problems” even in a case such as mid-
century urban environments in which all of “the growth is in one place and the problems are left 
behind in another.”10  In this way, Hodgson prepared the way for later historians to upend 
decades of myths and misconceptions about the 1960s urban crisis. 
For Hodgson, the process of suburbanization was the key factor in the deterioration of 
central cities.  The process of suburbanization, that is, the movement of middle- and upper-class 
whites leaving central cities and business districts for neighborhoods outside the city’s limits, 
dates as far back as 1890 in the United States.
11
  Further, the origins of suburban enclaves as 
peripheral towns to major cities date back further still, to at least 1840, when such enclaves often 
stressed their links to urban greatness.
12
  The notion that suburbs had a distinct identity separate 
                                                 
8
 Godfrey Hodgson, America in Our Time (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1976), 16. 
9
 Ibid., 420-21. 
10
 Ibid., 420. 
11
 Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 46. 
12
 Ibid., 45. 
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from large cities was a new development at the end of the nineteenth century.
13
  A related idea, 
that suburbs were defined in opposition to the negative aspects of city life was a new 
development at the end of the nineteenth century. Kenneth Jackson traced this shift in the 
meaning of suburbs to a late nineteenth century white middle-class consciousness of the 
distinction between two different types of community living. These were Gemeinschaft—or 
home and family—and Gesellschaft—or the impersonal relations of the outside world of work.14  
Increasingly,  the modern industrial city was seen as full of vice and danger, and therefore 
unsuited as a community space to raise a family that prided itself on social status. 
New technology and modes of transportation made the geographical separation of one’s 
home and the central city possible in the late nineteenth century. Electricity, telephones, and the 
streetcars helped to create the conditions in which this new middle and upper-class lifestyle 
could be sustained and grown over the decades after 1890.
15
  Suburbanization after 1890 was tied 
directly to social class (and in places like Boston, ethnicity), but did not become directly linked 
to racism and racial disparities until the modern real estate industry began to tie property values 
to the racial and ethnic compositions of neighborhoods beginning in the 1910s.
16
   World War II 
and postwar prosperity therefore did not cause suburbanization, which predated those time 
periods by half a century. What was new in the postwar era was instead the acceleration of 
suburbanization thanks to the automobile, the New Deal housing programs, and after 1956, the 
Interstate Highway System. The growth and development of suburbs occurred at the expense of 
                                                 
13
 Ibid., 72. 
14
 Ibid., 46. 
15
 Samuel Bass Warner, Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870-1900 ( Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1962), 31. 
16
 David M.P. Freund, Colored Property: State Policy and White Racial Politics in Suburban America (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007), 15. 
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cities by the turn of the century, but the process was not completely racialized until a half century 
later.  In the years following World War II, federal subsidizing of suburban expansion and the 
simultaneous institutionalization of the idea that the racial composition of neighborhoods was a 
primary consideration in evaluating the worth of property worked to lock in an extremely 
unequal pattern of urban development:  increasingly, the suburban and urban dichotomy became 
synonymous with the color line. 
Building on the insights of Hodgson as well as histories of suburbia by Kenneth T. 
Jackson and Samuel Bass Warner, a group of newer historians have challenged the older 
narratives of the urban crisis. In the last two decades, historians such as Thomas Sugrue, David 
Freund, Amanda Seligman, and Robert Self have forged a more complex interpretation. The 
urban crisis, they argue, was a result of the interaction of racial segregation and discrimination, 
housing policies at both the federal and local level, the rise and expansion of suburbs, and the 
long-term decline of the manufacturing sector of the US economy.
17
 All three explicitly rebut 
long-standing assumptions which had held that American major cities fell into crisis because of 
either the urban riots of the late 1960s or because of the economic and oil crises of the 1970s. 
Instead, they demonstrated that American cities were in trouble as far back as the 1940s, due to 
“the overdevelopment of the suburbs and the underdevelopment of cities” in terms of capital 
investment and the commitment of public resources.
18
 Sugrue and others have thus shifted the 
periodization of the narrative of urban crisis to earlier decades once assumed to be marked by 
stability, prosperity, and consensus.  
In addition to expanding the specific historical time frame of urban crisis, these historians 
                                                 
17
 Sugrue, 5; Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton University 
Press, 2003), 1-2; Amanda I. Seligman, Block By Block: Neighborhoods and Public Policy on Chicago’s West 
Side (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 6. 
18
 Sugrue, 6-7, 12; Self, 1. 
6 
 
have challenged earlier notions of what specifically caused the crisis in late-twentieth century 
American cities. Instead of pointing to single causes in the manner of earlier commentators and 
scholars, they assert that there were instead multiple, overlapping causes for the urban crisis. 
They find many of the older interpretations to be simplistic and ahistorical. They upend, for 
example, Charles Murray’s assertions that Great Society antipoverty programs were at fault by 
demonstrating that, on the contrary, the liberal state’s housing policies subsidized white middle-
class suburbia at the expense of the inner cities between the thirties and the sixties.
19
    They 
build on William J. Wilson’s economic arguments and Gary Orfield’s identification of 
suburbanization as a major cause of the crisis, but again, challenge their overall time frames 
which had placed the crisis in the late 1960s. 
Freund, for example, notes that New Deal programs as well as subsequent federal 
programs such as the Federal Housing Administration, the Homeowners’ Loan Corporation, the 
Public Housing Administration, and the Urban Renewal Administration played crucial roles in 
exacerbating existing racial discrimination in housing.
20
 Such discriminatory practices included 
explicitly racist evaluations of neighborhoods’ market value by the Homeowners Loan 
Corporation based on whether or not neighborhoods were populated exclusively by middle-class 
white Christians, especially Protestants.
21
 HOLC maps were color coded, and were the source of 
the term “redlining”: “red” connoted “undesirable” neighborhoods that were, by definition, those 
dominated by racial or ethnic minorities.  More subtly, especially after the Supreme Court 
outlawed race-restrictive neighborhood covenants in 1948, the FHA and other agencies 
continued to give preference to homeowners over renters and to excuse existing racial 
                                                 
19
 Freund, 177; Self, 1, 11. 
20
 Freund, 5-7. 
21
 Ibid., 113. 
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inequalities as unavoidable parts of a “free market” in housing.22 The Eisenhower administration 
and Congress made matters worse throughout the 1950s by never providing enough funding for 
those meager public housing provisions that existed, with the 1954 Omnibus Housing Act 
undermining public housing in favor of “urban renewal” and slum clearance.23 In identifying 
which particular policies of the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower administrations and 
corresponding congressional legislation were responsible for accelerating suburbanization and 
exacerbating the urban crisis, Freund fills in much needed details missing from Orfield’s 
interpretation of the crisis. Orfield had identified suburbanization and housing discrimination as 
at fault for the crisis but had neglected the role of federal policy in the perpetuation of both.
24
   
This new interpretation of the urban crisis has several consequences for twentieth century 
US historiography. Sugrue and Freund explicitly state that in order to truly understand the 
postwar era, it is critical that historians expand their geographical understanding of the civil 
rights struggle beyond the South to the North and West. They also urge historians to revise the 
historical time frame backward in attempts to locate the origins of right-wing “white backlash” 
politics.
25
 In both northern and southern cities, these scholars contend, it is critical to understand 
that white residents did not simply leave for the suburbs once their neighborhoods began to be 
integrated:  rather, they resisted violently and asserted new rationales for their behavior that were 
framed in the language of “homeowners rights” or “taxes” rather than race.26 Finally, the new 
literature on the “urban crisis” also challenges historians to recognize that, as Robert Self put it, 
                                                 
22
 Ibid., 177, 206. 
23
 Ibid., 186 
24
 Orfield, “Ghettoization and its Alternatives” in Peterson, New Urban Reality, 161-63. 
25
 Sugrue, 10; Self, 11; Freund, 6; Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism 
(Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), 11. 
26
 Seilgman, 6; Freund, 3, 6, 10; Kruse, 10-11, 238; Self, 2. 
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“African-Americans as a whole constituted the group in national life most deeply engaged in 
challenging urban decline and imagining remedies to the urban crisis.”27     
This study of the Greater Kansas City area builds on these recent studies of the urban 
crisis.  Consistent with these studies, I will argue that the full-blown emergence of the urban 
crisis between the 1940s and 1960s was a result of two interacting historical developments: first, 
persistent racial discrimination and segregation in housing beginning in the early decades of the 
twentieth century (and still ongoing today) and second, postwar macroeconomic shifts away 
from an industrial economy spurred on by a shift to the suburbs that developed from several 
causes.  
However, I differ from Sugrue, Self, and Freund by asserting that the transition to an 
automobile-based transportation system and the decline of labor unions and industrial capitalism 
were also crucial to the urban crisis. Despite how fashionable it has been in recent decades to 
believe so, it is simply not true that “market forces” are independent of public policies that 
subsidize suburbanization and certain modes of transportation over others. In the same vein, 
markets are not exempt from societal characteristics such as institutional racism.  Instead of 
faceless macroeconomic forces destroying the old unionized industrial urban order, decades of 
subsidizing cars, roads, and white-only suburbs shaped the emerging urban landscape of Kansas 
City between 1945 and 1980.  Indeed, capital went to suburban locations both because more 
affluent whites took their purchasing power there and because suburbs were places where unions 
were weak or nonexistent. White racism, the eclipse of railroads and streetcars by the car culture, 
urban renewal and freeway construction, and capital chasing white middle-class consumer 
dollars to conveniently non-union locations all did their part to exacerbate the urban crisis, 
                                                 
27
 Self, 1. 
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undermine the labor unions, and undo urban industrial capitalism. As Chapters 5 and 6 
document, the urban crisis had fully developed by the 1940s in the black neighborhoods of 
Kansas City, Missouri.
28
  I would also add to Sugrue’s and others’ revision of postwar American 
history my own observation that the postwar capital-labor accord has been greatly exaggerated in 
its importance. Strikes and repeated legislative and ballot initiatives designed to weaken unions 
as well as other conflicts over the direction of the US economy and society continued into the 
1950s.
29
  
I chose Greater Kansas City as a case study for my entry into the urban crisis scholarship 
for two main reasons. First, it is fresh scholarly ground. Apart from Kevin Fox Gotham’s 
sociological study of urban segregation and some local histories, Kansas City was largely 
ignored in the scholarly literature. Unlike metropolises further east, west, or south, scholars have 
devoted little attention to Kansas City’s urban history of either organized labor or the “urban 
crisis,” despite the fact that both were present.  This may be because older labor historians have 
tended to focus their attention on industrial metropolises much further east, while newer 
historians and social scientists searching for “suburban warriors” in the Sunbelt may have 
concluded that Kansas City is too far north.
30
    
Secondly, Kansas City fits some patterns seen in other local case studies in urban crisis 
scholarship, but in other ways, the city’s history and characteristics are completely different from 
Detroit, Atlanta, Oakland, and Chicago. If Kansas City, Missouri, matches Sugrue’s timeline for 
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the development of conditions of urban crisis by showing signs of it around 1939-40, in other 
ways the situation in Greater Kansas City was entirely different from Detroit’s experience in 
these decades. Kansas City, Kansas, for example, did not experience urban crisis conditions until 
later, after World War II. More importantly—and this sets the metro apart from other large cities 
in a striking way—the effects of the Great Migration on KCMO occurred later than elsewhere in 
the urban North, as it was not until World War II that the city attracted large numbers of blacks 
from the Deep South (at the rate of a thousand a month) in the national Great Migration wave.
31
  
In other words, KCMO had mass black migration both earlier and later than was the norm for 
northern industrial cities, as the World War I-era wave was negligible there compared to the 
1879-81 Exoduster migration before or the migration after, in the 1940s. 
There are other differences as well.  As Sugrue had shown, the problem in Detroit was a 
scarcity of housing that helped fuel racial violence; in KCMO, housing booms occurred in the 
1920s and 1950s that had little effect on the prevailing racial discrimination and violence that 
occurred throughout the area between 1911 and 1962.
32
  This is not to say housing was not a 
problem at crisis levels for KCMO’s blacks. Instead, crisis conditions in housing were caused by 
blatant race discrimination alone rather than Detroit’s pattern of scarcity for all combined with 
racial discrimination. In their studies of the white racial politics of suburbanization, Freund and 
Kevin Kruse stress the importance of a new white language for speaking about race. This 
language coded overt racism in a language of “individual choice” and “free markets in housing.” 
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In Kansas City, Missouri, overt racism was not so carefully circumscribed: John Birchers and 
white tavern owners often combined this newer discourse with older and overtly racist rhetoric 
about “race mixing.”33  Moreover, the political climate in both Kansas Cities during the urban 
crisis was also starkly different from that of, say, Chicago or Detroit. Instead of the phenomenon 
of white blue-collar Democrats voting for Republican mayors that Sugrue identified in 1940s 
Detroit, in KCMO it was a paternalistic “clean-government” city management that enforced a 
racial segregation rooted in local custom.
34
  
 My study differs from the existing urban crisis literature in additional ways. The varying 
historical context in which the African American community formed and developed political and 
social institutions in Kansas City, Kansas and Kansas City, Missouri, over time is addressed.  
Second, instead of being a single urban core with surrounding suburbs, here two urban cores on 
each side of the state line are present, along with their surrounding suburbs.  Third, I begin my 
study in the mid-nineteenth century, rather than in the 1940s, because the history of urban 
development and racial discrimination in the Kansas City area was initially, and directly, tied to 
the conflict over slavery. Furthermore, the type of white racism and discrimination African 
Americans encountered in each municipality was directly tied to Kansas’ and Missouri’s 
respective historical records on the question of slavery. Missouri was a slave state and whites 
there had strong Confederate sympathies, while Kansas was mostly antislavery, but as Eric S. 
Foner and others have pointed out in recent historiographical scholarship, the latter often 
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translated to “free soil” notions of a “white republic.”35  Of the large urban crisis studies, only 
Kruse’s Atlanta seems to share KCMO’s history of antebellum slavery; however, the twentieth 
century Atlanta that Kruse explores was actually newer than Kansas City, Missouri, having 
rebuilt from scratch after the Union Army burnt it to the ground. St. Louis, at the other end of the 
state, would probably be closest to KCMO’s history in that it too existed as an antebellum slave 
society in a Union state, but I am unaware of any major urban crisis studies exclusively focusing 
on St. Louis in the literature. Moreover, the divided nature of the Kansas side of the area as 
“free” and the Missouri side as “slave” appears nowhere else in urban case studies; its relevance 
to this discussion is that the area attracted significant African American migration decades before 
the Great Migration attracted large black populations to Chicago, Detroit, or Oakland. The “free 
soil” debate over whether white antislavery activists should embrace African-Americans and 
their rights is important to understanding the roots of Jim Crow racism in what would become 
Kansas City, Kansas because it provided a precedent for racism in a town with an antislavery 
heritage.  
Local histories, particularly those of Avila University History Professor Sherry Lamb 
Schirmer, Kansas City Star journalist Charles Coulter, University of South Florida anthropology 
Professor Susan Greenbaum, Tulane University Sociology Professor Kevin Fox Gotham, and 
Kansas University Geology Professor James R. Shortridge were enormously helpful.  Along with 
the primary sources, they provided portraits of African-American life in both KCMO and KCK 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Of these works, Dr. Gotham’s is the closest to an urban 
crisis study of the Kansas City metropolitan area, and it applies Douglas Massey and Nancy 
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Denton’s contributions to the literature in American Apartheid to his analysis of race and housing 
in Kansas City.
36
  Massey and Denton argue that, contrary to myth, segregation in the United 
States did not end in 1965, but in fact intensified in large cities in the decades after 1965 to the 
point of isolation of inner-city African-Americans from other demographic groups. What really 
ended, they argued, was the legal Jim Crow regime in the South that enshrined segregation into 
state laws. 
Dr. Schirmer’s contribution to understanding the nature of Kansas City, Missouri’s 
historical racism lies in her main thesis. She maintains in her study of Kansas City race relations 
in the first half of the twentieth century, A City Divided, that Kansas City, Missouri developed its 
own form of Jim Crow that was highly class-inflected and gendered in the early decades of the 
twentieth century; she argues that this system was rooted in white middle-class anxieties over 
status and urban space.
37
  Though she never mentions him by name, Schirmer’s diagnosis of the 
characteristics of KCMO’s version of Jim Crow obviously owes a lot to Robert H. Wiebe’s 
seminal The Search For Order, which argued that one of the main motivators for progressive 
reform was white middle-class anxiety over the new urban landscape and loss of “island 
communities.”38  The component of her thesis surrounding “status anxiety” harkens to another 
landmark study of the Progressive Era, Richard Hofstadter’s Age of Reform.39  What would 
become KCK had none of this dynamic: the area was a predominantly working-class industrial 
area after the 1870s, where socialism would become a significant force by 1904 by virtue of 
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drawing crowds “just three and a half times the size of the combined crowd of the democrats 
[sic] and republicans [sic] a few nights before.”40  
Beyond the urban crisis literature and the secondary sources, I’ve made extensive use of 
the primary sources available in the state archival collections in both Kansas and Missouri 
pertaining to the papers of the NAACP and the Urban League. Additionally, the Kansas City 
Public Library’s considerable Missouri Valley Special Collections covering the city’s local 
history—especially that of its black citizens—dating back to the late nineteenth century was of 
immense help. The John Ramos Collection in particular is a treasure trove of local African 
American history. Additionally, I have made extensive use of black newspapers from the era, as 
they are often the only surviving records of important events in a deeply racist era in which 
white-run mainline newspapers often ignored the black community and its experiences 
altogether. 
In synthesizing these sources with the available primary sources, I trace several stories 
within this time frame and place. These are as follows: the story of the meteoric rise of a major 
metropolitan area from very small settlements that originally had little to do with one another; a 
struggle for basic human rights by the black population of Kansas City, Missouri, going all the 
way back to the late 1860s and through the twentieth century to the 1968 riots; mass migration 
from the Deep South to the metro area in repeated waves between 1850 and 1960; the rise of the 
automobile to complete domination of American transportation between 1900 and 1950; the rise 
of real estate companies and the beginning of  the practice of evaluation and appraisal of 
property on the basis of race and ethnicity after the 1910s; and the rapid decentralization and 
suburbanization of the metro starting in the 1930s. Again, the key argument of this study is that 
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the urban crisis, the shift to automobiles, and the decline of unions are linked together by decades 
of subsidized suburbanization that undid industrial capitalism in American cities. 
I deliberately chose to research and write this study from the perspective of local African 
American activists in order to illustrate the tenacity and frustrations inherent in the long struggle 
for equal rights against a backdrop of emerging urban crisis, and to give these men and women 
agency. It cannot be stressed enough that the forces of institutional racism they confronted were 
close to overwhelming, as developer J.C. Nichols and the city’s political and economic elite 
locked in a system that perpetuated racist housing policies as a corollary of bourgeois and elite 
anxieties about urban space and status.  Against ferocious opposition, these activists won a series 
of significant battles against Kansas City’s version of Jim Crow.   That their efforts were not, in 
the end, enough to defuse a full-blown crisis is testimony, not to their lack of effort, but rather to 
the power of the institutionalized forces arrayed against them.  
This study is divided into six chapters. Chapter one covers the years from 1830 to 1900. 
The chapter discusses the origins of each city--KCMO in the 1830s, and KCK as a cluster of 
several small settlements in the 1850s—and their development side by side, with their respective 
territory/state on opposite sides of the national divide over the issue of slavery. It documents the 
formation of both cities’ African-American communities in the decade before the Civil War and 
how subsequent migrations, both from the Deep South and from Missouri outside of KCMO, 
increased the population of both black communities between 1850 and 1885.  The fight over 
slavery within both communities before the Civil War, and how this shaped both cities’ emerging 
identities in the mid-nineteenth century, is given critical attention. The role of the railroads was 
crucial in ensuring the phenomenal growth of KCMO and the surrounding area generally 
between the end of the Civil War and 1900, and in bringing the stockyards and packinghouses to 
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the area in the 1870s. The meatpacking plants, stockyards, and railroads then acted as a catalyst 
for further urbanization, industrialization, migration of rural Missouri and southern blacks, 
immigration from Eastern Europe and Mexico, and the development of an industrial labor force 
and labor movement between 1869 and 1900. The fusion of several smaller towns on the Kansas 
side into KCK in 1886 will be tied to the emergence of a unified Greater Kansas City 
metropolitan area by the turn of the century and explained as a consequence of the growth of the 
area. Finally, this chapter establishes that the civil rights movement in Kansas City began not in 
the 1950s or even the early twentieth century—but instead during Missouri’s own peculiar 
version of Reconstruction in the late 1860s and early 1870s. Chapter One hence introduces both 
cities’ earliest activists for black freedom. 
Chapter two covers the rise of Kansas City, Missouri’s own particular brand of Jim Crow 
and its parallel rise in KCK between 1905 and 1920. Rooted in both Missouri’s slave past and a 
developing sense of anxiety over urban space on the part of the city’s white middle-class, this 
type of racism emphasized distance from black people as synonymous with distance from urban 
vice. This kind of ideology was perfect for a nascent real estate industry that contended that the 
best quality neighborhoods were white and that the presence of African-Americans undermined 
property values. The earliest white terror bombings and arsons of black homes purchased in 
“white only” neighborhoods took place in this period. These developments occurred during the 
national context of the nadir in US race relations between the 1880s and 1920s. Both cities, the 
record shows, could have easily experienced a lynching or a race riot in these years but did not. 
In the case of KCK, the trigger could have been a 1904 altercation between a black teenage boy 
and group of white teenage boys, and in KCMO in 1919 an incident between a black physician 
and a white postal worker nearly triggered violence.  KCMO’s white middle class was especially 
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anxious over the idea of interracial romantic or sexual relationships and espoused a racism that 
was not only class-inflected, but highly gendered. By the end of the 1910s, all that remained 
integrated among the city’s public accommodations were its streetcars, and only because political 
calculations by Democratic Party machines in city wards and opposition by operators to the extra 
cost of segregated seating killed proposals to segregate them. Factional political fights in both 
the Democratic and Republican Parties between the machines and “good government” reformers 
also shaped city policy towards blacks, as both this chapter and chapters four and five show, with 
anti-machine reformers often being deeply hostile to the city’s black citizens. 
Chapter three demonstrates how African American activists responded to the 
intensification of Jim Crow and white racism in these same years between 1900 and 1920. While 
chapter two studies the city’s white middle-class and its development of a racist ideology, 
chapter three looks at the black middle-class and elite of the community, and how these men and 
women fought back against worsening racial discrimination, exclusion, and segregation, 
continuing the struggle begun in the late nineteenth century. These men and women were often 
black Kansas City’s teachers, newspaper owners and reporters, physicians, and ministers who 
built the institutional heart and soul of black Kansas City. 
Chapter four traces the history of the relationship between organized labor and the 
African American community in Greater Kansas City from the turn of the century through the 
Great Depression, noting a wide range of attitudes even in the early 1900s. These ranged from 
interracial strike actions to complete exclusion from other trade unions. Additionally, the chapter 
examines carefully the record of the broader Left, such as the Socialist Party of Eugene Debs in 
the 1910s and the Communist Party USA in the 1930s, in both the relative influence they had in 
the area, and in their attitudes towards African Americans. Critical national African-American 
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national leaders such as A. Philip Randolph and Marcus Garvey will be noted for the impact their 
respective political organizations had on Kansas City’s black population. Additionally, Chapter 
four examines the 1920s and concludes with the simultaneous election of Franklin Roosevelt and 
Tom Pendergast’s gaining of control over Kansas City in 1932. 
Chapter five discusses the history of the streetcars in Kansas City and the slow rise of the 
automobile industry in the US from under the shadows of the vehicle’s French and German 
inventors and the railroads in 1900 to increasing dominance by World War Two. This shift was 
greatly aided by two highway bills, one from 1916 and the other from 1921, and the beginning of 
the use of the gas tax to fund highways in the 1920s. It will then tie this story directly in with the 
experiences of Kansas City’s African American population during the Depression, noting the 
mixed record of Roosevelt’s New Deal in regard to helping or harming the community and 
Pendergast’s shortcomings on civil rights beyond the issue of police brutality and some 
patronage, despite his—and his late brother Jim’s—successful courting of the city’s black vote 
over the preceding two decades. The New Deal’s importance to Greater Kansas City in the 1930s 
is critical, especially its housing policies. Special attention will be given to the history of the 
Homeowners’ Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration in adopting 
exclusionary private real estate practices that became known as “redlining.” Chapter five 
connects the rise of the car and decline of the streetcars and rail to racial inequality in two ways: 
one, by emphasizing how most urban dwellers and especially poor and working-class people did 
not own a car until after 1950 and, two, by describing and documenting new forms of Jim Crow 
that rose to discriminate against blacks who could afford automobiles in the 1930s. The chapter 
will conclude by linking the Fairfax World War II munitions plant in KCK to a major wartime 
event—the Randolph March on Washington movement—which helped force FDR to issue an 
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executive order banning discrimination in defense plants. 
Finally, Chapter Six covers the time period between World War II and the 1968 riots in 
KCMO.  Themes will include the development of a new kind of white ally and civil rights 
activist in the 1940s who came from Christian or ecumenical pacifist circles, the emergence of 
urban crisis conditions in overcrowding as early as 1939, the long struggle against Jim Crow in 
public accommodations between 1945 and 1964, the emergence of urban renewal, rapid racial 
turnover and white flight in KCMO neighborhoods between 1949 and 1968, the resistance of 
tavern owners and the John Birch Society to municipal civil rights ordinances, and the conditions 
that led to the 1968 riot. The paradox of victories for civil rights in public accommodations is the 
these victories occurred at the same time that whole black neighborhoods east of Troost 
Avenue—a major north and south artery in KCMO—had been cut off from the job market by 
redlining and the outright destruction of black owned businesses by urban renewal and urban 
interstate construction.    
 In examining the story of the urban crisis in Greater Kansas City and its historical roots, 
one finds familiar patterns from other case studies as well as unique wrinkles in the local story 
peculiar to the story of the development of the area. The familiar stories are overcrowding, white 
terror and violence against blacks moving into “white” neighborhoods, police brutality, and an 
urban rebellion (i.e., the 1968 riot). On the other hand, KCMO’s mixture of southern cultural 
characteristics with those of a northern industrial urban setting led by an elite political culture 
that combined status, anxiety over urban space, and racism is enough to guarantee this. Likewise, 
KCK’s interdependent but distinctly different character in terms of origins and class composition 
makes for a case study in which patterns of urban crisis are put to the test to discern which are 
close to universal for all American cities and which do not hold up in every case. At much of the 
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heart of this metropolitan area’s unique character lies the question of what exactly its regional 
identity is. A casual observer might suggest that the metro, as with Kansas and Missouri 
generally, is a “Plains” city. To assert as much both begs the question of what a “Plains” city’s or 
state’s characteristics are and masks debates over (especially) Missouri’s identity. For example, is 
Missouri a Plains state, a Midwestern state, or a southern state? Likewise, Kansas has sometimes 
been identified as a western or even southwestern state. Kansas’ antebellum role as a “free” state 
that was a refuge for escaped slaves even more dramatically sets the history of the metro apart 
from other American metropolitan areas, which had no equivalent. What plays out in the Greater 
KC metropolitan area is a struggle for civil rights which enfolds a push for an integrated or open 
public space over the period of half a century, with housing being among the most frustrating and 
difficult struggles of all.  
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CHAPTER ONE: ROOTS: KANSAS CITY, KANSAS AND 
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, 1850-1900 
 
 
Before proceeding to examine and analyze twentieth century Greater Kansas City and its 
place in the unfolding of the urban crisis, it is necessary to provide historical background. The 
earliest references to a unified Greater Kansas City metropolitan area encompassing both Kansas 
City, Missouri and Kansas City, Kansas appear to date back to the early twentieth century.
1
  It is 
most crucial to note that notions of a unified “Greater Kansas City” metropolitan area combining 
Kansas City, Missouri and Kansas City, Kansas were far from inevitable; given such a history of 
late antebellum and Civil War-era conflict, the emergence of Greater Kansas City as a unified 
metropolitan area was extremely unlikely. Each city had a distinct identity from the other. During 
the formative years of both cities in the mid-1800s, the nationwide sectional crisis over slavery 
and civil war sharply divided and further marked the two as entirely separate cities.
2
 As shall be 
shown, the division between Kansas and Missouri over slavery in the mid-nineteenth century 
would strongly shape the divergent historical identities of each city but paradoxically, that same 
history for African-Americans would render “the boundary between the two Kansas Cities” as 
“permeable.”3   
Indeed, each city’s origin occurred independently of the other. Kansas City, Missouri, was 
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originally called the “Town of Kansas” in 1838.4 Contrary to what one might expect, the town in 
Missouri was named “Kansas” sixteen years before the territory was; both were named after the 
river.
5
 What would become Kansas City, Missouri had been primarily Native American lands 
held by the Osage nation between 1821 and 1833.
6
 As a result of the 1820 Missouri Compromise 
in Congress between slave states and free states over the question of whether new states created 
out of the Louisiana Purchase would be slave or free, Missouri’s status as a slave state was well-
established by the time the “Town of Kansas” was incorporated. 
 Accordingly, between 1831 and 1838, the population began to drastically change, as 
large numbers of migrants from Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee came to the area.
7
 The 
majority of African Americans living in Jackson County before the Civil War were brought to the 
area as slaves by planters from those three states.
8
 The first conflict in the area was not, however, 
between free and slave state forces but between the planter class and a large and growing 
Mormon settlement in Jackson County. In 1831, a Mormon settlement in the Missouri Town of 
Kansas was established in accordance with Joseph Smith’s designation of Jackson County as a 
holy land for the Latter Day Saints.
9
 Unlike their new neighbors in Missouri, the Mormons had 
originated not from Southern or border slave states but from upstate New York, and most of their 
followers were from non-slave states like Ohio and Illinois; the religious sect had emerged as 
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part of the Second Great Awakening in New York.
10
 The lands around what are now the Plaza, 
the Paseo, and Blue Ridge Cutoff were Latter Day Saints lands until 1833, when the Mormons 
were expelled from Jackson County.
11
 Mormons in the county were attacked by a vigilante mob 
that destroyed their printing presses and drove them from their homes.
12
 This violent reaction 
against the Mormons was motivated by a combination of distaste for the Latter Day Saints 
beliefs that they constituted a “chosen people” of God, a distrust of Mormon economic practices, 
and the suspicion that the Saints were an abolitionist sect bent on encouraging slave rebellion.
13
 
These suspicions probably were rooted in southern and border-state perceptions of Northerners 
and especially Northern religious groups which were usually seen as synonymous with radical 
abolitionism. 
The economic and business practices of the Mormons in Jackson County were more 
communitarian in orientation than was the norm for the other settlers and were considered 
especially threatening. Latter Day Saints used their Church funds to buy land and start 
businesses, causing fear among speculators and businessmen that they would be frozen out by 
their Mormon competitors.
14
 The Mormons were also suspected of encouraging Native American 
resistance to the non-Mormon settlers in Missouri.
15
 Mormon expulsion from the area that would 
become KCMO was a prelude to a full-blown war in Northwestern Missouri, resulting in their 
expulsion from Missouri generally in 1838.
16
 Coincidentally, Missouri's Governor at the time, 
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Liliburn W. Boggs, was originally from Independence, Missouri.
17
   Given that conflict in 
Jackson County between Mormons and non-Mormons had directly preceded the 1838 war, it 
could be reasonably inferred that Boggs's decision to expel the Latter Day Saints from Missouri 
was influenced as much by his hometown as by popular demands by Missourians in the 
aftermath of the war. Subsequent inquiry into the causes of the war by the state courts found no 
evidence at all for the accusations that the Saints were abolitionists or encouraging Native 
warfare against Missouri settlers but did find that the Mormons had formed military units 
without state approval and had committed attacks on troops, property, and towns during the 
war.
18
 By May 1839 nearly all Mormons had left the state of Missouri except for a few who 
renounced the Mormon faith and/or allegiance to Joseph Smith.
19
   
Once the Mormons were removed as a competing group for political and social control of 
the “Town of Kansas,” plantation owners from southern and border states brought their slaves 
with them to Jackson County, Missouri, and proceeded to reproduce the plantation system in the 
areas surrounding what would become the Greater Kansas City, Missouri area between 1838 and 
1865, especially in Independence, Missouri.
20
 By the 1850s, Jackson County Missouri’s wealth 
was directly tied to slavery.
21
 The county had 3,944 slaves mostly located in Independence and 
Westport.
22
 Jackson and Clay Counties were part of a thirteen county region of the state along the 
Missouri river known as “Little Dixie” for planation slavery, mostly in small-scale production of 
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cotton, tobacco, and hemp.
23
  In KCMO, most slaves were domestics or helpers and those who 
owned slaves in the city usually owned few, sometimes only one or two.
24
   Free African 
Americans in Kansas City, Missouri were rigidly segregated in the 1850s, along with the Irish, to 
the east of Knob Hill in an area called “East Kansas.”25 “East Kansas” was an area of 
considerable poverty, directly linked to racial and ethnic discrimination.
26
 Very early in the 
history of the city, therefore, precedent had been set for residential segregation by race (and 
ethnicity). This was in addition to the race-based bondage that characterized the system of 
slavery both in Missouri and throughout the South.   
However, in KCMO itself slavery was not as firmly established as it was in the rest of the 
state; St. Louis’ slave population, for example, greatly outnumbered KCMO’s, and even in 
Jackson County, most slaves were in Independence and Westport.
27
 The presence of 
Pennsylvania abolitionist Kersey Coates among the early boosters of KCMO in the 1850s would 
undermine slavery in the city as would subsequent European immigration.
28
 Coates had come to 
the city in 1854 primarily in order to invest for Philadelphia business interests, but he was also 
strong financial supporter of the antislavery cause across the border, even shielding the anti-
slavery Kansas governor Andrew Reeder when he was pursued by a pro-slavery mob.
29
 Coates 
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was so devoted to the cause against slavery that he chose to legally represent anti-slavery Kansas 
Governor Charles Robinson in Lecompton, Kansas against charges of treason by the pro-slavery 
Lecompton government.
30
 In Westport, and then again once Coates arrived in Lecompton, he 
was threatened with death if he did not abandon his support of Robinson or leave Lecompton 
immediately.
31
 Despite warnings by the Territorial Governor that he could not be given any 
protection, Coates refused to be intimidated, stating that “I am not aware that I am violating any 
law and shall remain in Lecompton until I have transacted the business I have in hand.” 32  
Coates was the first prominent antislavery northerner to settle in KCMO and, in fact, his 
father had been the first president of William Lloyd Garrison’s American Anti-Slavery Society.33   
Before coming to KCMO, Coates had studied law in Lancaster, Pennsylvania under the 
abolitionist and Radical Republican icon, Pennsylvania Congressman Thaddeus Stevens.
34
   
Given how unpopular Coates’s views were in a Missouri county that a mere decade and a half 
before had expelled Mormons violently on mere suspicion of abolitionism, Kersey Coates and 
his wife each kept loaded pistols under their pillows while they slept and  a Sharps rifle within 
reach of their bed.
35
    Sarah Coates, his wife, was also a pivotal figure in early KCMO history: 
she would found nine women’s clubs in the city between 1870 and 1890 and was a committed 
woman’s suffragist and advocate of women’s education in fields such as “the business, science, 
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and literary” worlds.36   Most fatefully, Kersey Coates’ signature investment in the city would be 
lobbying for the main railroad to pass through the city.
37
    As we shall see, both Coates spouses 
were often the connection between the antebellum issues of slavery and railroad development 
and the late 19th century development of middle-class reform movements surrounding “uplift” 
and the management of urban space.
38
   
In contrast, Kansas City, Kansas, was not created until long after the Civil War, in an 
1886 incorporation of several smaller Kansas towns: Wyandotte, Kansas City, Armourdale, 
Riverview, and Armstrong (these lands also included the former town of Quindaro). During the 
1850s, in sharp contrast to the Missouri side, those small communities experienced conflict and 
division over the unresolved status of slavery within the Kansas Territory. As noted previously, 
Missouri had been declared a slave state by an act of Congress since 1820, while Kansas’ status 
as a “free” or “slave” territory was undetermined until the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1853 
provided the impetus for direct conflict between opposing forces on the issue of slavery after a 
long assumption that the Missouri Compromise meant the eventual status of the territory would 
be free. In KCMO, despite the fears of planters, the Mormons had never really been a threat to 
the slave system; in Wyandotte County, slavery was challenged from the beginning. Slavery was 
a divisive topic among both the Wyandots who held the lands in the 1840s and white settlers who 
arrived in the 1850s.
39
   Additionally, surrounding towns in Northeastern Kansas were divided 
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between pro-slavery and anti-slavery towns, creating a fluid situation that differed from the near 
political and social monopoly slave society enjoyed in Missouri. The dynamic also differed in 
that the original Osage population in the KCMO area did not have nearly the role in the 
formation of the city’s society and politics that the Wyandotts did in what would become KCK. 
For example, Atchison—just upriver on the Missouri River from KCK—was notorious  
by the 1850s as what one historian termed “the most violent pro-slavery town” in all of the 
Kansas Territory.
40
   This reflected the political allegiances of the man who founded the town and 
lent it his name: Missouri Senator David R. Atchison.
41
   Atchison was so pro-slavery that he and 
the town named for him refused to do business with New England traders.
42
   Leavenworth, in 
between Atchison and KCK, was also founded by Missourians from slave-owning backgrounds, 
but they chose to keep politics surrounding slavery relatively quiet so as to avoid the loss of 
much-needed capital from potential investors.
43
  Such cautious tendencies were only reinforced 
by the backlash against and subsequent decline of the city of Atchison after 1857, when Kansas 
Territory became “free soil” in political orientation.44  Lawrence, by contrast, was the opposite of 
Atchison: it was an openly abolitionist stronghold from its founding in October 1854 by Eli 
Thayer and the New England Emigrant Aid Company.
45
  The Kansas Territory itself had two 
competing capitals: Topeka (free) and Lecompton (slave) throughout the protracted violence that 
constituted “Bleeding Kansas” in the 1850s. 
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 Complicating matters further was the fact that Missourians Thomas H. Swope and Hiram 
Northrup directly financed Wyandotte’s development as a city from 1856 to 1857, making the 
slavery issue more delicate.
46
   Swope, Northrup, three Wyandot leaders, and three Kansans were 
able to attract significant capital investment to the settlement between 1856 and the outbreak of 
the Civil War in anticipation of the railroad companies’ planning for a rail line connecting 
KCMO and Wyandotte near the junction of the Kansas and Missouri Rivers.
47
  The role of 
transportation in shaping the contours of the development of the future metro area was therefore 
present from very in each settlement’s history. Over time, changing transportation patterns would 
interact with patterns of racial discrimination and economic distribution as an integral part of the 
story of urban crisis in Greater Kansas City. A product itself of capital, the new railroad 
transportation system in the long term would become a magnet for capital accumulation and 
development, accelerating the urban development of both areas, and in the process altering labor-
capital relations. In the short term, Swope’s participation in boosting “free” Wyandotte and 
Coates’ in boosting KCMO also demonstrated the power of railroad capital to mute the tensions 
over slavery ripping the area and nation apart, even up to the point of bloodshed and full-blown 
Civil War. 
Despite the financial pressures against overt abolitionism as well as the fact that some 
Wyandots held slaves, by 1850 the predominant opinion of the Wyandots tribe opposed slavery.
48
   
Patterns of settlement differed from KCMO from the beginning: both the Wyandots and whites 
who came to the territory were from non-slave societies. The Wyandots, for their part, had been 
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expelled from Ohio by the US government between 1830 and 1840.
49
   One of the most 
influential religious figures in Wyandot life in Ohio had been the Methodist minister John 
Stewart, who taught an egalitarian form of Methodism and was of mixed African, European, and 
Native American descent.
50
  This gave the settlement—before 1856 known as Wyandot 
Purchase—a sharply different character not only from KCMO but other surrounding pro-slavery 
settlements such as Leavenworth and Atchison. 
Further developments reinforced the anti-slavery politics of the area that would become 
KCK. Again, white settlers who came to Wyandotte County were quite different from those who 
came to KCMO. Instead of the southern and border-state white settlers who came to KCMO, 
whites who emigrated to the area that would become KCK were overwhelmingly from states 
without slavery.
51
  Among them was a small but influential number of abolitionists from New 
England. The national context of controversy over the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act provided the 
catalyst for antislavery activists in Massachusetts to begin funding organized, large scale 
migration to Kansas, including the Wyandot Purchase and especially the Quindaro settlement.
52
  
The Kansas-Nebraska Act had amended the Missouri Compromise so that Kansas and Nebraska 
could vote over their status as free or slave territories: that created a scramble between Missouri 
slaveowners and whites from non-slave states further east that pro-slavery forces ultimately lost. 
Although most of the “Bleeding Kansas” violence occurred quite a bit to the west of what would 
become KCK, it could not be said that it was entirely unaffected by the fighting. In Wyandotte, 
mobs from both sides of the slavery debate burnt both the abolitionist Methodist Church North 
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and the pro-slavery Methodist Church South to the ground in 1856; these events were the 
catalyst for the formation of Quindaro.
53
   The close proximity of pro-slavery Leavenworth and 
especially Atchison to Wyandotte also added to the sense of peril felt by abolitionists and blacks, 
inducing moves to Quindaro.
54
  
Neighboring Quindaro accordingly became the more staunchly anti-slavery settlement in 
what would become KCK, and a haven for escaped slaves and free state advocates from New 
England.
55
  Located in a valley on the Kansas side of the Missouri River bend to its south, 
Quindaro was a separate town from Wyandot in the 1850s located to Wyandot’s north. It was 
founded by an Ohio free-state supporter, Abelard Guthrie, who named the town after his 
Wyandot wife.
56
  Guthrie and his wife Nancy Brown (Quindaro) founded the town around their 
property in 1856; by 1859, the town incorporated the former site of the Methodist Episcopal 
Church North.
57
  The town’s name literally translated to “bundle of sticks,” but it was interpreted 
by residents to mean “strength through union.”58  Oral histories of former slaves passed down to 
their descendants have long claimed that Quindaro was a major center of the Underground 
Railroad in Kansas.
59
  With the aid of the New England Emigrant Aid Company, Quindaro 
boomed between 1857 and 1859.
60
  Quindaro was in fact so well known as a refuge for escaped 
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slaves that it was widely despised by pro-slavery Missourians throughout Jackson County.
61
   
This did not mean, however, that what would become Kansas City, Kansas would not 
have racial segregation or be a bastion of racial equality. Most whites who came to Wyandot 
Purchase and the Kansas Territory were “free soilers” who opposed slavery in Kansas but 
thought abolitionists were too radical.
62
  As Eric Foner noted was the case with the “free soil” 
movement nationally, “free soilers” in Wyandot were anti-black; the Wyandot constitution denied 
suffrage to blacks and permitted segregated schools.
63
  In fact, a provision to forbid blacks from 
settling in Kansas was only narrowly defeated during the process of approving the territorial 
constitution and a similar provision had earlier been passed by the “free” territorial legislature 
without dissent.
64
  Moreover, “free soilers” considered abolitionists felons for violating the 
Fugitive Slave Act. Despite their disagreements, both groups soon clashed with pro-slavery 
“Border -Ruffians” from Missouri, who were paid to cross the border by Missouri politicians 
such as David Atchison to prevent the Kansas Territory from becoming an antislavery 
stronghold.
65
  
Both cities, then, had established precedents for racial segregation and discrimination 
early in their histories despite their fundamental disagreement over slavery as a political, social, 
and economic order. Each reflected the larger patterns of race relations that prevailed in their 
respective territory/state. In the case of Missouri, that meant a society and economy organized 
around race-based slavery; in the case of Kansas, this meant a “free labor” society in which there 
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was “tension between a commitment to blacks’ legal freedom and a hesitance to embrace the full 
realization of that freedom through extension of political and social equality.”66  Again, as Foner 
and others document, such contradictions stemmed from the uneasy combination of anti-slavery 
principles and antiblack racism that characterized the antebellum “free soil” movement.67  This 
contradiction would have tremendous consequences for the future of what would become KCK, 
Kansas, and the rest of the nation and would prove one of the factors dooming Reconstruction in 
the South after the war. 
Despite the presence of racial segregation and discrimination in both settlements and 
political dissent against slavery in KCMO , the distinction for antebellum African-Americans 
was a sharp and clear one: KCMO was a slave society, while the area that would become KCK, 
especially Quindaro, was a place of escape from bondage.
68
  Reflecting this development, by the 
late 1850s, free blacks had replaced slaves as the majority of the black population in the Kansas 
Territory as a whole.
69
  In fact, so many slaves in Jackson County either escaped or were aided in 
escaping to Quindaro and other parts of Kansas that KCMO imposed a curfew in November of 
1855 forbidding “Negroes or mulattoes” to be on the streets from 10 pm to 4 am or to 
assemble.
70
  The passage of the 1859 Kansas territorial constitution prohibiting slavery in Kansas 
merely served to make such a distinction official.
71
  However, the Fugitive Slave Act  and the 
bounty hunters who accompanied it made life in the area for escaped slaves (and blacks 
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generally) quite precarious and perilous until the outbreak of the Civil War, especially in the 
aftermath of the 1857 Supreme Court Dred Scott decision.
72
   For this very reason, most escaped 
slaves did not permanently settle in the area and chose Quindaro as temporary refuge in a 
journey to far western Kansas territory or north to Nebraska or Canada, which were much more 
safely out of the reach of slave catchers and bounty hunters.
73
  
Both the Wyandotte town and KCMO enjoyed sustained economic and population growth 
between the 1850s and the beginning of the Civil War in spite of the “Bleeding Kansas” border 
violence, owing to railroad investors and speculators.
74
  In the case of KCMO, the California 
Gold Rush of the late 1840s-early 1850s provided an added impetus for growth.
75
  Between 1850 
and 1859, KCMO’s population shot up to 40,000 from only 700.76  More amazingly, this growth 
rate occurred despite a deadly cholera outbreak in the city between 1849 and 1851.
77
  As for 
Wyandotte, its population doubled twice in the years between 1856 and 1860.
78
  Much of this 
growth was fuelled by Irish immigration to both cities and by African American migration to 
Wyandotte from both Missouri and the South.
79
  In contrast to cities like Detroit and Chicago, 
where large-scale black migration to urban neighborhoods only came about during the Great 
Migration of the first half of the twentieth century, such demographic changes were already 
underway over half a century earlier in what would become KCK. This migration coincided with 
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the wave of European immigration of the 1840s and 1850s from countries such as Ireland and 
Germany. 
Once the war was underway, bounty hunters trying to capture slaves became less brazen 
in Wyandotte County as the area around KCMO became a battlefield. What would become KCK 
thus escaped the war relatively unscathed. The closest the war came to threatening the area was 
the Battle of Westport later in October 1864, but Union victory there turned back Confederate 
advances towards the area.
80
  Quindaro, however, was another story. It had been in decline as a 
competing urban center in Wyandotte county after the city of Wyandotte became the county 
seat.
81
   This was despite the fact that Quindaro’s population had been growing along with 
Wyandotte’s and KCMO’s in the 1850s, becoming nearly as large as Wyandotte by 1859.82  The 
war proved its undoing, but Quindaro ironically did not meet this fate at the hands of the 
Confederate Army or border ruffians; it was instead the Second Kansas Cavalry under Col. A.C. 
Davis that destroyed rows of houses for firewood after evacuating the population to Wyandotte 
in order to protect it against Missouri raiders.
83
  By 1862, Quindaro lost its town charter, which 
was revoked by the state assembly in Topeka.
84
  Quindaro’s loss benefitted Wyandotte, as former 
black residents were relocated there. The African-American population in Wyandotte grew 
steadily during the war: in addition to the ex-residents of Quindaro evacuated there, a wave of 
escaped slaves from Missouri poured into Wyandotte between 1863 and the end of the war.
85
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The first thing many former slave men did once they got to Kansas was to enlist in the Union 
Army.
86
  Contemporaries described this development as “an exodus.”87  That turn of phrase 
would reappear in both the city and the State of Kansas’s assessment of an even larger 
emigration after the war, in the late 1870s and early 1880s. By 1870, the Black population in 
Wyandotte County had increased to seventy times the number it had been just ten years earlier.
88
   
Initially, the official policy was that African-American men were not eligible for Union 
Army service, in Kansas or nationally.
89
  The decision by the Lincoln administration to exclude 
black men from the Union Army was no doubt politically motivated: as noted above, even 
antislavery and Republican politics had a strong “free soil” contingent that was deeply racist and 
hostile to African Americans. Additionally, as we will see with KCMO, Missouri and a few other 
slave states chose to remain in the Union. To argue against this policy and urge risking free soil 
and border state ire, abolitionists and blacks argued that former slaves had the deepest stake in 
the outcome of the war, that martial combat against the Confederacy would prove a worthy basis 
for citizenship, and that the additional manpower of black soldiers would support and relieve 
overburdened white Union soldiers.  It would not be until the Emancipation Proclamation of 
January 1863 that the Union Army would officially admit black soldiers, in Kansas, or 
elsewhere.  Once the Union started openly recruiting blacks, black enlistees in Wyandotte 
outnumbered their white counterparts by 483 to 477.
90
  
Unofficially, however, there had been an irregular use of escaped slaves and free blacks 
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somewhat earlier. General James Lane of Kansas was among the first to recruit and mobilize 
“Colored Regiments” as early as 1862, with a total of 206 recruits to the First Colored Regiment 
of Kansas in Wyandotte by the fall of that year.
91
  A number of the recruits were residents of 
Wyandotte and ex-residents of Quindaro, but the bulk were escaped slaves from Missouri.  
Kansas eventually sent four African-American brigades in total to fight the Confederacy, with 
Lane’s First Colored Regiment sent to Rolla, Missouri, to fight the Battle of Prairie Grove.  
Subsequently, the First would fight Confederate forces in Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, and 
Mississippi before disbanding in July 1865.  They paid a heavy price: of the 206 original 
enlistees, only 52 survived.  At the war’s end, military service had definitely left its mark on 
KCK’s African American community: the most common occupation listed for black men in the 
1865 census in Wyandotte was that of “soldier.”92  
KCMO, by contrast, was in greater danger of invasion by the Confederate Army and, 
consequently, was significantly disrupted by the outbreak of the war. To make matters worse, 
KCMO was much closer to the Battle of Westport than Wyandotte, and the Confederate Army 
under General Price occupied the land just east of Independence, Missouri, effectively flanking 
the city to its south and east.
93
  Although a slave state, Missouri had officially chosen to remain 
in the Union, like Kentucky, West Virginia, and Maryland. The loyalties of its population, 
however, were sharply divided between the Union and Confederacy; in KCMO, already divided 
over slavery itself, this was an understatement.
94
  There had been a special municipal election in 
1861 over the secession issue in which the Unionists prevailed, but the Mayor of KCMO had 
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been forced to call in the Union Army from Fort Leavenworth after Confederate sympathizers 
raised the Confederate flag over an intersection in the city.
95
  The Union Army occupied the city 
for the remainder of the war. The city was effectively cut off from the outside by warring 
abolitionist and pro-slavery guerilla armies throughout the war.
96
  The effect on commerce was 
devastating: businesses closed, gold and silver disappeared from circulation and large firms 
relocated to New York (the banking company Northrup and Chick) or Fort Leavenworth (the 
shipping firm Tussell Majors and Waddell).
97
   
In an effort to stop “bushwhacking” pro-Confederate raiding into Kansas, the Union 
Army confined several female relatives of the guerilla raiders to a building on Grand Avenue.
98
   
Unfortunately, that building collapsed in August 1862, killing four of the women held there.  
Partially in retaliation, Quantrill led his infamous raid into Lawrence.  Days after Quantrill’s raid, 
Union Brigadier General Thomas Ewing issued General Order No. 11, which decreed that all 
residents of Jackson, Cass, Bates, and northern Vernon counties were ordered to leave their rural 
homes within fifteen days unless they lived within a mile of KCMO, Independence, or three 
military posts.  In addition to that command, Order Number 11 also authorized the expulsion of 
those residents who did not demonstrate their loyalty to the Union cause from the area.  The 
results of the order were the loss of two-thirds of the populations of the effected counties and 
scores of homes and farms burnt to the ground.  By 1863, the situation in KCMO was quite 
tense: visitors noted that “everyone carried arms and slept with revolvers under their pillows.”  
The Coates’s daughter, Laura, later recalled indiscriminate shooting on the outskirts of town in 
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1863-64 that resulted in a bullet striking the family bedroom on one occasion.
99
  By the end of 
the war, KCMO was briefly threatened with eclipse by St. Joseph or Leavenworth, Kansas as the 
urban center of the region as its trade on the Missouri River had been ruined by the war and 
never completely recovered.
100
  
The railroad’s eclipse of river trade and travel both locally and nationally allowed KCMO 
to escape such a fate and it proved very fortunate that prewar plans of a rail line through KCMO 
and Wyandotte were revived during the war. Those plans received an added boost from St. Louis 
business and rail interests lobbying heavily for that very routing and it was written into law in the 
form of the 1862 Pacific Railroad Act.
101
  Additionally, Chicago business leaders who had toyed 
with the idea of a main rail link to Kansas via St. Joseph and Hannibal abandoned it in favor of a 
direct routing to California via Iowa and Nebraska, which they and New York business interests 
deemed more direct than diversion into Kansas via Atchison or Leavenworth.
102
  Despite that 
change, Coates kept lines of communications open to Chicago business interests and lobbied 
hard for the St. Joseph and Hannibal Railroad to build a branch from Cameron, Missouri that 
would cross the Missouri river at KCMO.   They had approached eastern businessmen during the 
war, but failed to interest them.  It was the fortuitous accident of focusing on a rising executive at 
the Boston firm who controlled the Burlington Rail Company in Chicago named James Joy that 
turned the situation around within a year.  Joy was a manager of the St. Joseph and Hannibal who 
had a great appetite for real estate: Coates and the other Kansas City investors gave him land and 
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financial control over the “Cameron to KCMO branch” rail proposal.103  Joy lobbied Congress 
hard for Coates’ bridge and additionally got Congress to agree to build a rail link to the 
Galveston, Lawrence, and Leavenworth rail line to Olathe from Ottawa.
104
  With the completion 
of the Missouri River Bridge in 1869 that had been a dream of Kersey Coates’ for over a decade, 
KCMO became positioned to become the urban center of the region and the seeds for the rise of 
a Greater Kansas City metropolitan area were in place.
105
  The Olathe link additionally redirected 
Texas rail traffic into what would become KCK— at the expense of both Leavenworth and 
Lawrence; the two towns had evidently been too busy fighting each other over a railroad bridge 
to notice.
106
  
Instead of the eclipse by Leavenworth, Atchison, or St. Joseph feared by KCMO civic 
leaders at the end of the Civil War, KCMO experienced a rapid rise as an urban center in the late 
1860s, one that would expand greatly in subsequent decades.
107
  This growth in such a relatively 
short period of time is usually attributed to single-minded ambition on the part of KCMO 
boosters and to its competitors' mistakes.  While there is truth to both of these assertions, again, 
the decisions of St. Louis business and rail interests to push for a routing through KCMO and 
Wyandotte rather than to Leavenworth was a crucial factor which was largely outside the control 
of any of the cities in the region.
108
  The backroom dealing of Coates and Joy was, if anything, 
even less controllable by such competitors.  
The establishment of KCMO and neighboring Wyandotte as urban and rail hub would 
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attract, as with other cities in the United States in the latter half of the nineteenth century, a large 
wave of immigrants from Europe to fill jobs as rail and industrial workers. In addition to this 
nationwide development in the late nineteenth century, trends of black migration to both of these 
cities from rural Missouri and the Deep South would continue, and vastly accelerate during the 
1879-81 “Exoduster” wave.109  European immigration and black migration to both cities 
reinforced both Kansas Cities’ urbanization and industrialization, while the railroad and the 
capital investment it attracted to both cities encouraged the growth of KCK on the Kansas side 
and ultimately, the reality of KCK and KCMO as a semi-unified metropolitan area. By 1880, 
seventeen percent of KCMO’s population was foreign born and fifteen percent was black.110  In 
1870, twenty-four percent of KCMO’s population had been foreign born; the decline in 
percentage reflected the massive growth of the city in those ten years and the effect of the 
Exoduster migration.
111
  The city’s population jumped from 32, 260 in 1870 to 163, 752 with the 
greatest increase of black population occurring in the census year 1880 and the greatest in 
immigrant population occurring in 1890.  Strikingly, KCMO’s black population increased by 
sixty-eight percent in the 1880s while Jackson County as a whole had a forty percent decline in 
its black population; over the next three decades the city’s black population tripled while the 
state of Missouri’s black population only grew by eight percent.112  
The stockyards and packinghouses that developed along the state line after 1870 attracted 
freedmen in postwar Missouri who were unable to find work in surrounding towns such as 
Lexington and Chillicothe and who chose, after slavery ended, to leave agricultural and rural 
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lives for cities and towns.
113
  This was the case before the Exoduster migration from southern 
states, a decade later. The first of these massive packinghouse plants was built along the Missouri 
River’s west bottoms in 1870 by the Plankinton and Armour firm.114  Job choices were sharply 
limited in a climate consisting of small towns in which more African-American job hunters 
existed than jobs and in which Missouri’s former status as a slave state meant considerable white 
racial prejudice in large cities such as KCMO.
115
  The meatpacking industry was an exception in 
that it welcomed black workers, although it limited the types of jobs for which African-
Americans were eligible.
116
   
As historian Sherry Lamb Schirmer has noted, in KCMO “relations between black and 
white Kansas Citians in the latter nineteenth century were shaped in part by Missouri law.”117 
Missouri abolished slavery in 1865 at the war’s end and the Republican postwar state 
government extended most civil rights to blacks except the right to vote or hold public office.
118
  
In response to the legislature’s failure to extend the franchise, African American activists in 
Missouri formed the Missouri Equal Rights League to press for voting rights.  Given how limited 
early postwar civil rights were in the state, it is not surprising that employment in the private 
sector was so racially discriminatory in nature. However, Missouri never enacted the infamous 
“black codes” so crushing to black liberty that characterized the states of the former Confederacy 
before Radical Reconstruction.
119
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Here, it is instructive to compare the two states’s prevailing racial policies. In comparing 
what historian James N. Leiker called Kansas’ “libertarian” patterns of historical racism and 
segregation to Missouri’s record, one sees similarities and differences. Both the Kansas Territory 
before the war and postwar Missouri had attempted to constitutionally deny black voting rights; 
both could be described as having what Leiker characterized as Kansas’s “tension between 
commitment to blacks’ legal freedom and a hesitance to embrace the full realization of that 
freedom through the extension of political and social equality.”120  But Kansas had failed to 
insert the denial of political and civil rights for blacks into its state constitution, while, as we 
shall see, the Missouri government managed to deny voting rights to African-Americans for 
several years despite strong protests from the black community.
121
  Ironically, precisely because 
of the Confederate defeat and the end of slavery that was its outcome, Missouri’s postwar 
government actually took a more active role in promoting civil rights during Reconstruction. 
However, Missouri definitely fit a more “southern” pattern in its outlawing of interracial 
marriage between whites and blacks or those with one-fourth black ancestry in 1869.
122
  Once 
Reconstruction ended nationally, Missouri revised this statute to ban all marriage between whites 
and those of one-eighth black ancestry; this remained state law until the 1967 Loving v. Virginia 
Supreme Court decision.  In contrast, Kansas lacked such a statute. As we shall see, the 
segregation of schools happened quite a bit later in KCK than in KCMO, and was enacted by the 
state in KCMO but by the city in KCK.
123
  
Both Kansas Cities (KCK emerged as a city after 1886) did develop a cadre of educated 
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black leaders as early as the 1870s, but such men and women were far from typical of the 
majority of black men and women who moved to both KCMO and KCK between 1865 and 
1875.
124
  Many came from Kentucky and Tennessee after the end of slavery in those states.
125
  
This group of migrants numbered in the thousands and was distinct from the Exodusters who 
came after them, but would inspire the latter group by setting up colonies in Northwestern and 
Southeastern Kansas.
126
  Most late nineteenth century African-Americans in KCMO worked as 
day laborers, domestics, or teamsters.
127
  Most late nineteenth century blacks in KCMO lived 
with a racism driven by custom rather than legal statutes enacted by either the state or the city, 
with the exceptions of state laws against intermarriage and—after 1889—the state prohibition 
against teaching children of different races in the same schools.
128
  In addition to hiring 
discrimination, theaters and hotels continued to segregate or exclude black patrons despite the 
1875 Missouri civil rights law passed during Missouri’s Reconstruction; most whites expected 
the law to change nothing in terms of “the place” of blacks in society.129  Police brutality and 
harassment were also rampant, becoming so bad that black residents and activists formed a 
Protective League in 1882.
130
  Adequate housing was also hard to come by, but ironically not 
because of residential race segregation.
131
  Residential segregation by race was virtually 
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unknown in late-nineteenth century KCMO.
132
  The 1870 census of the city listed many 
boardinghouses and bordellos as including both black and white residents and areas of the city 
that were strongly black in the 1880s also housed significant numbers of whites.
133
  Furthermore, 
no evidence has been found of white neighbors in these neighborhoods being particularly hostile 
to blacks before 1900.
134
  That fact should not be read as assertion or evidence of any belief in 
racial equality on the part of the city’s whites. The more typical attitude of whites towards blacks 
in KCMO was a paternalistic kind of racism that mocked them as childish and, more often than 
not, chose to ignore blacks and their political needs, as voiced by the newspaper The Kansas City 
Times.
135
  For example, the Times opined that more rigid segregation was unnecessary because 
“the colored people evidently know their place and are possessed of too much common sense to 
attempt to force themselves on the white people.”136  A black woman who was charged with the 
misdemeanor of assaulting her fiancé four years earlier was made the clownish punchline of the 
paper’s observation that she “loved, and loved too well.”137  
As frustrating as rampant race discrimination was and as terrible as police abuses were in 
KCMO, those migrants known as “The Exodusters” who came to the area between 1879 and 
early 1880 were fleeing the worst conditions of agropeonage and racial oppression (often terror) 
that emerged in states like Louisiana, Texas, and Mississippi after the end of Reconstruction in 
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the South.
138
  Fears of disenfranchisement by the new Democratic governments and actual 
assassinations and race-based violence by so-called “bulldozer” white Democrats in Louisiana 
and Mississippi in 1878 drove the migration; that migration was often accompanied with 
millenarian hopes that Kansas was a promised land.
139
  Benjamin “Pap” Singleton, born into 
slavery in Nashville, had been encouraging migration of African Americans to Cherokee County 
Kansas since 1876 and he took credit for inspiring the Exodus.
140
  Those from Mississippi and 
Louisiana traveled up the Mississippi River to St. Louis and then on to Kansas via the Missouri 
River.
141
  Knowing that Missouri had been a slave state, most of these migrants wanted to get to 
Wyandotte and not stop anywhere else west of St. Louis, including KCMO. 
142
 However, some 
landed in the city anyway because they had no other choice; one historian estimated that as many 
as a third of some fifteen to twenty-thousand migrants may have been stranded in either KCMO 
or Wyandotte after their travels funds were used up.
143
  Often, they had hoped to reach all-black 
communities such as Nicodemus in northwestern Kansas or Benjamin “Pap” Singleton’s towns 
in Southeast Kansas.
144
  The first large numbers reached the two cities along the state line in 
March 1879.
145
  
KCMO’s reaction was varied: newspapers such as The Kansas City Times were 
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downright hateful and even threatening to the Exodusters, calling them “rubbish” and “paupers 
and thieves” who carried diseases that Wyandotte should “garrison the town against.”146   Among 
ordinary residents, however, whites as well as blacks contributed food, clothes, and money to 
help these emigrants on their journey.
147
  However, that did not mean they welcomed them to 
stay. When Wyandotte stopped accepting further refugees, the captain of a ship carrying 
Exodusters instead dropped two hundred and forty passengers off at the Plankinton and Armour 
packing plant in KCMO to loud protests from city officials.
148
  Authorities had to temporarily 
accept them due to lack of a city ordinance dealing with the mass migration, but arranged them 
to be shipped off to Manhattan, Kansas as soon as funds were available.
149
  Officially, civic 
leaders in both cities coordinated a plan to deal with the sudden influx that combined relief with 
plans to eventually disperse the large number of migrants across the state of Kansas.
150
  KCMO’s 
Mayor George M. Shelley pleaded with the Secretary of War to allow use of a portion of Fort 
Leavenworth for the refugees and was refused; Secretary George McCrary told him he had to 
consult Congress.
151
  Reverend B.F. Watson of the Allen Chapel African Methodist Episcopal 
Church was the key figure in KCMO’s black community in aiding the migrants and assimilating 
them into the city’s African-American community.152  Those Exodusters who were stranded in 
KCMO settled in several areas around the city: along the Missouri River in the East Bottoms, 
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along the West Bottoms, and on the southern edge of the city.
153
  
In Wyandotte, in March 1879, newspapers appealed to the American public directly for 
financial and material donations to help the overwhelming number of refugees.
154
  Again, 
Corvine Patterson and other local prominent blacks such as Henry Reed pressured and pled with 
Wyandotte municipal leaders to allow the migrants to remain and managed to convince some 
powerful whites such as the Northrup banking family to support allowing the refugees to remain 
in the city.
155
  Like in KCMO, many of the refugees who stayed in Wyandotte settled along the 
river bottom and formed small communities such as Juniper Town and Mississippi Town that 
later yielded a permanent black settlement along the Kansas River.  Rattlebone Hollow, north of 
present-day KCK and Hogg’s Town, on the western edge of the city, grew from origins as 
Exoduster squatter settlements as well.
156
  
However, given that Wyandotte had much larger arrivals of Exodusters than KCMO and 
was quite a bit smaller in population, such generosity was severely tested fairly rapidly.
157
  Older 
African American residents as well as whites became opposed to further migration to their city 
from Mississippi and Louisiana.  Local blacks, according to a newspaper editor, did “not want 
anything to do with them [the Exodusters]” and the two groups almost never associated in 
1880.
158
  Locals and business leaders reacted negatively to the refugees taking relief without 
agreeing to work, which violated cherished cultural mores surrounding the Protestant work ethic.   
The Mayor of Wyandotte , J.S. Stockton, appealed for calm and continued generosity 
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towards those already there but decided to put a freeze on further migration to Wyandotte in 
April of 1879.
159
  By late April, there was ominous talk of vigilante action against further 
migrants.
160
  To avert this, Stockton had arranged for the steamboats carrying refugees rerouted 
upriver to Atchison and Leavenworth, paying their way.
161
  Stockton and other Wyandotte 
officials telegraphed St. Louis relief officials that Wyandotte had reached its limit for refugees 
and that Topeka was a much better choice for Exoduster settlement among cities in Eastern 
Kansas.
162
  Wyandotte also paid a dollar a head to ship large numbers off to Ellis, Kansas.
163
  
Thus whites as well as blacks in both KCMO and Wyandotte displayed a strange mixture of a 
genuine sense of charity towards the refugees combined with a fear and disgust directed against 
them for being poor and sick. The impulse to help the refugees tended to be the initial reaction 
initial reaction in both cities, although KCMO exhibited hostile attitudes from the beginning.
164
  
The Exodus of blacks from Mississippi, Texas, and Louisiana to Kansas lasted about a year and a 
half, with at least forty thousand blacks making the journey to Kansas before being halted by the 
pressure exerted on transit companies by both southern planters and state governments.
165
  
Even given how intense local resentments surrounding the Exodus was in both cities, 
once it had ended, those who remained in KCK and KCMO were absorbed quite rapidly into the 
respective black communities between 1880 and 1900.
166
  Nor did the Exodus prompt the kind of 
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rigid residential race segregation seen in twentieth-century cities.
167
  In the case of KCMO, one 
of the 1880 Exoduster settlements in the West Bottoms called Hell’s Half Acre consisted of two-
thirds Missouri born blacks by the turn of the century.
168
  Moreover, this area was a mixture of 
black and white households with a third of its white population being Irish or German.
169
  
Located near the stockyards, warehouses, and packinghouses, its cheap housing lacked proper 
sanitation and clean water and was notorious for prostitution and city toughs who hung around 
the train depot and saloons in the area.  Hell’s Half Acre had a high turnover of Black, Irish, and 
German families who moved out of these miserable conditions as soon as they could.  
Interestingly enough, even this tough neighborhood was not segregated by social class either: 
mingled in with the poorest black and white industrial proletariat were at least a fifth of whites 
who were small business owners or white-collar workers.
170
   
In KCK, the Exodus had the effect of more than doubling the black population. In the 
same year, KCK was flooded with German, Swedish, and Irish immigrants who had come to 
seek jobs in the meatpacking industry, many coming from working in Chicago earlier.
171
  An 
excellent example of a former Exoduster enclave in KCK that became a neighborhood with a 
mixture of black and white residents was Rattlebone Hollow.
172
  There, German, Jewish, 
Catholic, and Slavic immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe lived alongside former 
Exodusters and local-born African Americans alike.
173
  Unlike the rough Hell’s Half Acre, 
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Rattlebone Hollow was semi-agricultural rather than industrial and was much more diverse in 
terms of social class.
174
  Income levels ranged from the very poor to the richest citizens of the 
city.
175
  Despite the presence of livestock and its semi-agricultural character, it had streetcar 
service in the 1880s.  
At the close of the nineteenth century, both cities were growing rapidly.  Both cities had 
streetcars by 1885 and KCMO had its first skyscraper, the New York Life Building, by 1890. 
KCK as a city rather than a combination of smaller towns such as Wyandotte and Armourdale 
was less than a decade and a half old. Both cities had come through the turbulence of civil war 
and border violence and against unlikely odds, rose to regional metropolitan status thanks to the 
railroad and African-Americans and European immigrants searching for a better life. Racism 
could be found in each city, but real estate had not yet drawn the color line that already 
permeated custom and in Missouri, was imposed legally on its school system and upon marriage.
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CHAPTER TWO: JIM CROW AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
URBAN CRISIS IN GREATER KANSAS CITY, 1900-1920 
The urban crisis that occurred in KCMO between 1940 and 1968 had seeds extending as 
far back as the first decade of the twentieth century. Residential segregation and racial 
discrimination in both KCMO and KCK at the turn of the twentieth century need to be 
understood as part of a nadir of American race relations, between the 1890s through the 1920s, 
marked by national consensus—among whites—around white supremacy and racism.1  Codified 
as the law of the land by 1896’s Plessy v. Ferguson, “separate but equal” underpinned a new 
white supremacist southern legal order known as Jim Crow that found subtle and not so subtle 
echoes elsewhere. It was a brutal period marked by lynchings and race riots nationwide.  This 
development was bolstered by an academic and intellectual climate that boosted pseudoscience 
around racial groups’ supposed superiority and inferiority, which, in a global context, was used to 
justify Western colonialism and imperialism. In the US, this same racist ideology not only 
justified the recent American empire-building after the Spanish-American War and the complete 
conquest of Native American lands before 1890—but also served purposes of healing sectional 
division from the Civil War at the expense of blacks.
2
   
At the same time, America went through a great metamorphosis from proprietary-based 
capitalism to a new industrialized corporate capitalism that prompted “a search for order” in the 
form of middle-class reform movements aimed at regulating corporate power and reordering the 
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new urban space.
3
  Additionally, what was then called “the labor question” simultaneously 
occupied national attention, with frequent violent clashes between strikers and employers’ hired 
muscle over the right to unionize and workers’ living conditions. For African Americans, the fall 
of the more inclusive and multiracial Knights of Labor and the rise of Samuel Gompers’ 
American Federation of Labor as the dominant labor organization encouraged their exclusion 
from the labor movement, as the AFL was openly racist. It would not be until the late 1920s 
appearance of A. Philip Randolph, the great African-American socialist and sleepingcar porter 
labor leader, and the 1935 formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations that this 
situation would begin to change.  
The Great Migration, beginning just before US entry into World War I and lasting until 
1970, was a mass migration of the nation’s black population away from the rural South to urban 
centers in the Northeast, Midwest, and West Coast. The Great Migration was driven by 
continuing severe racial oppression and terror directed against rural southern blacks, capital’s 
need for sufficient industrial labor once the war—and later, immigration restriction by 
Congress—interrupted the flow of European immigration, and the devastation of cotton growing 
by the boll weevil insect infestation in the 1910s and 1920s that led to the collapse of cotton 
prices by the late 1920s.
4
  Unfortunately for the newly arrived black residents of major cities, 
their arrival in northern and western cities occurred at the same time as the emergence of racist 
real estate practices nationwide. Over time, in US major cities, real estate judgments of property 
                                                 
3
 Robert H. Wiebe, The Search For Order, 1877-1920: The Making of America (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967),  
81-82, 111; Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The Market, 
The Law, and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 14-20; Martin J. Sklar, The US as a 
Developing Country: Studies in U.S. History in the Progressive Era and the 1920s (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 68-69. 
4
 David M. P. Freund, Colored Property: State Policy and White Racial Politics in Suburban America (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007), 14, 94; Gotham, 33-40. 
 54 
 
values being tied to “ethnic character” of neighborhoods would combine with overcrowding in 
segregated black sections of towns to contribute to what historians term the “Urban Crisis,” 
which would not be noticed by whites, the government, or the American press  until the mid-to-
late 1960s urban rebellions that included Kansas City, Missouri by 1968.
5
  The Urban League, 
however, had been warning of housing crises for blacks in KCMO as far back as 1940.
6
  
Nonetheless, it is in this time period, from 1900 to 1920, that the proverbial seeds were planted 
that would germinate fully in the Kansas City, Missouri Urban Crisis in the decades between the 
Second World War and 1968. One of the key characteristics of the urban crisis in every city was 
massive residential segregation by race; this time period was critical as the starting point for the 
development of the pattern of black inner-city poverty, hypersegregation, and isolation 
surrounded by predominantly white middle-class suburbs. 
As has been seen, both KCK and KCMO in the late nineteenth centuries had heavily 
African American neighborhoods that nonetheless also included a significant number of white 
residents, both native-born and immigrant.
7
   The only parallel in either city’s history to the kind 
of residential race segregation that would soon mark Greater Kansas City and all other American 
major cities in the early decades of the twentieth century was found in the antebellum 
segregation of KCMO’s free blacks and Irish into a slum called “East Kansas”. 8 Even here, 
however, one did not see a sharply drawn color line between “white” Irish and African-
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Americans in the manner that the real estate industry would adopt in the early twentieth century. 
Racial discrimination and the struggles against it were nothing new: what was new was the racial 
segregation of urban space. This chapter will tell the story of how, within the space of four 
decades, KCMO changed from a place in which racial segregation and discrimination had been 
mostly by custom into what by 1923 future NAACP president Roy Wilkins termed “a Jim Crow 
Town right down to its bootstraps” which segregated everything except streetcars.9  He added 
that the city “was as thoroughly segregated as anything in Memphis” and “might as well have 
been Gulfport, Mississippi” in its racial attitudes. 10 Subsequent Urban League studies concurred 
with this assessment, nicknaming KCMO the “Northern City with a Southern Exposure.” 11 
In the case of KCMO, according to historian Sherry Lamb Schirmer, the city’s pattern of 
racial discrimination extended precisely from the middle-class “ordering” impulses that Robert 
Wiebe identified that would exacerbate the developing pattern of urban racial segregation of 
neighborhoods in the early twentieth century. Schirmer noted that the early twentieth century in 
KCMO witnessed a fusion of “concerns about social status and urban space” among the city’s 
white middle-class and elites that would shape the way the city’s middle-class whites would 
respond to race and to the city’s black population.12  At first, this emerging ideology of status and 
urban space was rooted in developments and realities that had very little to do with race. Rather, 
it was a byproduct instead of local class formation and growing upper-class consciousness of its 
own social class. The anxiety around urban space was rooted in the origins of the city in the 
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1830s, when it was notorious for being an ugly, dirty, and small settlement. Even when the city 
grew after the Civil War from migration and immigration, industrialization, and the railroads, its 
elites lacked pretensions and protocols that marked established eastern cities’ “high society;” 
anyone who possessed “absolute respectability” and “full allegiance to the town’s welfare” was 
welcomed.
13
  Within a decade, that situation changed completely, and Sarah Coates, prominent 
KCMO clubwoman and spouse of antislavery city booster Kersey Coates, began to complain 
about her fellow upper-class citizens’ growing snobbery and focus on entertainment. The city’s 
famous urban improvement efforts between the 1880s and 1920s known as “the city beautiful 
movement” did much to spread an ideology of class status tied directly to the hygienic 
maintenance of urban space in KCMO.
14
  
In the 1880s, KCMO’s elite began to distance themselves from the rest of the city’s 
citizenry.
15
  They began to hold more selective and exclusive gatherings ironically referred to as 
“open houses” that made the newspapers for their elegance and extravagance.16  These included 
the city’s first major country clubs.  In order to maintain their status and separation from the 
social classes below them, KCMO’s upper class had to move several times as the city grew and 
as factories, working-class, poor, and middle-class residents began encroaching on the older 
upper-crust neighborhoods. In the same decade that saw the maturation of the city’s upper class, 
a real estate boom occurred as speculators moved to capitalize on a phenomenal two-hundred 
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and forty percent growth the city enjoyed in the 1880s.
17
  Both the possibility of further 
encroachment on well-to-do neighborhoods from population growth and the remaining ugliness 
of the city despite its growth upset the city’s rich greatly.  As late as 1880, none of the city’s 
streets were paved, and fewer than a third of homes were connected to the city’s sewer system. 
Those who developed the elite Hyde Park and Kenwood neighborhoods in 1886 adopted control 
measures such as deed restrictions that required high-quality home construction.
18
  One of the 
developers, George Kessler, went on to propose a park and boulevard system of urban 
beautification by 1893.
19
  One of Kessler’s models for KCMO’s beautification was the famous 
“White City” exhibit at the 1893 World’s Fair in Chicago.20  By the close of the century, the 
city’s elite had established social and physical distance between themselves and the rest of the 
city.
21
  The beautiful parks, winding boulevards, and civic monuments in KCMO are a legacy of 
the upper-class drive for both separation from other social classes and urban cleanliness. 
KCMO’s middle class reacted to this development in two ways. First, it embraced the 
upper-class fixation on cleanliness and urban spaces, adopting it as their own.
22
  And secondly, 
the realization that they had not insulated themselves from the lower classes or urban vice such 
as prostitution increased their anxiety by highlighting the precariousness of middle-class identity. 
This middle-class anxiety outlined the contours of local politics for the decades between the 
1890s and 1910s: from the Pendergast machine to clean government reformers and from wealthy 
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manufacturers like William Volker to democratic-socialist lawyer Frank P. Walsh, the focus was 
on combatting city vice. Especially in the face of the wave of moral panic over “white slavery” 
that characterized the early teens, this issue was moved to the forefront.
23
  Racial prejudice that 
already existed among the city’s whites would be folded into this emerging white middle-class 
milieu of anxiety over being exposed to poorer social classes and urban vice over the first two 
decades of the twentieth century. Given that the “white slavery” discourse around the stories of 
native-born white Protestant girls being forced into prostitution was itself deeply racist and 
xenophobic (Jews, Catholics, and Chinese immigrants were most often accused of this), it 
probably contributed to white middle-class perceptions of vice becoming racist.
24
  
These anxieties played out in a fiercely partisan political climate that would witness the 
rise of one of the major urban Democratic machines of the era: that of Jim and Tom Pendergast.  
From 1892 until 1911, Jim Pendergast had controlled the West Bottoms as the Democratic First 
Ward, allowing him to “guide” a full half of the votes cast in the city in later years.25  Such 
political dominance was far from preordained: in 1894, he was one of only two Democrats who 
survived a municipal Republican sweep, despite the fact that the Republican alliance with a 
militant nativist organization known as the American Protective Association drove German 
immigrant voters away from the Republicans.
26
  While his party suffered from deep divisions 
between 1894 and 1900, Jim Pendergast continued to rack up majorities in his ward that stunned 
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contemporaries.
27
  Republicans accused him of receiving fraudulent votes from Kansans who 
crossed the state line, along with voter intimidation and stuffing ballots, accusations quite 
common in this era.  Pendergast denied these allegations and dismissed the common reformer’s 
condemnation of the spoils system in which he rewarded his friends and supporters with 
municipal positions.  Jim, however, claimed a code of ethics so strong that he boasted of “never 
having taken a cent in exchange for political favor.”28  After Jim’s death in 1911, Tom Pendergast 
took over the First Ward and his brother’s rivalry with Democratic ward boss Joseph Shannon.29  
Tom Pendergast would be the figure in the 1930s who would elevate the Pendergast machine to 
control of KCMO, rendering it “Tom’s Town,” owing considerably to his considerable political 
skills. He would expand his working-class Irish coalition into an unlikely large alliance of Irish, 
Italian, African American, and some of the very middle-class native-born white voters most 
uneasy with “commercialized vice.”30  
At first, the response to growing middle-class pressure to act against urban vices yielded 
a policy of containment.
31
  In 1908, Missouri had elected a clean government and reform-minded 
Republican named Herbert Hadley as governor, who proceeded to appoint a like-minded attorney 
named Thomas Marks from KCMO to head the city’s Board of Police Commissioners. As 
commissioner, Marks likened vice and prostitution to “measles,” which could not be eradicated 
entirely but whose spread could be checked by quarantine.
32
  Accordingly, the city’s policing 
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aimed to keep its urban vices in a red-light district on the city’s North End and away from both 
the affluent and the middle-classes.
33
  To do so, they would discreetly collect fines from brothels 
of thirty dollars per month—with an additional fee of twenty extra dollars if the brothel served 
liquor—in exchange for the owner’s promise to run an “orderly” brothel and to keep such 
activities in the city’s North End. Unfortunately for the city’s African-American community, the 
North End happened to have a significant black population, whose living standards worsened in 
the 1910s. This policy continued for three years.  African-Americans were not the only group 
living in the North End; Jewish and Italian Americans also lived in sections of the neighborhood. 
In addition to prejudice against all three groups, the decision of the Marks strategy to contain 
vice in the North End reflected the previous flight of the wealthy, commercial interests, and the 
middle class from the North End over the years.  
In pushing urban vice into an area that included a predominantly black neighborhood, the 
Marks policy served to begin the process of racializing white middle-class perceptions of urban 
vice. Italians and Jews who lived in the North End area were also, as was the case nationally in 
the early 1900s, viewed as “nonwhite” groups by both white elites and older, more established 
European ethnics.
34
  Therefore, the “othering” of certain urban spaces in the minds of middle-
class whites was not affected by the presence of non-black groups. As Kevin Fox Gotham noted, 
this development was in contrast to the late nineteenth century, during which KCMO’s residents 
not only failed to link urban vice to blacks specifically, but also did not make “a connection 
between black ‘culture’ and a particular ‘place’ occupied exclusively by blacks.”35  This was 
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because, again, most of the city’s black families had lived on streets with whites, albeit of 
different social classes.
36
   
The Marks’ strategy had the benefit from the point of view of the city’s politicians of 
transcending divides between reformers and the Pendergast machine, as the city’s Democratic 
machine also pledged to keep vice out of middle-class neighborhoods and wards that voted 
Democratic.
37
  In fact, from the machine’s point of view, this Republican good government 
containment plan was truly ideal: the machine could both court middle-class voters in 
Democratic wards by keeping vice away from them while continuing to receive political 
donations and funding from owners of brothels and saloons.
38
  So too, in its own way, did the 
Pendergast machine advance KCMO’s upper and middle-class agendas of managing and 
cleaning up “selected urban spaces.”39  
However, consensus around containing vice soon unraveled. KCMO’s clubwomen and 
clergy were horrified by a New York social worker’s conclusion that the Marks police force 
strategy had essentially licensed immorality by enacting the fines system and that over four 
hundred white girls worked as sex workers in the city.
40
  The latter finding, of course, fed into 
what was then not only a local but a national scare over “white slavery,” i.e., stories and rumors 
of young white Protestant girls forced into prostitution against their will by racial or religious 
“others.” The Church Federation of Kansas City was especially outraged by the fact that 
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“decent” men and women had to cross the North End to get to the city hall and courthouse.41  In 
addition, they charged that by compromising with vice, the city was guilty of enabling “white 
slavery,” propagating venereal disease, and creating disrespect for law and order by involving the 
police in deals with operators of prostitution rings.  
Instead, from 1911 through 1913, these upper- and middle-class moral guardians 
campaigned for nothing less than the eradication of vice and the destruction of the red-light 
district in the North End as a means to achieve their vision of a city free of vice.
42
  Accordingly, 
the Church Federation organized the Society For the Suppression of Commercialized Vice. The 
position of the KCMO police was not helped by the fact that in September 1913, the moral 
reformers convinced enough voters to reverse a 1905 ordinance that had kept saloons out of 
residential wards.
43
  Facing middle-class outrage, the police shut down the red-light district in a 
series of night time raids that evicted the women from all of the brothels in the North End. 
The result was disastrous. The opposite of the intent of the reformers occurred: 
prostitution spread out of the North End into the northern end of the Paseo, hotels in the central 
business district and became more closely linked to the illicit drug trade than before.
44
  The 
political consequences, too, were the exact opposite of what moral reformers wished to see: the 
North End became solidly Democratic, and aligned with the Joseph Shannon machine Democrats 
at that.
45
   
The Society For the Suppression of Commercialized Vice desperately brought suits to 
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close down the brothels as public nuisances, but the Missouri Supreme Court ruled against the 
notion that a brothel was a public nuisance and threw out the suits.
46
  By the time of the First 
World War, the situation was so out of hand that it caused an outbreak of venereal disease in 
Kansas military encampments.
47
  In 1917, Attorney General Palmer threatened that the military 
would post sentries at Union Station to stop soldiers from going to the city if KCMO neglected 
to enact a city ordinance for mandatory medical inspections and isolation of prostitutes. By 1918, 
the War Department directly intervened, setting up a vice free zone within five miles in each 
direction of an army encampment. The Society, which had five years earlier sought to eradicate 
vice altogether in the city, now merely applauded federal wartime attempts to restore some 
control over it. 
At the same time the World War I-era debacle around vice and venereal disease in KCMO 
unfolded, KCMO’s version of Jim Crow and its complete residential segregation of blacks into 
urban ghettoes fully emerged as a social order.  This development occurred relatively rapidly, 
mainly between 1900 and 1920.
48
 As late as 1900, only a quarter of the population of the Vine 
Street district was black, mixed in with white-collar whites who were ninety percent native born.  
About twelve percent of Vine Street blacks in 1900 were skilled Pullman Porters, while about six 
percent were white-collar workers. 
In addition to the national climate encouraging overt racism and local middle-class 
anxieties over space and status, what changed after 1900 was that the city’s Kesslerian 
beautification projects and its real estate market dynamics began to rearrange black residential 
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patterns in ways that concentrated the African American population of the city.
49
  The 
construction of the parks and Union Station, along with new industrial and commercial districts, 
uprooted former integrated neighborhoods. The West Bottoms integrated neighborhoods were 
particularly hard-hit by the expansion of the new industrial districts in the first decade of the new 
century. The result was an increasing concentration of the city’s black population in the North 
End and the Vine Street area. 
By 1907, the African American press began to note the rise of discriminatory practices 
among white realtors.
50
   These included refusing to sell or rent to blacks in middle-class 
“respectable” neighborhoods, attempting to force out those who lived in majority white 
neighborhoods, and steering black families away from majority white neighborhoods. In 1908, 
Jackson County began enacting racially restrictive covenants.
51
  If any of these tactics failed to 
deter prospective black residents, white vigilantes made death threats and torched or bombed 
black homes.
52
  These changes locally coincided with the 1908 formation of the National 
Association of Real Estate Boards, which disseminated the notion that blacks’ presence in 
neighborhoods destabilized them and led to lower property values in pamphlets, periodicals, and 
textbooks nationwide.
53
  By 1910-11, there had been a total of six black homes bombed on 
Montgall Avenue, which was just east of a predominantly black neighborhood.
54
  All of this 
occurred before the Great Migration began nationally and before KCMO had any set of official 
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studies by sociologists that rationalized such discrimination. At least in the case of KCMO, such 
a study would come two years after the Montgall  bombings. 
This increasing residential segregation complemented the tightening of both customary 
race segregation and state-enforced legal race segregation outside of housing and real estate. As 
early as 1904, the city’s state-mandated school segregation was extended to KCMO’s School 
District teachers’ meetings.55  Before then, even though white and black children went to 
separate schools, black teachers and other faculty had sat on panels presenting scholarly papers 
with their white counterparts and had otherwise socially mingled with them. At the same time, 
owners of meeting halls began to refuse to rent these halls to blacks. By 1907, KCMO’s 
cemeteries owned by whites refused to bury the black dead and white doctors began turning 
away black patients.
56
  Railcar segregation was barely averted at the state level each time it came 
up in 1903, 1907, and 1917, and then only because the Democratic machines in both KCMO and 
St. Louis bucked their party’s national white supremacist stance in favor of courting black voters 
and because the owner of the KCMO streetcar system was opposed to the cost of segregating the 
cars.
57
  In this case, the nascent local civil rights movement represented in the Negro Protective 
League of Kansas City had some unexpected allies, but were fighting an uphill fight against a 
deepening local, state, and national climate of extreme racial oppression and intolerance. Also, 
the lack of segregation in public transportation in the city was more than tempered by the fact 
that black passengers were frequently attacked or insulted by white passengers and drivers 
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alike.
58
  
Party politics at the local and state level also encouraged white middle-class racism: this 
was especially true in the elections of 1906 and 1908.
59
  Before moving on to discuss how this 
was so, some brief background in local party politics before 1906 is necessary. As was common 
nationally, in the late nineteenth-century, the majority of African American voters in KCMO 
were Republicans. As the next chapter documents, there was already a local black protest 
movement against discrimination and unequal law enforcement. When black protest became 
more visible to the city’s native-born whites after the turn of the century, it only increased 
KCMO whites’ racial hostility.  Black protest and resistance against the emerging Jim Crow 
order will be discussed in much more detail in the next chapter. For the purposes of setting the 
context for the 1906 election, it needs to be understood that the tie between African-Americans 
and the Republican Party in the late nineteenth century was often expressed through patronage; 
KCMO was no exception.  However, in KCMO, this long-standing coalition was in trouble as far 
back as 1907, when the staunchly “Square Deal” Republican black paper Rising Son began to 
bitterly condemn local white Republicans, President Roosevelt’s discharge of black soldiers at 
Brownsville, Texas (an act that had also enraged DuBois) and the “lilly-white” movement behind 
William Howard Taft’s 1908 nomination.60  In these cases, when local Republicans became too 
neglectful of black voters’ needs, local activists would threaten to form a third party or withhold 
the black vote.
61
  Lewis Woods, editor of the black newspaper Rising Son and Nelson Crews, one 
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of KCMO’s most prominent African American Republicans and editor of the Kansas City Sun, 
frequently used this tactic.  Incidentally, Woods and Crews despised each other despite their 
common Republicanism and dissatisfaction with the direction of the party.
62
  In any case, their 
threats to leave the party were seldom effective, as the local Republicans would simply lure 
defectors back by promising more patronage, which they rarely kept in full. 
If the Republicans were disappointing to their African-American constituents, the 
Democrats were more divided still.  In the city, they were badly divided between machine and 
clean-government (called “independent” Democrats) wings of the party.63  As noted already, the 
machines of the city, such as the Pendergasts, often moved to take advantage of black 
dissatisfaction with the Republican Party. One of the first black Democratic Party organizations 
was the Negro Central League, formed in 1900, which attracted considerable middle-class black 
support; Dr. William J. Thompkins was one of the first outspoken African-American Democrats 
in the city.
64
  In 1906, there was a bruising primary in which the antiboss “independents” tried to 
take control of the party from the Pendergast and Shannon machines; they were also known as 
“rabbits” while the Pendergast and Shannon machine Democrats were known as “goats.”65  The 
party “independents” used race-baiting tactics against the machine Democrats, and continued to 
do so even after the machine-backed mayoral candidate won.
66
  Thus, African American voters 
who began to vote for the city’s machine Democrats out of frustration with the Republican Party 
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found themselves caught right in the middle of deep divisions within the city’s Democratic Party 
and directly scapegoated by a rival faction of the party. Egged on by rural Democrats in Missouri 
who were openly white supremacist, the “independents” began to attack the Republicans as a 
force for putting KCMO under “Negro domination” in their paper, The Kansas City Post.67   The 
paper singled out Nelson Crews by name as the Republican politician at the center of this 
supposed “scheme” to take over KCMO.68   
These accusations were not only racist but outlandish given the fact that Crews was once 
again fighting with white Republicans over patronage.
69
  To further inflame white racial hatred of 
blacks and thus make these attacks stick, the Post seized on a 1905 “scandal” broken the 
previous year by another KC paper, the Kansas City World.  The scandal involved a city 
workhouse in which a black male guard had beaten a white female inmate with a hose.
70
 The 
local branch of the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), the middle-class moral 
uplift organization, launched an investigation immediately through a committee. The WCTU was 
outraged and shocked to find out that white female inmates sometimes bathed in the presence of 
black guards, that white women and black women were housed in the same cells, and that 
prominent black physician T.C. Unthank was allowed to treat white female prisoners.
71
  The 
WCTU recommended building a separate prison facility for white women prisoners and 
releasing the most well-behaved prisoners in order to alleviate overcrowding. The sole Democrat 
on the committee, an alderman named S.C. Woodson, exploded with rage against the Republican 
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city council.  Woodson unloaded racial invectives against blacks: “negro brutes” who were 
“whip[ping] white women” and the “unnatural” sight of “white women and negresses in the 
same cells” demanded intense racial segregation.72  Above all, he was horrified at any physical 
contact between white women and blacks, violent or intimate, since it raised the possibility of 
sexual relations between the white female inmates and the black male guards.  
By the time of the ensuing 1906 election, the Republican city council had not enacted the 
WCTU-proposed reforms of the workhouse or punished its administrators. This proved the 
perfect opportunity for the “independent” Democrats and the Post to further demagogue along 
racial lines.
73
  The paper and Democrats seized on the workhouse scandal as an example of what 
Republican patronage for blacks entailed and demonized blacks and Republicans ruthlessly. 
They appealed to “the better class of white Republicans” to turn against their party lest “this 
magnificent city” become “the stronghold of negro equality” and thus be “turned over to the 
negroes.”74  This invocation of Southern Democratic anti-Reconstruction discourse was quite 
deliberate on their parts and predated its use nationally by D.W. Griffith in film by nearly a 
decade. Even pro-labor and democratic-socialist Democrats like Frank Walsh spoke out at city 
rallies denouncing “negro atrocities” and the Republican city council.75  Machine Democrats, 
perhaps embarrassed by their primary rivals’ blatant race-baiting, kept relatively silent on the 
topic, as did their candidate, Robert Gregory. Neither the independents’ race-baiting nor 
Gregory’s pet issue, opposition to extending the street railway, saved Gregory from defeat at the 
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hands of the Republicans as part of a sweep in 1906.
76
  
Undeterred by that poor showing, the Post instead continued to fear-monger on the basis 
of race and Republican political ties to blacks and preferred to blame the bosses and their 
machines for the crushing losses to the Republicans. The paper invoked images of lines of 
Crews’ friends lining up for appointments and “white women of the city” seeing “the kinds of 
clerks that will transact their business.”77  Ironically, the Republicans once again broke their 
promises of patronage to black constituents, so the reality could not be further removed from 
such editorial bluster. 
Independent Democrats returned to a race-baiting strategy in 1908, this time succeeding 
politically. They took over the Democratic Party and elected one of their own, Thomas 
Crittenden, as mayor. In fact, the Democrats swept every office in Jackson County in 1908.
78
  
What, then, accounted for such a drastic shift in fortunes in such a short time if they employed 
the same tactic? As it turned out, an unforeseen development that was tailor-made for the race-
baiting independents occurred.  Charles Zueblin, one of the few sociologists of his day who 
openly disagreed with scientific racism, came to speak at a series of lectures in KCMO public 
schools.  He condemned racial prejudice and was quoted as suggesting that racial intermarriage 
would benefit humankind by erasing social division.
79
  Zueblin later denied he had advocated 
marriage between whites and blacks, but the Democrats ran with the issue nonetheless. The Post 
thundered against “negro domination” that “Hadleyism [Hadley was the Republican candidate] 
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and Zueblinism abroad in the land” threatened.80  It accused Republicans of throwing into 
question whether “Missouri [shall] be a white man’s state and a white woman’s home?”81  This 
time, Republicans themselves also attacked Zueblin, and echoed independent Democratic 
demands that the city board of education bar speakers advocating “degrading theories about 
women” or “miscegenation.”82  Hadley himself race-baited the Democrats as good as they did 
him, accusing Democratic gubernatorial opponent William Cowherd of “appointing criminal 
negroes” while KC mayor.83  The only figures in the city who kept silent on race were Jim 
Pendergast and Joe Shannon, who nonetheless supported the Democratic ticket in full. As a 
result, what began as a factional struggle within the KCMO Democratic Party in 1906 led by the 
end of the 1908 election to a bipartisan discourse over race that was highly gendered. After the 
1908 election, the resurgence of machine influence over the Democratic Party reduced the 
amount of Democratic race baiting at the local level, but the damage had been done. Urban space 
and vice anxieties were now given a racial inflection by the rhetoric of the 1906 and 1908 
campaigns, one that was intertwined with notions of “sexual morality.”84  
Finally, the other local factor that influenced KCMO’s tightening of Jim Crow and the 
rise of its own residential segregation even before the Great Migration began was the ties 
between the city’s African American population and the strike-prone labor movement. This 
relationship, as with the city’s Democratic Party, was highly atypical for the times; elsewhere in 
the 1900s and 1910s, blacks and white unionists were often bitter opponents due to AFL racism. 
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The full history of the labor movement in Greater Kansas City and its ties to the African-
American community will be examined more thoroughly in Chapter Four. For now, what is 
critical is the impact of a series of strikes between 1904 and 1918 on both attempts at interracial 
labor solidarity in KCMO and growing white middle-class anxiety, here linking the fear of labor 
and class violence to a “black assertiveness.”85  
Labor unions in KCMO had a mixed record supporting black workers, as they often 
racially excluded African Americans from membership
86
.   However, in some trades such as hod-
carrying in the Buildings Trades, they would support unions in which black workers were the 
majority.
87
  In the first two decades of the twentieth century, African American workers not only 
engaged in strikes but often helped to launch them. Overall, hod carriers in the Building Trade 
unions were much more open to black unionism than was the case for the labor movement 
nationally. 
Examples of interracial labor strikes include the 1904 hack drivers’ strike against transfer 
companies, in which the highest officers of the hack drivers’ local included African Americans.88  
Remarkably for 1904, this strike was fully backed by the Teamsters’ Union. The employers were 
the ones who attempted to incite racial divisions among the workers, by offering to rehire only 
the striking white drivers to settle the strike. White union leadership not only saw through the 
tactic but complained to the Kansas City Star about owners “exiting a dangerous race feeling” 
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against “the negroes [who] are the backbone of the strike.”89  This was the reverse of the usual 
national pattern of management use of racism to break strikes, as they normally undercut racist 
unions by hiring black strikebreakers in the early twentieth century. 
Later in 1904, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters went on strike in KCMO and in eight other 
cities to seek union recognition and better pay.
90
  Here, the packinghouse owners kept their 
plants open with scab labor, which included African Americans from KCMO and elsewhere; in 
some cases, these nonunion workers were deputized as private detectives and issued firearms.
91
  
Given the slave-holding history of Missouri, the tactic of arming black strikebreakers could and 
did inflame white racist feelings among white strikers.
92
  In this respect, the meat cutters’ strike 
would seem to be much more typical for the era in terms of the relationship between labor unions 
and African-Americans.  However, in this case, black workers were actually active on both sides 
of the strike. The meat cutters’ union had been organizing black and Eastern European immigrant 
workers for several years before the strike in order to reduce the available nonunion labor for 
management. Ultimately, the 1904 strike failed due to a destructive local flood rather than any 
racial division among workers.
93
  The immediate results were disastrous for the union: 
Amalgamated Meat Cutters union membership dropped sharply for the next thirteen years, to the 
point that the plants were nearly unorganized after 1904.
94
  However, the number of African-
American workers in the packing plants jumped to nearly twenty-percent of the packingworker 
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labor force by 1917.
95
  Rather than being a force to keep unions out as management had hoped, 
black men and women breathed new life into the local packinghouse labor movement by 
launching a massive wildcat strike in September 1917.
96
  
This time, the interracial group of laborers who launched the strike was comprised of 
women, and nearly half were African American.
97
  Around sixty black and white women canners 
walked off the job at the Cudahy plant demanding a living wage for women. All but sixty of the 
Cudahy plant’s workers were on strike by the end of the day and were calling on other 
packinghouse workers to join them in struggling for an eight-hour day. When the strikers asked 
for the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen’s International unions to help organize 
the strike, black workers in other plants assured them of solidarity with the strike. Having spread 
from women to men, now the interracial strike expanded to include freight handlers and soap 
factory workers. Some five meatpacking plants were shut down, and especially given that it was 
wartime, city elites panicked over the “strike epidemic.”98  The Wilson administration directly 
intervened, sending a mediator by the name of Patrick Gill, just as a general strike in the city was 
being considered. Before it came to that, Gill ended the strike by securing a pledge from 
management to increase pay and rehire all strikers. 
In Chicago, where a similar strike had led to similar federal mediation, KCMO’s 
Amalgamated local sent T. A. McCresh—its organizer—to attend those hearings and so get 
agreements from meatpacking firms headquartered in Chicago that operated in Kansas City.
99
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McCreash noted that KCMO’s packers had substituted lower-paid female workers for males and 
that most of these female workers were black. Instead of demanding exclusion of blacks and 
women as was common in the era of Samuel Gompers’ AFL, McCreash instead asked for the 
federal judge mediating the strike in Chicago to grant equal wages to workers of both sexes and 
races.
100
  In March 1918, Judge Samuel Alschuler agreed to the eight-hour day, time and a 
quarter for overtime, and amazingly for 1918, equal pay for men and women.
101
  However, he 
refused to order the companies to recognize the union, another defeat for Amalgamated.  
A few months afterwards, KCMO had another interracial wildcat strike, this time in the 
laundries and streetcars, that ignited a city-wide general strike.
102
  The city’s commercialized 
laundries had some of the worst working conditions in the city in the 1910s, and although black 
women constituted less than a third of commercial laundresses, the laundries were often an entry 
point for black women into industrial labor since no other industrial employers other than the 
packinghouses and two bag factories would hire black women.
103
  There were several attempts to 
unionize the laundries throughout the decade before World War I, all of them unsuccessful.  
Much of this was due to the Laundry Owner’s Association’s dogged determination to keep the 
laundries as open shop workplaces. On February 14, 1918, around three hundred women walked 
out demanding a union. 
By February 19, 1918, an estimated one thousand workers, men and women as well as 
black and white as with the packinghouse strike, were on the picket lines or throwing stones at 
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scab laundry drivers.
104
  Again, the federal government sent Paul Gill to Kansas City, who was 
joined by the Women’s Trade Union League’s Sarah Green, in order to settle the strike. However, 
the Hotel Muehlebach, the agreed site of the hearings, refused to allow black strikers into the 
building. This display of local Jim Crow ruined any chances of stopping the strike before it grew 
into a general strike, as white strikers refused to testify in segregated hearings.
105
   As a result, 
the general strike that followed ended up “tying up streetcar service, bakeries, restaurants, 
building sites, breweries and buildings with elevator service” during wartime. 106 The 
intervention of the Missouri National Guard wasn’t enough to end the strike either; it lasted six 
days after the Guard’s arrival until union leaders accepted a wage offer from management. If 
KCMO’s working class failed to establish a truly interracial unionism, these strikes show that 
this failure resulted not from a lack of effort, and that working-class laborers interacted with one 
another in these endeavors in ways that the “better element” of whites could never imagine.107  
Indeed, the mainstream press emphasized the races of the strikers in its reporting while the labor 
press made almost no mention of race. Instead, elite and middle-class whites of the city now 
considered blacks more associated with disorder due to the strikes and labor activism than 
before.   
A strong sense of class consciousness among workers confounded management’s attempt 
to play white and black workers against each other. Rucker Smith, a barber and chef organizer of 
the National Council of Colored Workers, urged KCMO’s blacks “not to be a scab, remember 
you belong to the working-class, and if the unions offer to be fair with you, join hands with them 
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in the struggle, capital against labor.”108  To oversimplify, KCMO was almost a textbook case of 
Marxist notions of class consciousness, with both “proletarian” and “bourgeois” class identities 
developing. This was no accident. Such ideas were highly popular across the state line in KCK, 
which was a hotbed of industrial unionism and labor radicalism.
109
  In both cities, and across the 
region, Eugene V. Debs’ Socialist Party was very popular between 1904 and 1912.110  As 
Schirmer has noted, KCMO’s twentieth century patterns of racism were themselves a partial 
byproduct of class consciousness, but of a different class altogether: the city’s bourgeois.  
It was against the previously discussed political and social backdrop that the relatively 
new profession of sociology began to explore urban space through the preconception that 
character and physical environment were directly linked.
111
  At the same time, real estate was 
coming into its own as an industry. In KCMO, it was the publication of civics teacher Asa 
Martin’s Our Negro Population in 1913 that provided the official justification for residential 
segregation.
112
  Martin described the local African American community in vicious ways, using 
language dripping with racist stereotyping and contempt. He opined that “social workers say that 
no class of people with whom they have to deal is so shiftless, indolent, and lazy as the Negro” 
and proceeded to link blacks with moral laxity, bad personal character, disorderly conduct, 
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criminality, and property devaluation.
113
  Martin continued to cement the link between race, 
urban space, homeownership, and property value by noting that “cleanliness, sense of security, 
modesty, health, and good citizenship all depend of the kind of houses in which people live,” 
which he contrasted with “the unsanitary condition of the streets and alleys in Negro districts” 
arising from “negligence” and “ignorance and carelessness.”114  Such a description automatically 
drew a color line around middle-class respectability at a time in which the black middle-class in 
KCMO was beginning to assert itself locally. Martin in truth put into writing the kinds of 
assumptions whites already made about African-Americans and their homes. Conscious of this, 
The Rising Son as early as 1907 begged black renters to “be more careful in these houses” and 
“not be such destroyers,” lest whites have ammunition for these prejudices.115  Ironically, such a 
study laced with racist diatribe was commissioned by KCMO’s first public welfare agency (and 
first welfare agency in the nation), the Bureau of Public Welfare, in 1910.
116
  The Bureau itself 
was what came out of 1908 investigations into the workhouse scandal.
117
   
In addition to Martin’s work, the bureau-produced Report on Housing in 1912 and The 
Social Prospectus of Kansas City in 1913 drew similar conclusions; what had begun as part of a 
response to the 1908 workhouse scandal by 1913 resulted in justifications for housing 
discrimination.
118
  The Report on Housing infamously singled out African-Americans as “a 
negative social force”, while Social Prospectus described black neighborhoods as having “low 
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civilization” and black residents as “steeped in crime.”119  Taken together, these three studies 
racialized urban space by linking place, race, and behavior.
120
   
Martin was one of two leading influential figures who helped create the conditions for 
which residential segregation by race intensified in KCMO. The other figure was the powerful 
developer J.C. Nichols, famous for creating the Plaza district in the 1920s, who would astutely 
use the New Deal housing agencies to construct much of Johnson County, Kansas’ wealthiest 
enclaves—Shawnee-Mission, Overland Park, Lenexa—as a sort of Levittowns of the Plains 
between the Depression and early sixties.
121
  Nichols made extensive use of whites-only 
covenants and managed to skirt the 1948 Shelley v. Kraemer Supreme Court decision outlawing 
them until the early 1960s. These exclusionary covenants barred Jews as well as African-
Americans from Nichols’ suburban developments.122  
Together with interracial labor strikes, the workhouse scandal, the race-baiting 1906 and 
1908 elections, and expansion of vice throughout the city after the closure of the red-light 
district, the three studies on housing and race would shape middle-class white Kansas Citians’ 
perception of race and African Americans.
123
  This white bourgeois discourse identified black 
men as sexual aggressors years before D.W. Griffith’s Birth of A Nation projected that image on 
film for a national audience, was anxious about immorality coming near the home, and linked the 
presence of blacks to property value deterioration.
124
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Sadly, KCK witnessed a similar process of deterioration of race relations and growing 
discrimination in the years of the early twentieth century. Unlike in KCMO and most other 
places in the US at the turn of the century, racial segregation was far from universal in early 
twentieth century KCK.
125
  Although most white Kansans were opposed to the idea of 
meaningful racial equality for blacks, attempts to codify a racial order in law were very rare in 
the state of Kansas generally, including KCK.
126
   An exception was an ongoing campaign 
underway by white segregationists in KCK to try to lobby the city and state governments 
segregate the local high school system.
127
  Although white advocates of school segregation were 
very careful to deny racial animosity as a motive and insisted that racial segregation of the high 
schools would benefit both races, KCK’s black population was not fooled by such pretensions in 
the slightest.
128
  
The high school in KCK was racially integrated with relative harmony, except for an 
incident in 1890 in which a white student refused to sit next to a black student at the 
commencement ceremonies; another white student swapping places with him ended the 
matter.
129
   An altercation between a black teenage employee of the Swift meatpacking plant 
named Louis Gregory and two white teenagers from the high school baseball team led to an 
explosive situation that would prove the opening advocates of school segregation had been 
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looking for.
130
  Gregory was catching frogs in a pond with a twenty-two caliber shotgun with 
him; it was common for bullfrog hunters to carry rifles in those days. As he was walking along 
the pond, two teenage boys approached him with the intent of making fun of him and making 
him leave his frogs.  An argument followed, resulting in one of the white baseball players 
attacking him with a baseball bat. As a result, Gregory grabbed his rifle, picked it up, and then 
fired it. One of the baseball players, a very popular student named Roy Martin, was hit and the 
shot killed him.
131
  Gregory was then arrested and taken to the Wyandotte County Jail at 7th and 
State Avenue. 
 In the aftermath of this incident, race relations had deteriorated so badly that there was 
nearly a lynching. White-run major newspapers in KCMO , Republican as well as Democratic in 
partisan allegiance, ran incendiary headlines proclaiming “race war” was possible the following 
school day.
132
  Despite such fears, these predicted calamitous outcomes did not materialize on 
that day, but the situation was dire enough. A mob of white boys formed a line across the 
schoolyard in front of the white girls, who barred the doorway to the high school building in 
order to keep black students out.
133
  When officers arrived, the white students refused to 
disperse.
134
  Instead of breaking up the students, city police formed their own line in front of the 
white boys, becoming accomplices to the physical exclusion of black students from the school. 
When a group of black senior boys finally broke through the lines using football game tactics, 
they were kicked and beaten by white students of both sexes and told to go home “to avoid 
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further trouble” by white school officials.135  
Given such a climate, KCK’s blacks were very worried for their own safety and for 
Gregory.  Ominously, an angry white mob (with most from Missouri) assembled with the intent 
of removing Gregory from his cell.
136
  In response, the African American community of KCK  
mobilized its own “vigilance committee” composed of fifteen uniformed veterans of the Spanish-
American War with rifles in hand, with the Reverends George McNeal and Thomas Kapper at 
their sides. They gathered in front of the jailhouse door. As the mob approached, Reverend 
McNeal thundered, “The first man among you who crosses this line is eating breakfast in Hell in 
the morning.”137  The Spanish-American War veterans readied their rifles as the words were 
spoken; the mob dispersed. Gregory was thus spared lynching, but received a very harsh prison 
sentence. 
Reaction to the confrontation varied throughout the city. It was clear that KCK’s usual 
law enforcement had failed to adequately protect a prisoner in their custody from mob assault.
138
  
As a result, members of the African American community had been forced to take the law into 
their own hands and two normally peaceful clergymen had been forced to oversee the use of 
deadly forced in self-defense. Still, bloodshed had been avoided, and several of the veterans 
involved were appointed as KCK police officers. 
Within a large segment of the white population, however, this incident increased racial 
hostility.
139
  To avoid further violence at the high school, the students were put on racially 
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divided half-day shifts. This proved the preliminary step that ultimately led to the creation of a 
separate all-black high school, named Sumner High School after abolitionist Charles Sumner.
140
 
The school opened in fall 1905.  In order to legitimize this move, the state legislature passed a 
law exempting KCK’s school district from (at the time) state law banning segregated schools.141  
If such a law existed, one might ask, how then to explain the Brown v. Board of Education case 
in Topeka some half a century later? The answer lies in the fact that the state had allowed for 
race segregation of grammar schools in towns larger than fifteen thousand people, which was 
written into state law in 1879.
142
  The ban had been aimed at high schools only. 
In terms of residential segregation, KCK and what would become the Kansas side of the 
Greater Kansas City Metro Area generally also saw housing discrimination and black urban 
isolation occur. In KCK’s case, this process happened much more slowly and later than in 
KCMO, as the bulk of “white flight” to suburbs in western Wyandotte County and south to 
Johnson County occurred there after the Second World War.
143
  Late-nineteenth-century 
integrated enclaves in KCK such as Rattlebone Hollow over time became black neighborhoods 
not because whites moved out, but because whites stopped moving there after the 1900s.
144
  
Residential segregation on both sides of the state line in Greater KC was boosted by both Kansas 
and Missouri state Supreme Court decisions endorsing racial covenants as legal between 1918 
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and the 1920s.
145
  Out of all the Kansas counties in the Kansas City metro area, it was Johnson 
County that had whites-only neighborhood covenants for the longest duration.
146
  Johnson 
County initiated its racially restrictive covenants in 1917 and they were in effect until 1962; a 
whopping ninety-six percent of subdivisions had these covenants.
147
  By contrast, KCMO itself 
and all of Jackson County only had sixty-two percent of its subdivisions under these 
covenants.
148
  The Nichols company was responsible for a large share of subdivisions with 
exclusionary covenants. 
By the end of the first two decades of the twentieth century, then, both KCMO and KCK 
were becoming more segregated, reflecting of the national nadir of race relations. Like in other 
major cities in the twentieth century, systematic housing discrimination coincided with the mass 
migration of Southern rural blacks to urban spaces. Notions of race, urban space, anxieties over 
morality and women’s sexuality, and class status combined in KCMO to shape the way its story 
of urban crisis would unfold. A lot of this chapter has been spent analyzing the city’s white 
middle-class and its form of racism driving Jim Crow segregation in KCMO. The next chapter 
addresses the struggle against this increasing discrimination and the role of the black middle-
class in resisting racism. 
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 CHAPTER THREE:  ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS AND 
BLACK FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN GREATER KANSAS CITY, 
1870-1920 
 
African American citizens of KCK and KCMO did not resign themselves to the growing 
racial discrimination and oppression in the social climates of both cities after 1904. Indeed, the 
struggle for the basic human rights of KCMO’s black citizens had begun in the 1870s, when the 
shortcomings of Missouri’s Reconstruction regime led to successful protests for the right to vote, 
among other basic rights. Fights for the vote and equality in education had begun in the late 
nineteenth century; the success of the former meant that Southern-style disfranchisement 
attempts in Missouri would not be attempted. The fight for the latter, on the other hand, would 
continue into the twentieth century despite the tightening of racial segregation and discrimination 
in the early twentieth century.  The housing issue, which would become the impetus for the urban 
crisis by 1940, would also see activists engage in protest against discriminatory real estate 
practices and white terror bombings by the 1910s. These activities would lay the groundwork for 
over fifty years of struggle for fair and integrated housing. The individuals whose stories are told 
here formed part of a local black middle- and upper-class that would push back against Jim Crow 
and housing discrimination and who would correctly warn of the urban crisis’s development. 
They shared KCMO’s white middle-classes’ premiums on respectability, status, and orderly 
urban spaces free of vice, and demanded inclusion into the “city beautiful” and all it signified at 
the very moment the white middle-class shut black people entirely out of such suburban whimsy. 
In both KCK and KCMO, the nucleus of a black civic elite formed after the Civil War, 
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quite removed from the rough conditions of the packing plants and the black industrial 
workforce. In KCMO, James Dallas Bowser rose to preeminence as a newspaper writer and 
intellectual by the early twentieth century. He had been born into slavery in North Carolina in 
1846, but his mother escaped with him to Ohio later in the year.
1
   Bowser came to KCMO in 
1868 from Ohio at age twenty-two with his parents and brother by train, by his own account 
lured by stories of great wealth that could be made in the city.  Bowser’s father had been one of 
the first black teachers in Chillicothe, Ohio; accordingly, the young Bowser initially followed his 
father’s footsteps into teaching and education.  He taught at the Penn School for black children in 
Westport for a year before taking over Lincoln School in the Kansas City school district; he was 
principal at Lincoln for twelve years, until 1879.
2
   
From his background in education, Bowser branched out into local politics, serving a 
stint as a railroad postal clerk in the 1880s; his ambition and drive led him to edit one of 
KCMO’s first black oriented newspapers, The Gate City Press, at the same time he was principal 
at another school, the Attucks School.
3
   Additionally, Bowser was a political activist for 
Republican and civil rights causes by the turn of the century and held a number of patronage jobs 
in the federal government during Republican administrations.  He was a shrewd businessman as 
well; through a series of real estate deals, Bowser gained a fortune valued at seventy-five 
thousand dollars by 1906.  By the 1920s, he had one of the finest homes in the African American 
community on The Paseo.  In the early twentieth century, Bowser was KCMO’s leading black 
intellectual and activist.  He was one of the staunchest and earliest supporters of the NAACP in 
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the city after its national inception in 1909 and a member of the Inter-Racial Committee of 
Twelve, a local group of black and white civil rights activists formed in 1920.
4
    
In 1899, Bowser wrote a rebuttal to Rudyard Kipling’s poem “The White Man’s Burden,” 
which was circulated nationally.  It read:  
Take up the Black Man’s burden— 
“Send forth the best ye breed” 
To judge with righteous judgment 
The Black Man’s worth and need 
To set down naught with malice 
In hate or prejudice 
To tell the truth about him 
To paint him as he is. 
Take up the Black Man’s burden 
Ye of the bold and strong 
And might makes right as only 
It does no weak race wrong; 
When yours—his chances equal, 
Give him the fairest test 
Then “hands off” be your motto 
And he will do the rest. 
 
Take up the Black Man’s burden 
Don’t curse him in advance 
He can not lift a White Man’s load 
Without a White Man’s chance 
Shut out from mill and workshop 
From counting-room and store 
By caste and labor unions 
You close industry’s door. 
 
Take up the Black Man’s burden 
Don’t crush him with his load 
Nor heap it up in courses 
By scoff and jeers bestowed 
The haughty Anglo-Saxon 
Was savage and untaught 
A thousand years of freedom 
A wondrous change has wrought. 
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Take up the Black Man’s burden 
Black men of every clime 
What though your cross be heavy 
Your sun but darkly shine 
Stoop with a freedman’s ardor 
Lift high a freedman’s hand 
Strand with a freedman’s firmness 
March with a freeman’s head.5 
 
Another key figure in the development of a black intelligentsia in KCMO was James 
Milton Turner. He had come to the city in the 1868 from St. Louis, where he had been a slave 
until the end of the Civil War.
6
   Turner was the first black teacher in Kansas City.  Like Bowser 
after him, Turner had been principal of Lincoln School before entering into local prominence 
through pursuit of other vocations that his talents helped him succeed in.  In Bowser’s case, these 
had been newspaper writing and business decisions in real estate; in Turner’s, his subsequent 
careers were in politics and the law.  In fact, Turner was the only African American to hold 
statewide office in Reconstruction-era Missouri and had been a key spokesman and organizer for 
the Missouri Equal Rights League.
7
   Despite the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution in 1870, the Missouri legislature took until 1872 to finally extend voting rights to 
black men.  Both Turner and Bowser’s jump into activism and politics from education was quite 
logical in that another key political struggle for post-Civil War Missouri blacks was over the 
quality of education black children received in the state.  Activists campaigned throughout the 
1860s and 1870s for an increase in both the number of schools and improvement in the quality of 
existing schools for black children.  In response, Missouri passed a revised state constitution in 
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1875 that required districts with at least fifteen black school-aged children to provide separate 
schools for African-American children.
8
   
In KCK (not incorporated as such until 1886), Union Army veteran Corvine Patterson 
was similarly a pillar of the postwar black community. Arriving in Wyandotte in 1868, Patterson 
had served in the Union Army 65th Regiment, Company 9 of the U.S. Colored Troops.
9
   He 
enlisted in Glasgow Missouri in 1864 and served until 1867.  The son of slaves, Patterson was 
largely self-educated.  He opened a grocery store with considerable success in 1872, and his 
prominence grew from there.  Patterson ran the store until after the arrival of the Exodusters.
10
   
Patterson would play a major role during the Exodusters’ arrival, arranging for assistance to the 
refugees and convincing other community leaders in the area to allow the Exodusters to settle.  
Like his counterparts in KCMO, Patterson was able to launch a significant political career from 
relatively humble origins. Also much like Bowser and Turner in KCMO, Patterson had a passion 
for black education and held prominent positions in the local educational system.
11
  In 1872, he 
was elected to serve on Wyandotte County’s Board of Education, the first of many political 
positions he would hold throughout the late nineteenth century as Wyandotte and the other towns 
in the area eventually merged into KCK around him.  Patterson remained a central figure in the 
African American educational system of the county for decades; as late as 1905, he was directly 
consulted in naming Sumner High School, an all-black school founded after KCK segregated its 
schools.  Even outside of the KCK area, Patterson had educational influence, as he sat on the 
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board of Lincoln Institute which later became Lincoln University in Jefferson City.
12
   Beyond 
education, Patterson was the first African-American appointed to the KCK city police force after 
the city’s incorporation in 1886.13   By 1889, he was elected street commissioner in addition to 
holding posts as the city marshal and deputy sheriff.  Tragically, Patterson committed suicide in 
1913 after being unable to bear the premature death of his son two years earlier. 
As noted earlier, the impetus for this protest activism initially was with a small but 
growing black middle-class in both KCMO and KCK in the late nineteenth century.  Buried in 
Asa Martin’s infamously racist report that maligned the character of most of the city’s blacks was 
his finding that by 1910, between eight hundred and one thousand African Americans owned real 
estate.
14
  Throughout the struggle for civil rights in the new century, it would be from among this 
small but very influential group that the leadership of many activist movements would come 
from.  In the years to come, African American women and ministers as well as men and secular 
activists would pick up where Bowser, Turner, and Patterson had left off in the late nineteenth 
century. To do full justice to this story, it is necessary to backtrack somewhat back to the end of 
the nineteenth century, when this constellation of activists, intellectuals, and organizations began 
to emerge to fight for full equality.  
One such activist was G.N. Grisham. Like Bowser and Turner, he had a background in 
teaching in the local high school and had been principal of the first and most prominent high 
schools for blacks in KCMO, the Lincoln School in 1890.
15
  From there, Grisham helped fellow 
activists Richard T. Coles and Paul Gaston to form a short-lived black political party in the late 
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nineteenth century as an alternative to the Republicans.
16
   
By 1897, Grisham was invited to join the American Negro Academy, a society of national 
black scholars that included W.E.B. DuBois and one of DuBois’s intellectual influences and 
mentors, Bishop Alexander Crummell.
17
  Even before the Niagara Falls movement of 1905 in 
which DuBois formally challenged Booker T. Washington’s leadership style and strategy, 
DuBois, Crummell , and the rest of the Academy had denounced Washington’s acceptance of 
menial labor for blacks at expense of the life of the mind and the high arts.
18
  Grisham couldn’t 
agree more with DuBois’s advocacy of a robust black public intellectual and intellectual culture 
and delivered an eloquent speech in favor of it in Washington D.C. in December 1897.
19
  Far 
from taking the advance of KCMO’s Jim Crow laying down, turn of the century black KCMO 
intellectuals such as Grisham were ready to directly do battle with Booker T. Washington’s 
counsel of accommodation with segregation. 
In his 1898 address “The Negro Scholar,” Grisham directly repudiated Washington’s 
advice against pursuit of higher education for black men, especially southern black men, 
Grisham boldly stated that “the Negro graduate is here” whether or not Washington or anyone 
else chose to acknowledge the fact.
20
   Beyond this, Grisham disagreed even more strongly with 
the very premise that lay behind Washington’s advocacy for vocational training instead of 
academic achievement. To Grisham, the black scholar was most important as a force for direct 
political activism, a view that went directly against the accomodationist approach that 
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Washington championed. Stressing the point further, Grisham noted that while it was true that 
once “there was a time when the scholar stood aloof from the practical world, as if he formed no 
part of it,” that no longer was a defensible conception of the function of the intellectual.21  
“Scholarship cannot create and breathe an atmosphere all its own,” Grisham insisted.22  While it 
was “commendable to search for the truth as the thing best worth knowing,” such a pursuit 
needed to be responsive to the needs of the present-day world.
23
  In particular, Grisham asserted, 
it was the duty of the black intelligentsia to provide leadership to the African-American 
community, both morally and politically. A couple of years before DuBois coined the term 
“talented tenth,”  Grisham was providing a skeletal outline for the meaning of the concept. In just 
eight short years, Grisham had risen to national recognition as an intellectual and activist. 
Though Grisham would quit the American Negro Academy ten years later, citing the great 
distance to the East Coast from KCMO, he had already made a national impression beyond 
Greater Kansas City for black activism. He would remain committed to the struggle until his 
death in 1930.
24
  
Grisham’s partner in the short-lived KCMO black political party, Richard T. Coles, also 
had a distinguished background at KCMO’s Lincoln School. Unlike Grisham, of whom little is 
known before 1890, Coles is known to have born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in 1860 to a father, 
Nathaniel Coles, who had escaped slavery and become a shoemaker and a mother who was a 
local and highly educated.
25
  Richard’s mother, Mary Ann, in fact had attended not only public 
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schools but colleges in the state of Pennsylvania, and had passed that love of learning to her nine 
children. Accordingly, Richard was not the only child of hers who became an educator; three of 
his siblings did as well. In the mid-1870s, the family moved to Ohio; Nathaniel Coles became 
politically active in the Republican Party in those years and would eventually hold a patronage 
position in the Grant administration.
26
  Just as he would inherit his mother’s love for education, 
Richard Coles would later inherit his father’s political activism. After living in Poland, Ohio for 
a few years, the family moved again to Farmville, Virginia, where Richard Coates enrolled in 
Hampton Institute. The Institute was one of the first schools established for former slaves after 
the Civil War and though it offered a “classical education,” it additionally had a strong manual 
arts curriculum in which students were taught practical skills. In fact, Booker T. Washington was 
one of Coates’s classmates at Hampton and had been so enthralled with Hampton’s manual arts 
curriculum that he modeled his entire Tuskegee school after it.  
Richard Coles graduated from Hampton in 1879 with honors and shortly thereafter, came 
to Kansas City to take a position at the Sumner high school as a teacher that he held for two 
years.
27
  In 1881, Coles took a teaching position at the Lincoln School; due to his training at 
Hampton, like Washington, Coles strongly advocated manual education. Five years later, Coles 
started his own school called the Pleasant Green School. By 1890, the Pleasant Green School 
was absorbed into the Kansas City School District and renamed the Garrison School.
28
  The 
KCMO school board was reluctant to include manual training in the Garrison curriculum, 
believing it not to be a necessary part of public education. Coles was relentless in lobbying for 
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manual education’s place in the school and eventually persuaded the superintendent of its 
importance. Coles was also good friends with James Dallas Bowser and, like Bowser, edited a 
weekly newspaper—The Kansas City Dispatch—in the 1880s.29  In 1920, Coles and Bowser 
would both serve on the Inter-Racial Committee of Twelve, a committee set up by the Kansas 
City Citizens’ League in reaction to the nationwide wave of race riots in 1919.30   
W.W. Yates was another such figure bridging the era of Bowser and Turner’s early 
activism to twentieth century civil rights struggles. Much less is known about him than either 
Coles or Grisham, but like them, Yates served on the Lincoln School Faculty.
31
  In the late 1880s, 
he became principal of the Wendell Phillips School. Yates would hold that position until his 
death in 1910.  In those years, in addition to presiding over Wendell Phillips School as an 
administrator, Yates was very active on a number of other fronts. He joined with Grisham and 
others in founding KCMO’s black YMCA.32  Yates also was likely a member of the city’s black 
men’s club, the Attucks Club, and may have helped Coles operate the Dispatch.33  Among all 
else Yates was known for, however, was that he was married to one of the most prominent 
activists among black women in the city, Josephine Silone Yates. 
Josephine Silone Yates was a leader in KCMO’s African-American women’s clubs and 
the movement around them.  A teacher herself and a gifted speaker, she lead the Kansas City 
Colored Women’s League as well as the National Association of Colored Women.34  Born 
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Josephine Silone in 1859 in Mannituck, New York to a prominent family, Silone’s mother began 
educating her at an early age.
35
  As a result, Silone had an almost prodigal mastery of reading, 
writing, and mathematics by the time she started going to school. Even though she was the only 
black child at the school, Silone quickly became a favorite of her teachers because of her thirst 
for learning. By age nine, she was studying physiology, physics, and advanced forms of math. 
Silone was already an avid reader and an accomplished writer. One of her biographers noted that 
Silone’s teacher sent one of her stories to a New York newspaper; the paper rejected her work but 
sent her a letter that encouraged her to continue writing.
36
  At age eleven, she went to live with 
an uncle who was an ordained minister in Philadelphia; he wanted her to be able to attend the 
Institution for Colored Youth, which was the most acclaimed educational institution for blacks in 
the eastern U.S.
37
   The Institution offered instruction in the classics in addition to the regular 
curriculum.
38
  Silone attended only one year, but under the tutelage of Fannie Jackson-Coppin, 
she learned Latin, Greek, and German. After that, she went to live with an aunt in Newport, 
Rhode Island to finish high school there, and became the first African American graduate and 
valedictorian at Newport’s Rogers High School in 1877. Silone then enrolled in the Rhode Island 
State Normal School, graduating from there with honors in 1879.
39
  
Silone came to Missouri in 1881, joining the faculty of Lincoln University, an all-black 
college, in Jefferson City, Missouri.
40
  She began there as chair of the Chemistry Department but 
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was soon promoted to chair of the school’s entire Science Department.  Silone remained there 
until 1889, when she resigned, moved to Kansas City, and married Yates.
41
  She had to resign 
upon marriage because in the late nineteenth century, married women were commonly forbidden 
to teach or hold high academic positions. As a result, Josephine Silone Yates turned—as many 
married middle-class women did who were her contemporaries, both black and white—to the 
women’s club movement. 
As noted earlier, Sarah Coates was one of the founders of the earliest white KCMO 
women’s clubs, founding about nine of them between 1870 and 1890.42  By the late nineteenth 
century, both the Coates-led KCMO clubs and Yates’s parallel women’s clubs, like their national 
counterparts, were stretching the standard gendered notions of “separate spheres” to issues in 
politics that could be tied to women and/or their homes.
43
  These issues included temperance, 
suffrage, secure spaces for children to play, and the creation of kindergartens. For black women, 
however, such issues were secondary to more pressing issues of basic human rights and equality 
and the project of moral “uplift of the race.”44  Accordingly, black clubwomen in KCMO and 
nationally supplemented black male activist voices and organizations calling for racial equality 
and civil rights. African American clubwomen also saw their duty as assistance to the poor in the 
community. Due to both race discrimination in most white women’s clubs and different 
priorities, African American women formed their own clubs in the 1890s.
45
  It was against this 
national backdrop that Josephine Yates, her friend Anna Jones, and two other women formed the 
                                                 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 “Believer in Women’s Capabilities,” Kansas City Star, February 7, 1975, as found in Vertical File: Kersey 
Coates, Missouri Valley Special Collections, KCPL. 
43
 Coulter, 37. 
44
 Ibid., 38. 
45
 Ibid. 
 97 
 
Kansas City Colored Women’s League in 1893. 
Josephine Yates was the main force behind the club, as she was the League’s first 
president and regularly wrote a column for the national black clubwomen’s publication, Woman’s 
Era called “The Kansas City Letter,” a regular report on the club’s activities in KCMO.46  Yates 
and the League planned to raise five hundred dollars to purchase land for an industrial arts 
school, but apparently weren’t able to do so since there is no record of the school’s existence or 
of the plan succeeding. They did offer sewing classes on Wednesdays and Saturdays for the 
young and old, which served multiple purposes. In addition to training girls and women in how 
to make dresses, aprons, and undergarments, these classes also produced overgarments for the 
needy in winter and clothing that could be sold to cover the league’s costs.47  Much of the 
league’s work was charity-oriented. Although the league’s stated mission was to improve the 
condition of African American women in the city, its first work was providing funding for the 
return trip of an invalid boy to his home in the South.
48
  The league gave temporary lodging to 
female new arrivals to the city, aided an orphan in seeking a home, and provided clothing to 
blind children.
49
  They also had a junior auxiliary for girls at least fourteen years old. 
The league also stepped in when political events warranted. In June 1893, an African 
American woman was sentenced to death by hanging in KCMO. After investigating the case, the 
KC Colored Women’s League proclaimed that both justice for the individual woman sentenced 
and “above all to the womanhood of our race” demanded commutation of the death sentence.50  
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The governor of Missouri relented under their pressure, commuting the sentence to fifty years in 
prison.
51
  Josephine Yates, in the remaining two years she chaired the league, was a frequent 
contributor to black magazines of the era such as the aforementioned Women’s Era and Voice of 
the Negro.
52
  In her columns for these periodicals, she stressed the themes and agendas of racial 
uplift, Booker T. Washington’s work-first industrial education, and appealed to blacks to stand 
strong against racial oppression.  
After she stepped down as president of the league, Yates was one of five women 
representing women’s clubs in the state of Missouri at the Congress of Colored Women at the 
Atlanta Exposition in December 1895.
53
  Her address there, “How Best to Raise the Moral Status 
of the Race,” drew praise from Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. DuBois  was also impressed 
by Yates’s oratory. DuBois judged Yates’s address the best paper given at the conference and said 
of her that “perhaps the finest specimen of Negro womanhood was Mrs. Josephine Yates of 
Kansas City, a dark brown matron with a quiet air of dignity and earnestness.”54  The previous 
year, she had delivered a paper called “Modern Education as Influenced by the Reformation” to 
the Greenwood Club, a group of some of the most prominent white men in Kansas City brought 
together by the superintendent of KCMO schools James Mickleborough Greenwood.
55
  At the 
National Association of Colored Women’s 1899 convention, Yates delivered an address entitled 
“Social Necessity of an Equal Moral Standard for Men and Women.”56  In addition to all of this 
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political activism, Yates was established and accomplished essayist and poet and wrote short 
stories and poems under the pen name R.K. Potter that were published. She continued to write 
for various publications, most notably writing “The Equipment of the Teacher” in a June 1904 
issue of Voice of the Negro, in which she thundered that failure by black educators to take their 
duty seriously would mark them as “traitors to the race.”57  
Yates succeeded Mary Church Terrell as president of the National Association of Colored 
Women in 1901 and served with distinction until 1906.
58
  After she stepped down in 1906 from 
the national organization, Yates was elected the following year to the presidency of the Missouri 
Association of Colored Women’s Clubs in Sedalia.59  She served as president of the state 
organization until 1910. Yates was also among the women who addressed the National Afro-
American League, a nineteenth century civil rights organization and in 1910, was a member of 
the Committee of One Hundred, the founding body of what would become the NAACP.
60
  After 
her husband’s death, Josephine Yates returned to teaching until her own sudden death in 1912. 
Quite impressive was the fact that she had signed what would become the local NAACP 
Constitution of March 1913 shortly before her death, showing her activism in the civil rights 
organization was as dedicated as her teaching career.
61
   She left a mighty legacy in both Kansas 
Cities as well as nationally, and accordingly, KCK’s YWCA was named after her in 1919.62  
After 1895, the presidency of the KC Colored Women’s League had passed to Yates’s 
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friend, Anna Jones.
63
  Jones was born in Canada in 1860 to a father who had escaped slavery via 
the Underground Railroad and a mother who was originally from New Jersey. We know very 
little of her early life.
64
  Jones was president of the Missouri Association of Colored Women’s 
Clubs from 1903 to 1906. 
65
  The Kansas City Club was one of the first local clubs affiliated with 
the national Colored Women’s League, and Anna Jones was picked to represent the D.C.-based 
Colored Women’s League in talks that led to a merger with the Boston-based National Federation 
of African American Women by 1900.  The result was the new national organization, The 
National Association of Colored Women. Jones wrote for several black publications, including 
The Voice of the Negro. In 1905, Jones wrote an article in Voice of the Negro detailing the 
educational accomplishments of African-American women, which ran in two parts.
66
   In the 
article, Jones pointed to Yates’s mentor at the Institute for Colored Youth in Philadelphia,  Fannie 
Jackson-Coppin, the educated black women involved in the racial uplift and club movements, 
and to the female principals across the nation as examples of black female educational 
achievement.
67
   Jones noted the growing number of African American women graduating from 
colleges across the nation, including ten from Kansas State University.
68
  
Like so many other prominent black activists and intellectuals, Jones held a teaching 
position at the Lincoln School by 1910.
69
  In 1911, Jones was the first black woman in KCMO to 
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serve as principal of a school when she was appointed to the position at the Douglass School on 
the city’s west side.70  Prophetically, Jones was one of the first local activists to warn of the city’s 
discriminatory housing conditions, writing a letter to W.E.B. DuBois in 1911 describing it in 
detail.
71
  By 1916, Jones was on the faculty at Lincoln, where she remained until her retirement 
in 1919.
72
  During this time, she was active in the YWCA and instrumental in establishing 
KCMO’s YMCA at 19th Street and The Paseo. She was also a giant in the local NAACP.  Jones 
served alongside James Bowser and future Kansas City Call editor Charles A. Franklin on the 
local executive committee by 1917. She, like Yates, had signed the 1913 Kansas City NAACP 
Constitution.
73
  
KCK’s civil rights activists had long stressed the importance of cross-town and state ties 
with the movement for equality in KCMO.
74
  Such a perspective was a written clause in the local 
NAACP constitution, which stressed the critical importance of ameliorating “the industrial, 
social, and civic conditions of the colored peoples of the two Kansas Cities.”75  This was 
especially true of black women who were activists in their own right in KCK. As mentioned 
already, the YWCA in KCK was posthumously named after Yates; this was because Yates and 
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Jones had joined Ida M. Becks in doing the work to establish a YWCA on the Kansas side of the 
metropolitan area.
76
  Becks, who worked at a rescue home in Topeka, was a featured speaker 
along with Jones at a mass civil rights rally in March 1911. Although not based in KCK herself, 
Becks was another example of KCMO activists’ commitment to advancing civil rights and 
conditions for blacks in KCK as well as KCMO. 
Becks had a history of civil rights and racial uplift activism in both Dayton, Ohio and 
Wichita before moving to the KC area.
77
 She had been born Ida M. Bowman in 1880 in 
Armstrong, Missouri.
78
  Her father died when she was eleven, leaving her mother to care for her 
and seven other children. After completing public school, Bowman moved to Carrollton, 
Missouri before enrolling at Lincoln Institute in Jefferson City. In order to finance her education 
thee, Bowman worked as a domestic in the home of a private family for a dollar a week. She 
graduated from Lincoln in 1899 as the class valedictorian, one among nine women who received 
degrees there that year.
79
  Becks spent a year in Wichita after that before moving to Cleveland, 
where she made the decision to dedicate her life to activism. Shortly thereafter, she moved to 
Dayton and joined the local Colored Women’s League.80  Bowman met H.W. Becks in Dayton, 
and they married in 1907. The couple moved to Kansas City in 1908, and H.W. Becks was 
appointed to the US Postal Service.  
Ida M. Becks continued her activism: for two years, she was a field representative for the 
Florence Crittendon Home in Topeka and also served as field representative for the National 
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Training School in Washington D.C.
81
  Becks’ work led to the formation of the Urban League’s 
local branch in Kansas City and by 1920, she was an important figure within state and national 
Baptist organizations, within Missouri’s black women’s club movement, and in African 
American communities in both KCMO and KCK. Becks was a staunch supporter of women’s 
suffrage and like many activist African American women of her time, Becks fiercely resisted the 
twin oppressors of racism and sexism.
82
  Like Yates, Becks was a public speaker whose oratory 
skills were much in demand. Upon former president Theodore Roosevelt’s passing in 1919, 
Becks spoke of his views on women’s suffrage at KCMO’s Second Baptist Church.83  She led a 
debate over women’s suffrage later that year at the Ebenezer AME Church.84  
 Fearless in the face of political fights with individuals of either race, Becks in 1921 
passionately argued in favor of a school bond issue that some in the black community opposed.
85
  
Using the moral authority of black religious language, she argued that financial resources were 
needed to mitigate congestion in the schools, particularly Lincoln.
86
   As the urban crisis began to 
develop almost two decades later, congestion at Lincoln and other African-American schools 
would become much worse than it already was in 1921 and despite the bond passing and 
construction of the new school, the Paseo High School, during the 1920s. 
Ida and H.W. Becks were both members and leaders of KCMO’s Second Baptist Church, 
in which they were deeply active through World War I.  Ida Becks was additionally active in the 
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Red Cross in 1919, served on the board of directors of Wheatley-Provident Hospital in the early 
1920s, and she was one of five KCMO delegates to the 1921 NAACP convention in Detroit.
87
  
That same year, the Negro Women’s National Republican League appointed Becks to organize a 
chapter in KCMO, which she was subsequently elected chair of.
88
  
An even more powerful demonstration of the connection between the activists of both 
KCMO and KCK was the career of KCK activist Kathyrn Johnson. Johnson would link Corvine 
Patterson’s legacy with the firment of the black clubwomen’s movement over the state line in 
KCMO. Johnson was also able to build on the success of KCK’s black-oriented newspaper, The 
American Citizen. Originally begun in Topeka in 1888, American Citizen would move to KCK 
the following year.
89
  Until 1907, it was in continuous publication and was published weekly 
between 1897 and 1900. John L. Waller, a prominent Republican in Topeka, had founded the 
paper, but he sold it to H.F. Johnson and George Dudley in KCK.
90
  H.F. Johnson was a former 
Exoduster who owned a grocery store and invested in real estate, while George Dudley arrived in 
the area right after the Civil War from Xenia, Ohio. Dudley was elected to City Council of 
Wyandotte in 1879 and then in 1885, elected deputy city marshal.
91
  Critically, American Citizen, 
like other black-owned newspapers around the country offered a medium for disseminating news 
that would not be covered by the mainstream press and by presenting black viewpoints on race 
that would not be covered by the mainstream press. Such newspapers connected the black 
community and gave it a voice. 
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Other activists in KCK who Johnson built upon included B.S. Smith and I.F. Bradley, Sr. 
Smith was a graduate of the University of Michigan Law School and had received his degree in 
1886; he arrived in KCK in 1887.
92
  Smith soon became active in civic affairs after establishing a 
law office. He served as deputy city attorney and was elected councilman in KCK’s Third Ward 
in 1892. B.S. Smith had been involved in negotiating the conditions surrounding the creating of 
Sumner High School in 1904. Smith became a charter member of DuBois’s Niagara Movement 
in 1905.  
I.F. Bradley was also a charter member of the Niagara Movement in 1905.
93
  Also like 
Smith, Bradley was a lawyer and elected official. Bradley had been born in Cambridge, Missouri 
in 1862 and received his law degree from KU in 1887, where he graduated from with honors.
94
  
In 1889, he was elected justice of the peace. From then until his death in 1938, I.F. Bradley, Sr. 
played a leading role in KCK’s civic and political affairs. Bradley was elected county attorney in 
1894 after his term as justice of the peace. He served as a Republican presidential elector for 
Kansas in 1900 and was nominated to be attorney general in 1908.
95
  Like Yates and Jones, 
Bradley was a signatory to the local NAACP constitution.
96
  In addition to the NAACP, he was a 
charter member of the National Afro-American Council and a founder of the Civic League of 
Kansas City, Kansas, which promoted voter registration, political participation, and better inter-
ethnic relations. 
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Kathryn Johnson was born in Ohio in 1878, where she also grew up.
97
  Johnson attended 
Wilberforce University in 1897-98, and, after graduating, taught in Ohio and Indiana public 
school systems. Johnson accepted a teaching position in 1904 in North Carolina and then in 
1906, became dean of women at Shorter College in Little Rock, Arkansas. Foreshadowing her 
political turn, she wrote a pamphlet in 1905 on the life of Fredrick Douglass entitled Fredrick 
Douglass: The Voice For the Silent Millions.
98
   Johnson moved to KCK in 1910, where she 
dedicated herself to “race work.”99  Johnson was among those who organized the KCK YWCA 
facility. She was also a charter member of the NAACP and for the first half of the 1910s was 
what Mary White Ovington called the organization’s “first fieldworker” in that Johnson made her 
living by making small amounts of money off of branch memberships and subscriptions to the 
Crisis.
100
  In 1913, Johnson expanded her work by travelling throughout the South and West 
educating blacks on the work of the NAACP and helping to establish branches of the 
organization.
101
  By 1916, Johnson was publicly recognized by the NAACP for her work on its 
behalf; six months later, however, she left the organization. 
Johnson then focused on work on behalf of the YWCA and was among three black 
women who worked for the YWCA in France during World War I.
102
  After World War I, she 
made a living off of sales commissions for works by and about African-Americans on behalf of 
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Associated Publishers and the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History. Although 
Johnson had taught, like Yates and Jones, she was not as intellectually gifted as they.
103
  
However, what she lacked in that area she more than made up for with her organizational and 
strategic gifts at the grassroots level that were fired by a tenacious spirit. 
Despite leaving work inside the NAACP, she continued to work with them as allies. An 
excellent example of this was her May 1921 protest against the KKK outside a New York theater 
that was showing Birth of A Nation.
104
  Johnson and four other men and women were arrested 
and convicted for distributing leaflets against the KKK in front of the theater.
105
  Six months 
later, the convictions were overturned, and Johnson and her fellow activists were released from 
jail.
106
  Her release generated front-page headlines in the Kansas City Sun, which also took note 
that the judge’s opinion had established the rights of citizens to protest against a movement 
which they believed threatened their rights.
107
  Johnson would continue her outspoken advocacy 
and activism on behalf of freedom, justice, and equality for African Americans for the next three 
decades; she passed away in 1955.
108
   
Grisham, Coles, Yates, Jones, Becks, Smith, Bradley,  and Johnson had carried on what 
Bowser, Turner, and Patterson had begun in the nineteenth century fighting for the rights of 
blacks as citizens in both KCMO and KCK. Together, beyond that, they had established a 
powerful framework of activism and egalitarian ideas to combat the KCMO middle-class white 
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racism of urban spaces and social status and Jim Crow in both cities with a black middle-class 
vision of racial equality, black educational and intellectual excellence, “Social Gospel” religious 
tendencies, and in the case of female activists especially, support for women’s rights and 
suffrage. In the first decades of the twentieth century, they advanced an alternative, racially 
egalitarian vision of progressivism. The interdependency of black freedom movements in KCMO 
and KCK that Yates, Jones, Becks, and Johnson had encouraged and nourished continued to 
grow over the years, as organizations that would cover both Kansas Cities would be formed in 
the remaining decades of the first half of the twentieth century. 
There were others who emerged as leaders of the community in those years, who 
benefitted from and complimented the activist work of Grisham, Coles, Yates, Jones, Becks, 
Smith, Bradley, and Johnson. As hinted at earlier, the black clergy were an important part of this 
group of organizations struggling for justice. One of the most important KCMO ministers was 
the Reverends Samuel William Bacote, T.H. Ewing, and James Wesley Hurse.
109
 From the 
perspective of the story of civil rights struggle and fight for open housing in Kansas City, Ewing 
and Hurse were the two most important figures by far. Ewing would encourage home ownership 
by African Americans, while Hurse would encourage tactics of boycott of white discriminatory 
businesses and institutions in favor of their black-owned and operated counterparts. 
 T.H. Ewing came to KCMO in 1887, right at the point where the city was undergoing a 
metamorphosis from a small frontier trading post into an industrial metropolis on the Plains.
110
  
The Vine Street Baptist Church was struggling then, but Ewing was determined to be a force for 
change. Ewing’s target was the poverty of his parishioners; Ewing preached that acquisition of 
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property was the key to earthly salvation.
111
  He stressed saving as the key to achieve this goal 
and advised his congregation to save ten cents a day out of weekly incomes sometimes as low as 
six dollars. He described multiple ways his parishioners could save: by walking instead of riding 
streetcars, buy groceries in bulk with cash, and eschew credit. Living within their means and 
avoiding frivolous and superfluous spending was critical, Ewing told his congregation. They 
were to avoid saloons and movie theaters especially. Instead, he encouraged them to open bank 
accounts and start looking to purchase a home. He organized an economic club designed to get 
members of his Vine Street congregation into homes as soon as possible.
112
  In 1904, Ewing 
began promoting three financial clubs—one for men and two for women—in which members 
pooled their resources and invested in real estate.
113
  Ewing practiced what he preached: upon his 
death in 1930, he owned considerable land, not just in KCMO, but properties in Oklahoma and 
Kansas (including KCK and Leavenworth) as well.
114
 James Wesley Hurse helped form St. 
Stephen’s Baptist Church in the early 1900s.115  Hurse was born in 1866 to former slaves in 
Collierville, Tennessee.
116
  Hurse had little formal education and moved to Memphis at about age 
nineteen in 1885. There, he worked first at a cotton gin and then as a roustabout on a steamboat 
on the Mississippi River. He worked at the latter job for over seven years but was increasingly 
distressed at the discrimination and racism he faced in Memphis and moved to KCMO in 
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1896.
117
  Already ordained as a minister five years before, he briefly worked for the city street 
crews before he was called to be minister at St. Stephen’s.  
Hurse was one of the most powerful orators of all of the Baptist preachers in KCMO and 
in the black community generally.
118
  By the end of the First World War, Hurse’s congregation 
swelled to over eight hundred. Like Ewing, he preached financial awareness and responsibility. 
However, Hurse also stressed that his parishioners be more racially conscious with how they 
spent their money.  Hurse encouraged them to patronize black-owned businesses; reportedly in 
1915, when one parishioner chose a white undertaker instead of available African American 
undertaking services, Hurse refused to deliver a funeral service.  Such awareness would help to 
influence Kansas City’s local civil rights movement in the tactic of using consumer patronage as 
a weapon against race discrimination. Hurse was an active member of the National Baptist 
Convention of America, the second largest black Baptist organization in the country. He was 
president of the organization from 1930 to 1933. In 1924, Hurse became the first African 
American in KCMO nominated for alderman by either party.
119
  Although he lost the election, 
Hurse remained active in KCMO’s black community until his 1935 death.  
Finally, one of the most important figures in early twentieth century black Kansas City 
was T.C. Unthank, a physician.
120
  Through his tireless activism and lobbying, Unthank helped to 
establish three medical facilities for blacks in both KCMO and KCK.
121
  Thomas C. Unthank had 
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been born in 1866 in Greensboro, North Carolina. He enrolled in Howard University’s Medical 
School in 1894, and after graduation in 1898, he moved to Kansas City. Shortly after arriving, he 
began working with black doctors on the Kansas side to establish a private hospital for blacks in 
KCK.
122
  One of these doctors was Dr. S.H. Thompson, Sr., a close ally of I.F. Bradley. The new 
hospital was badly needed because, as was previously noted, white doctors started turning away 
black patients and black doctors were not permitted to perform surgery or attend patients in the 
existing hospitals.
123
  Named for the Reverend Calvin Douglass of Western University, Douglass 
Hospital opened in KCK in 1898. The hospital immediately drew patients from both KCK and 
KCMO and soon became overcrowded.  
By 1902, Unthank helped to establish the John Lange Hospital in KCMO for black 
patients.
124
  It was named for John Lange, the wealthy business manager of a popular musical 
performer. Lange Hospital proved to be too reliant on Lange the man, however, and closed in 
1920, four years after Lange’s death due to financial difficulties. Douglass Hospital outlasted 
Lange by quite a lot; it closed in 1978, mainly because of the end of legal race segregation in the 
1960s nationwide. 
However, neither hospital in their heyday was adequate to handle the number of black 
patients in the area.
125
  KCMO’s black population was particularly distrustful of the city hospital, 
where neglect, segregation, and discrimination were commonplace. Particularly disgraceful in 
this regard was the treatment black and Mexican victims of the 1903 flood received by white 
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hospital staff at a makeshift shelter in the city’s Convention Hall.126  Unthank was enraged by the 
mistreatment patients of color had received and began pressuring the city for a separate hospital 
for blacks. If his proposal generated any controversy among other activists, no record of such 
survives.
127
  This is noteworthy because in many other cases nationwide, African American elites 
were sharply divided over the question of separate facilities versus integrated ones and if 
segregation should be compromised with at all. In any event, the end result was General Hospital 
Number 2, of which Unthank was one of the first superintendents. 
With all of these intellectuals, teachers, ministers, activists, lawyers, and doctors and their 
new organization and institutions as inspiration, black newspapers and editorialists were 
prepared to take head-on the kind of white racism discussed in the previous chapter. They 
examined whites’ perceptions and calculated how they would affect black Kansas City.128  
Middle-class blacks and whites both believed in home ownership as a symbol of achievement 
and agreed on the importance of morality and gender roles. In KCMO, these points of agreement 
would be used by race-conscious African Americans to attack racial injustice. 
Ewing had been merely one influential voice in a group of educators and clergymen 
urging black homeownership since the 1890s as a means of promoting thrift, providing economic 
security, and encouraging wholesome living standards. A 1903 editorial in the black newspaper 
Rising Son noted the political purposes of home ownership; a black community in which home 
ownership was widely dispersed would be best equipped to advance its own interests.
129
  Charles 
Starks, an advertising copywriter and local NAACP officer, by 1914 was exploring more radical 
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consequences of black home ownership. Writing in the Kansas City Sun, Starks reasoned that 
home ownership was among the most basic rights of American citizenship as it was vital step in 
the pursuit of happiness.
130
  Starks urged African Americans to purchase homes in predominantly 
white neighborhoods as both an exercise of liberty and assertion of their civil rights.
131
 Whites 
who objected, Starks said, were simply enemies of the most basic rights for African-
Americans.
132
   
Another writer for the Sun, W.E. Griffen, uncovered another motive behind whites’ 
segregation of the city’s neighborhoods after 1904: economics and status.133  Griffen stated that 
“race prejudice is almost wholly an economic question” and noted that “when [whites] denounce 
‘social equality’ they unwittingly mean economic equality.”134  When blacks purchased homes in 
comfortable middle-class neighborhoods, Griffen noted that this signaled their achievement of an 
economic status equivalent to those of their white neighbors, which triggered what Griffen called 
“a terrifying fear” that whites and their neighborhoods’ status was diminished.135  He concluded 
that, no matter what whites said about black people, deep down “the great middle class of white 
people are by no means convinced of the Negro’s inferiority. In fact, they are keenly alive to the 
fact that Negroes cannot be held down and in that they sense great danger to themselves.”136   
Nelson Crews, whose political wrangling with the local Republicans were previously 
discussed, was quite blunt in accusing middle-class whites of racist bigotry and highlighting the 
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worst of their hypocrisy: he wrote of white opposition to Western College that “our people are 
constantly being urged to lead intelligent, religious lives, yet when decent facilities for such 
progress are being sought, opposition rises and the unchristian spirit of race hatred bursts into 
flame.”137  Crews concluded that it was precisely the self-styled “better classes” of whites who 
were behind such racist opposition to black institutions, heaping scorn on the “so-called refined, 
fair, Christian people” who had “met and solemnly vowed that the school will not come near 
them and that they will keep it away at any cost.”138  Seeing though such whites’ sense of 
superiority to “mobs” that attacked black homes in Montgall, Crews linked their attitudes 
directly to white terrorism by stating “we know what ‘any cost’ means to Negro haters. We knew 
what it meant out on Montgall Avenue and other parts of the city.”139   Thus, Ewing, Starks, 
Griffen, and Crews launched some of the first editorial advocacy for what would become the 
long struggle by the city’s open housing movement against residential segregation. It would be 
especially this part of the civil rights movement that, in KCMO and nationwide, would see its 
work largely unfinished by the end of the twentieth century. White flight, white violence, the real 
estate industry, and—after 1933—the federal government would all provide strong headwinds 
against any real progress made on this front for decades to come. 
Starks also saw through KCMO middle-class whites’ and white officials’ duplicity on 
race, noting how “the enemies of the race” sought to “‘politely’ and ‘graciously’ enslave us.”140  
City officials were in fact notorious for denying any responsibility for segregation or 
discriminatory treatment of the city’s African-American population. An example of this was a 
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1918 incident at Paseo Parkway near the black business district in which park watchmen 
removed Julia Morrisson from the parkway and told her, “you niggers are not going to light this 
parkway between Ninth and Twelfth Streets.”141  When she and her allies complained, members 
of the park board denied they had ordered any segregation of the park and refused to act.
142
  In 
another incident at a music store, white management made excuses for the store’s discriminatory 
treatment of black customers by blaming white customers’ prejudice and the supposed 
“obnoxious behavior” of two black customers they never identified.143  The Sun incredulously 
and wryly noted that “these two men are always handy when wanted,” citing a list of other 
instances in which whites used apocryphal stories of two rowdy black men to excuse racial 
discrimination.
144
   
Black middle-class intellectuals were also worried about the impact of urban vice, but 
drew very different conclusions from its presence. While some expressed class resentment at 
“bad Negroes” among the lower class and poor “sullying the race’s image,” more often black 
intellectuals and the black press condemned black participation in vices such as crime and 
immorality as undermining uplift, racial solidarity, and political activism.
145
  Starks in particular 
believed vice was not a victimless crime because it vented lower-class frustrations in ways that 
were counterproductive to their well-being without changing the racist social order responsible 
for their condition.
146
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As for the white middle-class perception that crime and vice were inherent flaws in 
blacks’ character as a race, here too outraged black editorialists and intellectuals found rampant 
white hypocrisy and exposed it. The Sun thundered in one editorial that “some of the most 
vicious and notorious dives that ever infested the city are run by WHITE MEN for the 
debauchery and degradation of Negroes.”147  They countered whites’ and the white-owned real 
estate industry’s assertions that blacks were threatening to bring vice to white middle-class 
neighborhoods by arguing that it was whites who encouraged urban vice among blacks to keep 
them oppressed.
148
  The truth to this was apparent in the Marks’ Plan for making the North End a 
Red Light district in 1909-11. 
Worst of all, Starks noted, the racist and brutal behavior of KCMO police towards the 
city’s African Americans encouraged vice by undermining respect for the law even among the 
most elite black citizenry.
149
  Black citizens of KCMO “displayed a positive horror and 
antipathy” towards police due to “the exercise of an unwarrantable tyranny on the part of White 
Policemen whose ignorance overlaps their duty and discretion and who imagine that Cruelty 
instead of intelligence is the watchword in handling and adjusting cases coming under their 
care.”150  Black middle-class writers sought the same “respectability” in terms of bourgeois 
virtues as middle-class whites and fumed at a social environment created by whites in which 
blacks were rendered incapable of living respectably if they so chose. 
One of the strongest examples of the kind of respectability black activists advocated for 
and were denied by white society was that of black female respectability. Like white middle-
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class figures who were often their opponents, black middle-class activists believed in a gendered 
notion of bourgeois values in which the strength of the family and social morality was 
underpinned by the status of a middle-class woman as measured in feminine virtue.
151
  This 
racist slight was itself a carryover from slavery, which was held together by white owners having 
sexually exploited black women with impunity.
152
  That impunity in turn had led owners to 
characterize slave women as amoral which not only was used to justify the rape but also was 
absorbed into owners’ racist ideology justifying slavery. After Reconstruction, rape was used as a 
weapon against black women in the Deep South the way lynching was against black men. Given 
this history, black intellectuals and opinion leaders feared that KCMO’s urban vice was having 
the same effect in degrading and devaluing black women.
153
  
Lewis Woods decried the fact that the city’s racist social order—and nationally, by 
extension—inscribed a double standard in defining black and white women’s gender roles.154  
When whites insulted black women or consorted with degraded black girls and women in houses 
of prostitution, Woods argued, they disregarded the moral worth of every black person and 
family.
155
   Worse, the failure to defend the womanly virtue of black women by white men when 
other white men assaulted it exposed the sad fact that “the black home itself stood outside the 
guardianship of organized society” which was officially “pledged to the sanctity of the home” 
when white women and white homes were involved.
156
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The most outrageous examples were of a white judge who dismissed a rape charge 
against a white man who had raped a three year old black girl and a 1915 incident in which a 
black teenage boy named Kenneth Oden had been arrested for kicking a white man who insulting 
his female cousins while they rode in a streetcar.
157
  The Sun bitterly noted that Oden’s response 
should be considered the normal one whenever “a big burly white man ogles and winks and 
insults a colored girl as many of them have done before in a crowded street car, feeling secure 
that whatever he does will be endorsed by his fellows and that no punishment will come to him 
on account of the cowardice . . .  of the Negroes present.”158 The paper further raged against the 
double standard of justice that discouraged black gentlemen for standing up for black women; 
could one imagine, the editorial noted, if the situation had been the reverse and it had been a 
black man behaving that way towards a white woman?
159
  “Every white man in the car would 
have felt it his bounden duty to have administered a blow or kick” and “would have been 
liberated with words of praise from the court” while the perpetrator “would have administered to 
him the severest penalty upon the statute books.”160  
With racial tensions running high in the city in the late teens, white elites looked at the 
East St. Louis race riot of 1917 and, later, at the 1919 Chicago and Omaha race riots with 
growing alarm.
161
  The existing white middle-class moral anxiety over blacks as part of urban 
vice that threatened their property values and status, the emerging “New Negro” intellectual and 
social outlook of retuning African-American World War I veterans who had been treated better in 
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France and Belgium than at home and who were determined to resist Jim Crow in order to make 
the homefront “safe for democracy,” and a housing industry determined to draw color lines were 
on a collision course at the close of the teens. The revival of the Ku Klux Klan nationally after 
the success of the 1915 film Birth of a Nation only made the situation that much more tense, and 
the interracial labor ties locally raised the specter of “the Red Menace” with the wave of labor 
violence nationwide in 1919. Accordingly, The Kansas City Post warned in the face of a national 
wave of racial violence and labor insurrection that “any man who takes the law into his own 
hands, whether striker, Ku Klux, or bolshevist, will run slap up against the machine gun of public 
opinion.”162  A special committee of both prominent blacks and whites was called by the Mayor 
to mediate housing disputes, squelch rumors among both races that were inflammatory, and 
condemn violence and arbitrary regulation of black residence.
163
  
KCMO and KCK both managed to escape the kind of racial violence that had engulfed 
Omaha and Chicago in 1919. It had been a close shave, however. On the Kansas side, increased 
racial tension had emerged over a proposed anti-miscegenation bill in 1913 that only went down 
to defeat after much NAACP effort against it and only in the Kansas Senate.
164
  Only a short time 
before this committee was convened over housing, two black homes were burned and a black 
church dynamited following KCMO’s screening of Birth of a Nation.  Indeed, The Citizens’ 
League Bulletin warned that same year that KCMO “was sitting on a volcano” when it came to 
race.  Another example of a close call was the fact that in October, a black physician had told the 
Bulletin that he had intended to take a gun to a post office with intent to pistol-whip a white 
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postal worker who had insulted his wife but decided against it.  It was this climate that led to the 
formation of the Inter-Racial Committee of Twelve in 1920.  
The story of organized labor and the African-American community of KCK and KCMO 
between 1890 and the Second World War is at the heart of the next chapter. The importance of 
the 1920s and 1930s manifested themselves in the shaping shifting political alliances, civil rights 
activism, and urban development. At the end of this period, the earliest signs of urban crisis 
began to accumulate, but because of the ongoing Great Depression, few blacks or whites would 
pay attention. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: KANSAS CITY’S BLACK WORKING-
CLASS, POLITICS, AND ORGANIZED LABOR IN AN URBAN 
CRISIS, 1920-32   
Most African Americans in both KCK and KCMO in the early twentieth century were 
working-class or poor, and as such, far removed from the world of the city’s black elite 
intelligentsia discussed in the previous chapter. In educational access, status, and economic well-
being, to name but a few means of measuring the class gap within the African American 
community, the distinction was sharp. What both groups shared was the humiliation and 
oppression built in to the city’s local variant of Jim Crow at the hands of whites. It is precisely 
this African American working class, sharing with elite blacks the common experience of racial 
oppression but otherwise comprising an entirely different set of experiences in early twentieth 
Kansas City, who will be the focus of this chapter. As in other cities, it would be the African 
American working class who would be hit the hardest when the urban crisis fully developed at 
the end of the 1930s and early 1940s. To fully measure the damage the urban crisis did to this 
majority of the city’s black community, it is necessary to first examine the primary occupations, 
livelihoods, and position relative to both the labor movement and corporate employers black 
workers held before the crisis hit full force. 
The 1920s and 1930s would have important consequences for Greater Kansas City in 
shifting long standing political alliances, the rise and fall of vital industries for workers of all 
backgrounds, the rise of a newer more inclusive unionism, and economic catastrophe late in this 
time period drastically altering the landscape of everyday life for working-class blacks and 
everyone else. Despite these sweeping changes, a constant in city life remained the strong color 
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line drawn through housing policy and neighborhood planning, one which would help to cause 
urban crisis when combined with the Great Depression and eventual World War II-era Great 
Migration to the city from the rural South. 
As already noted in chapter two, labor unrest in KCMO represented one factor shaping 
white middle-class anxieties around race. The complex but often symbiotic relationship between 
white unionists and the black community in both KCMO and KCK was highly atypical for the 
country at the turn of the previous century. The national context of the relationship between 
mainstream organized labor and the black community, after all, was deeply adversarial until the 
1930s.  From the late nineteenth century until the 1930s, unions normally excluded African 
Americans, while industries normally used African American workers to break strikes. Not 
surprisingly, given the AFL’s hostility to blacks and other racial minorities, that norm was also 
often coupled with black intellectual opposition to the labor movement. The story of the 
interaction between Kansas City’s African American community and its labor unions relates to 
the urban crisis in two important ways. First, organized labor represented a potential, if far from 
fully realized, ally outside of KCMO’s African-American community in the fight against Jim 
Crow discrimination, including the housing discrimination that lay at the heart of the urban 
crisis. Secondly, when the urban crisis did hit, it helped to accelerate the process by which labor 
was undermined by the demise of the urban industrial base. 
 Charles E. Coulter accounted for this local exception to a national picture of mutual 
hostility between labor unions and the African-American community by using regional terms as 
metaphors for the strictness of racial hierarchical orders; as he put it, “Kansas City was both 
northern and western enough to allow some gaps in the city’s racially based strictures.”1  The 
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“western enough” metaphor for the city’s racial attitudes invokes the ways in which KCMO fit 
James Leikner’s description of the neighboring state of Kansas as “libertarian.”2  This had 
contradictory consequences for the relationship between blacks and labor specifically in the city. 
On the one hand, like in the rest of the country, “the major unions rejected African-American 
workers.”3  On the other hand, “the black hod-carriers union was recognized by labor leaders, 
and the major unions in the meatpacking industry organized both black and white labor.”4  
Additionally, as has already been discussed, some of the largest strikes in the 1910s were started 
by wildcat actions of both black and white workers in certain industries, including women as 
well as men of both races. 
Given that black workers were mostly concentrated in “the packinghouses and related 
industries,” and that the packinghouses were of predominant importance among local industries, 
the relationship between working-class blacks and white unionists locally was far more friendly 
than was the case almost everywhere else in the early decades of the twentieth century.
5
  As 
previously noted, the ties between the city’s black workers and the meatpacking plants went all 
the way back to the 1870s so those relationships were well established. In other industries, the 
attitudes of labor union locals and their officials varied widely in regards to African Americans.  
In addition to the hod-carriers and packinghouse workers, KCMO’s Building Trades, Iron 
Workers, Rock Quarrymen, and Truck Drivers union locals all were open to full African-
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American participation.
6
  The Musicians’ Union, Organization of Hotel and Restaurant 
Employees, Journeymen Barbers, and Laundry Workers’ unions, however, only admitted black 
workers as part of segregated union locals.  Still others, such as bricklayers, carpenters, cement 
finishers, electricians, painters, plasterers, plumbers, stonemasons, and tile setters would only 
hire blacks as “helpers” to white workers in those jobs.7   Finally, there was a significant set of 
organized labor unions that froze out African-Americans entirely: asbestos workers, carpet 
layers, elevator constructors, glaziers, hoisting engineers, insulators, lathers, marble setters, 
roofers, sheet metal workers, sign writers, and steamfitters all refused to admit black workers 
into their locals. Some railroad brotherhoods excluded not only African Americans, but Mexican-
Americans and American Indians as well.
8
  So while it would be false to claim that there was 
true interracial solidarity among Kansas City’s working-class, it was definitely the case that 
interracial labor actions weren’t as rare as elsewhere in the United States. Incidentally, KCK had 
been an international headquarters of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship 
Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers, and Helpers since 1893; this union permitted separate black 
locals but barred blacks from promotion to blacksmiths.
9
  
Beyond this wide variation in policy towards African Americans by the city’s labor locals 
lay the reality of the overall poor living conditions for working-class blacks. The Urban League 
of Kansas City conducted two major surveys of black employment in 1926 and 1940, 
respectively.
10
  Of the two reports, the 1940 report was the most blunt, reflecting as it did the full 
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ravages of a decade of the Great Depression. The 1926 report downplayed discrimination with 
euphemisms such as its assertion that the city’s black workers held “no unusual positions in 
industry” and in its insistence that black bricklayers and carpenters made “good money” in spite 
of those trades’ locals blatant racial discrimination.11  By contrast, the 1940 report explicitly 
described the consequences of job discrimination and identified the cause of it: employers’ and 
the AFL’s discriminatory policies. 
The study began in 1930, the year after the Stock Market Crash.
12
  Surveying the first 
year of the Depression among black workers in KCMO, the study noted that “two-thirds of all 
African-American workers were gainfully employed.”13  For male workers, blacks were engaged 
in 139 of 155 occupations listed, while for female workers, 41 of 59 occupations listed were 
open to blacks. However, these numbers were misleading given that elsewhere in the survey, it 
noted that for 43 of the occupations listed for men, fewer than ten black men were engaged, 
while fewer than a dozen black women were engaged in the 16 of 41 occupations open to black 
women in KCMO. The study also noticed that two-thirds of the black workforce of the city was 
concentrated in two areas: manufacturing and domestic services. In fact, the domestic percentage 
was higher than the industrial manufacturing percentage, some 34.3 percent to 30.8 percent, and 
these numbers did not include women workers.
14
 Census data from the year independent of the 
Urban League survey shows that eighty percent of teenage black girls and women were servants, 
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hairdressers, boardinghouse operators, laundresses, or waitresses.
15
  
Those unlucky enough to be seeking jobs outside of the packinghouse industry or the 
other occupations whose labor locals were open to black workers faced the near impossible task 
of finding work without union membership.
16
  Training in skilled work often went hand in hand 
with labor membership, so such discrimination kept black workers unskilled, lessening their 
chances for employment.  The report noted that employer discrimination in KCMO was also 
rampant, as “many employers are reluctant to hire Negroes except as a last resort and in the least 
desirable jobs.”17  Inside and outside of unions, the study noted, “many white workers object to 
working in company with Negroes” altogether.18   Accordingly, at the beginning of the 
Depression, only thirty percent of businesses in the city employed black workers, with half of 
those black workers being porters. 
The result of such discriminatory practices for living standards among black working 
families was disastrous: the Urban League determined that of the aforementioned thirty percent 
lucky enough to be employed by the city’s businesses, the average wage was twenty-one dollars 
and fifty cents a week, half of what their white counterparts earned.
19
  Nine years earlier, during 
the “good times” of the 1920s boom, the Bureau of Labor Statistics had found that a family of 
five needed twice that amount for basic housing, food, and clothing.
20
   
Examples of low wages and discrimination that the report described abound in the 
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primary sources of the times, especially in the black press. In 1921, for example, one of the 
department stores in the city fired four hundred and seventy men and women, only rehiring those 
that would accept a pay cut to fifteen dollars a week from the twenty-two dollars and fifty cents 
weekly rate the store had paid during the war.
21
  When Chevrolet opened a plant in the city in 
1929, it hired black workers only as janitors and paid them only fifteen dollars a week, a practice 
that editor Chester Franklin of The Kansas City Call denounced bitterly as a denial of “the living 
wage of the automobile industry” in favor of “Kansas City’s less-than-$20-a-week” wages for 
black men and women.
22
   
The list of these practices went on, demonstrating union as well as company 
discrimination. In the case of a local steel plant, the company displaced eighteen black workers 
on the nightshift with white workers from another sector of the plant.
23
  The eighteen workers 
protested in this case, but weren’t rehired until an investigation exposed that the white workers 
had refused to work on the open hearth during the hottest months of the summer, while the black 
workers displaced had done so. When the Carpenters’ Union organized a lumber mill in the city 
in the 1930s, it refused to accept a black man who had worked there since 1911 into the union.
24
  
When he joined the Truck Drivers’ Union instead, the Carpenters’ Union subsequently gave his 
job to a white man. The Urban League intervened and the worker regained his job, but, the 
carpenters’ local still refused to admit him. Finally, a black man who had worked for thirty years 
as a glassworker was cut from his job along with several white workers when the business started 
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to struggle; the white workers were subsequently rehired, but he was not.
25
  As was the case 
nationally, African Americans in KCMO in the 1920s and 30s were often the last hired and the 
first fired. 
How, then, one might ask, can this abominable record of race discrimination be 
reconciled with the description of the interracial strikes in 1904, 1917, and 1918 among hack 
drivers, meat cutters, cannery workers, freight carriers, soap workers, laundresses, and streetcar 
workers? The answer, again, is that the common denominator of these strikes mostly revolved 
around the packinghouses and industries strongly related to them. In all but the 1918 laundry-led 
general strike, this is especially apparent. And as noted already, laundresses happened to be one 
of the occupations open to black women.  
Comparisons to other industrial cities of the era that experienced race riots in the late 
1910s such as Chicago and St. Louis are instructive. Unlike the explosive situation in Chicago in 
1919 or in East St. Louis in 1917, African Americans in KCK and KCMO did not compete with 
Eastern European immigrants or Irish for housing space and had not in the late nineteenth 
century either, when Eastern European immigrants first arrived in the Greater Kansas City area; 
the different groups lived in distinct parts of the city.
26
  In addition, Irish immigrants and black 
workers had worked side by side in unskilled positions in the plants since the 1870s. This was 
because both KCK and KCMO’s black communities predated Chicago’s by several decades, 
stretching back to the 1850s. Instead of being new arrivals in the Great Migration wave from the 
rural Deep South to cities with established Irish or Eastern European immigrant communities, 
black communities in both KCK and KCMO had been present since the earliest Irish 
                                                 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Coulter, 61; US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census(Washington D.C.: 1911), 
Fourteenth Census (Washington D.C.: 1921) 
 129 
 
communities and had been established before the arrival of Eastern European immigrants.  There 
had already been at least three waves of black migration to the Greater Kansas City metro 
between 1850 and 1880, with the Exoduster wave of 1879-80 being the largest.  
While scholars are unsure as to how much of a difference the Great Migration made in 
KCMO (Charles Coulter stated that it was inconclusive), it is clear that the post-1915 Great 
Migration increased the black population of KCMO by a third between 1910 and 1920 and also 
accounted for a steady increase in black packinghouse workers in the 1910s to the point that they 
comprised twenty percent of its labor force.
27
  Coulter noted that the growth rate of KCMO’s 
black population between 1910 and 1920 “paled in comparison to other cities farther north and 
east,” although that could simply reflect the fact that many of those cities had a negligible 
African American population before 1910, while again, KCMO already had a significant one.
28
  
As subsequent chapters will demonstrate, the Great Migration would hit the city with its fullest 
force several decades later, during World War II. Interestingly enough, Coulter also concluded 
that both the Great Migration and the phasing out of skilled butchers pushed the Cudahy canners’ 
strike to its victory by increasing the number of black workers in the packing plants.
29
  The 
reason for the removal of skilled butchers was the modernization of the plants by applying 
assembly-line techniques using machines; the result was that new opportunities opened for 
unskilled workers.  
But if racial tensions had not been caused by competition between blacks and immigrants 
over jobs or housing, there were still very real racial tensions in the city. Historian Sherry Lamb 
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Schirmer, for her part, has argued that the Great Migration increased population overcrowding on 
the “black” eastside, especially after 1922.30  By 1925, Kansas City was noted alongside those 
very “cities father north and east” such as Detroit and Cleveland as having high racial tensions 
over housing by the Federal Council of Churches.
31
  So, while competition for jobs was not a 
potent factor for racial violence in KCMO, by the 1920s housing patterns certainly were as much 
a source of racial violence as anything in Detroit. Given the history of mixed neighborhoods in 
the city between the 1850s and roughly 1904 mentioned in this chapter and earlier, this was a 
drastic change of events for KCMO. 
Indeed, the color lines drawn by the insurance industry and middle-class whites around 
housing, property, and neighborhoods and the white middle-class anxiety over race, status, 
gender, and place identified in chapter two intensified in this time period. As Schirmer put it, the 
1920s were a time of “partitioning Kansas City” along racial lines.32  The growth of the black 
commercial district at Eighteenth and Vine in the middle and later 1920s made the eastside quite 
attractive to black homeowners, but construction of new businesses or institutions such as 
schools or churches removed available space for housing. Overcrowding was already a problem 
in the black eastside by the middle of the 1920s, as residences averaged an occupancy of four 
and a half families.
33
  This development especially hurt the black working-class and poor, who 
were forced to endure overcrowding and deteriorating conditions because they had no money to 
move anywhere else. Here we see an ominous foreshadowing of the urban crisis’ full blown 
emergence in KCMO by the Second World War. 
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Desperate to find better housing than the increasing ghettoization occurring in the Eighth 
Ward, middle-class African Americans relied on black real estate agents to find housing 
elsewhere in the city. One of the city’s best known and successful black realtors was Fortune J. 
Weaver.
34
  Nicknamed “The Locator,” Weaver was one of the earliest so-called “blockbusters” in 
Kansas City. Cultivating ties with white-owned realty firms, and white property owners, he knew 
how to convince them to rent or sell to African American customers.  Weaver’s formula was this: 
he would first announce “a willingness to pay cash for lots of twenty-five” and then, other real 
estate agents would encourage white flight by having a light-skinned black person called “the 
strawman” pretend to buy a house in an all-white neighborhood.35  Unlike in subsequent decades, 
when the drive would be for integrated housing, civil rights activists in 1920s Kansas City did 
not lament white flight both because it gave blacks additional places to live and because racial 
hostility, discrimination, and oppression were so intense that attempting to integrate housing was 
not a priority. In fact, the editor of the Call, Chester A. Franklin, noted rather dismissively that “it 
is time wasted to try to prove to whites that they should not refuse to live neighbors to 
Negroes.”36  Such “busted” neighborhoods tended to re-segregate rapidly. 
However, if only one black family purchased a home in a white neighborhood it was 
incredibly dangerous. White violence against black homes peaked between 1921 and 1928, with 
sometimes as many as seven bombings of homes in a single year.
37
  1923 was a particularly bad 
year for such clashes, as Chester A. Franklin complained of a lack of “unoccupied ground where 
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Negroes can go and live without having to fight to do so.”38  Vigilance committees and the 
formation of a Negro Protective and Improvement Association failed to stem the attacks, as did 
NAACP complaints to the police. As shall be seen later, the police force at this time was 
controlled by a very anti-black political faction of the Republican Party, so claims of “adequate 
protection” verbally by the department were undermined by practices of leaving the houses 
unguarded at “the right time” and failure to arrest any whites connected with the attacks.39  If 
other blacks lived in the neighborhood of a threatened home, they would often sit with their 
threatened neighbors to watch over their home. All too rare was the case in 1927 when white 
residents of a similar neighborhood actually protected two black women from a white mob.
40
  
Racial violence by whites over housing in KCMO had a definite class character in that it 
was usually middle-class. For example, in all of the cases of white violence against black 
homeowners and renters in the city, Schirmer identified the perpetrators as being solidly blue-
collar in only one instance, the North End. Other whites involved in the fighting in the 
neighborhood came from a mixture of class backgrounds and ethnicities that were predominantly 
lower-middle-class.
41
  This incident occurred in an apartment complex there known as the 
Garland in 1925.
42
  The Garland had been built as part of a series of apartment complexes in the 
1880s along Independence Avenue. The new owner in 1925 wanted to increase his occupancy 
rate by opening the apartments to black renters. The owner renamed the complex Lincoln 
Apartments and assigned a black owned real estate firm to handle rentals. He was forced to 
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change his plans when an angry mob of white protestors gathered.
43
  Along with the wide 
variation in labor local practices towards blacks, the outburst of violence at Garland 
demonstrates that there was no true interracial solidarity among KCMO’s working-class in the 
1920s; that it was atypical also serves to further underline the mostly middle-class nature of the 
city’s white racism.  
The other cases occurred on the eastern and western flanks of KCMO’s black eastside, as 
crowding pressured black residents outward into older white suburbs.
44
  There were seven 
different neighborhoods in the city that witnessed the most violence (typically bombings) 
between 1923 and 1927: 21st and Park, 25th and Montgall, 19th and Montgall, 20th and Park, 
24th and Brooklyn, 25th and Tracy, and 20th and Montgall.
45
  All of these neighborhoods were a 
mixture of class and ethnic backgrounds but they were dominated by the lower middle class. 
Amongst the heterogeneous population were German, Italian, and Jewish families and, often, 
each end of the class structure, with physicians side by side with blue-collar workers. Unlike 
other cases, residents here were not defending homes and streets they had known for many years; 
about sixty percent had arrived only three years before the first anti-black violence started. In 
other words, these neighborhoods already had high turnover rates even before African Americans 
tried to purchase homes in significant numbers. Unlike Chicago and Detroit, where housing 
shortages did much to inflame racial violence over housing, in KCMO the bombings actually 
followed one of the biggest housing booms in the city’s history.46  The motive for violence in 
KCMO wasn’t competition over houses, but the skin color of residents and anxieties over 
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property values. Unfortunately, the 1923-27 wave of attacks was neither the first nor the last 
example of white terror bombing in the city’s history for the purposes of keeping certain 
neighborhoods white. 
If white residents turned to terror bombings to keep blacks out of majority white  
neighborhoods, white city officials and private businessmen in real estate and housing 
construction firms used more subtle tactics to get the same results. Many other American cities 
used zoning laws before 1917 as a means to create racially segregated neighborhoods and urban 
spaces. US cities were forced to end such practices when the Supreme Court ruled racial zoning 
illegal in the Buchanan v. Warley case of 1917, striking down a Louisville zoning ordinance.  In 
Kansas City’s case, however, similar moves were made much later. In June 1923, KCMO ‘s city 
council passed a zoning ordinance and began utilizing it specifically to separate land uses by 
race.
47
  The city enacted this law despite the Buchanan v. Warley ruling. KCMO was able to 
escape accountability for this action largely because neither the ordinance nor its supporters 
mentioned race; it was justified under the rubric of beautifying the city.
48
  Its zoning ordinance 
was in addition to private sector restrictive covenants, which replaced zoning elsewhere as a tool 
for urban race segregation. As mentioned earlier, private real estate firms and homeowners also 
turned to the whites-only restrictive covenants to keep African-Americans out of white 
neighborhoods. The Supreme Court would not strike these covenants down until after World War 
II, and by then they had been put in place “in almost every Kansas City suburb and newly 
developed residential area.”49   
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The 1920s were an important decade in the development of the modern real estate 
industry. One key figure in the hardening of residential race segregation in KCMO who would be 
linked to the inscription of housing discrimination into the New Deal’s federal housing policies 
was J.C. Nichols, already famous for the Plaza and the city beautiful movement locally.
50
  
Nichols was one of the first developers to promote the use of racial covenants and his J.C. 
Nichols Company was a major land developer and shopping center constructor as well as 
homebuilder.
51
  Nichols’ use of covenants not only shaped KCMO’s model for residential race 
segregation, but was used as a model in other cities as well. Fatefully, he helped advise the 
Federal Housing Administration at its creation during the 1930s, bringing these biases into 
federal policy.
52
  His influence went still deeper: as noted by sociologist Kevin Fox Gotham, 
“deed restrictions and restrictive covenants not only legitimized the idea of land-use control,” but 
were also “the primary mechanism” in the creation of the modern subdivision.53  The 
consequences of these developments would be a decades-long and even now frustratingly 
unresolved issue for the civil rights movement both in Greater Kansas City and nationally. By the 
1920s, all major actors and segments of the US housing industry were convinced that 
neighborhood decay, poor housing, and lower property values were linked to either black or 
racially mixed occupancy of a given space. 
Beginning in 1908 and continuing throughout this period, Nichols’s company built 
dozens of whites-only upper- and middle-class housing with covenants that officially prohibited 
housing sales to African Americans. Nichols advertised his subdivisions as the “highest class” in 
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Kansas City, appealing to white middle-class sentiments about place and status.
54
  By the late 
1930s, the Nichols Company owned more than four thousand tracts of land in the Kansas City 
area and was expanding its racially exclusive housing properties into Johnson County, Kansas.
55
  
Another tactic to exclude blacks that Nichols pioneered was the organization of white 
homeowners into mandatory homeowners’ associations.56  The purpose in mind here was to 
create an incentive to enforce the racial covenants of the neighborhood, as neighborhoods in the 
process of turning over often ignored the covenants.
57
  After World War II, home builders 
routinely made such homeowners association mandatory in their suburban housing planning.
58
  
Nichols justified housing discrimination from the 1910s onward by claiming that such practices 
established “harmonious surroundings” and a “feeling of security” by establishing the “character 
of the neighborhood.”59  Nichols even claimed that such exclusion of blacks and Jews created “a 
more interested citizenship and a more home-loving family.”60  
Influenced by the former, a second type of homeowner association that was voluntary 
began to appear in white middle-class neighborhoods to prevent racial turnover. These 
organizations spread rapidly throughout KCMO in the 1920s and were often led by real estate 
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agents.
61
  These associations attempted to buy property from recent black homeowners, bought 
property from landlords renting to blacks, and bought vacant homes in their neighborhoods. The 
organizations also lobbied city hall to pass racially discriminatory land-use policies and to close 
streets where African Americans lived to through traffic. In some cases, they made Jim Crow in 
public places worse by threatening to boycott white businesses that had any black clients.
62
  
Among the most well-known of these homeowners’ associations were the Linwood Improvement 
Association (founded in 1923), the Greenwood Improvement Association (founded in 1923), the 
Southeast Home and Protective Association (founded in 1923), the Home Owners’ Mutual 
Benefit Association (founded in 1926), the East Side Improvement Association (founded in 
1926), and the Southeast Improvement Association (founded in 1926).
63
  These organizations 
would help mount defenses of KCMO’s Jim Crow segregation well into the 1940s.64  
Nor were these organizations above invoking the threat of vigilante white terror as a 
deterrent to blacks who would move into “their” neighborhoods. Between 1910 and 1932, letters, 
signs, and posters appeared in several Kansas City neighborhoods that threatened violence or 
death.
65
  In 1927, letters were circulated around neighborhoods and to the Kansas City Call that 
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stated that “Niggers have no business in this neighborhood.”66  The following year, posters began 
appearing on trees in some neighborhoods that said “Danger! Colored people are hereby notified 
that they will not be allowed to live on this block. This block is white and going to stay white at 
any cost.”67  The toll of the solidifying of residential apartheid in the 1920s and 1930s was 
apparent by 1940, as black neighborhoods rose to racial isolation rates of eighty-eight percent, an 
almost complete reversal of the degree of residential mixing in the late nineteenth century.
68
  
Building on the mighty legacies of Grisham, Coles, Yates, Jones, Becks, Smith, Bradley, 
Johnson, and Crews were a group of African American middle-class intellectuals and activists 
who called themselves “race men” and “race women”; they were determined to resist the 
deepening racial oppression and segregation in the 1920s and push for basic civil rights.
69
  A 
smaller, more politically active portion of the black professional class, educator J. Silas Harris 
described them as “distinguished leaders of the race.”70  In contrast to the black working-class, 
the major occupations of which were meatpacking, janitorial and domestic work, and railcar 
porters, the dominant occupation for the black professional classes was that of clergyman.
71
  The 
city’s form of Jim Crow, however, would humiliate blacks of all backgrounds and the housing 
discrimination directly excluded middle-class blacks. 
Among the best known “race men” and “race women” were Willa Glenn, Chester A. 
Franklin, editor of the Kansas City Call, and future NAACP leader Roy Wilkins.  Nelson Crews, 
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as noted previously, had edited the Sun throughout the 1910s as a robust voice for black 
Republicanism in the city. By 1921, however, his health began to decline. Willa Glenn was a 
graduate of Western University and had joined the Sun in 1910.  She had taken over the Sun 
between 1921 and 1923 and had contributed editorials for Crews in the spirit of “The New 
Negro” before Crews’ illness.72  She was a firm believer in uplift and “advancement of the race.” 
Glenn pulled no punches in her fiery writing; in 1921, she castigated police brutality with the 
cutting remark that “the order ‘SHOOT TO KILL’ is fine, just right, just the thing, PROVIDED 
the man you shoot is a Negro.”73  Another column the previous year, at the very height of white 
supremacist thinking and Klan revival in the US, asserted that “a nigger-hater is not only an 
enemy to Democracy but a curse to himself.”74  Nelson Crews passed away on April 24, 1923.75    
After Crews’ death, Watkins, Fred Dabney, Samuel Hopkins, Reuben Street, L. Amasa Knox, and 
the Reverends D.A. Holmes and James Wesley Hurse bought the Sun and tried to save it, but the 
paper folded in 1925.   
Into the void left by Crews’ death and the collapse of the Sun stepped Chester Arthur 
Franklin, founder of the Kansas City Call.
76
  As previously noted, Franklin was already a force 
for civil rights in the city through his work in the NAACP. Franklin was born on June 7, 1880 in 
Denison, Texas. In 1887, his parents had been part of the waves of southern black migration to 
Kansas; the Texas couple’s original goal had been Nicodemus in northwestern Kansas. On the 
way, they changed their mind and young Chester Franklin grew up in Omaha. In 1913, Franklin 
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came to Kansas City with the intent of starting a newspaper. Due to the outbreak of World War I, 
his dream was delayed by a couple of years, but he nonetheless opened a printing press. On May 
6, 1919, Franklin published the first issue of the Kansas City Call.
77
  
Like Crews, Franklin pushed for a proud black Republicanism, but was also adamant 
about “the growing race consciousness of Negroes” which race men were obligated to encourage 
in “resistance that is taking them upwards with leaps and bounds.”78  Franklin’s ideal “race man” 
and “race woman” were defined by several qualities. These included deeds; knowledge of black 
history and culture; proud self-identification as “Negroes;” no toleration of racial insult or slight; 
and an unspoken or spoken vow to “advance the race” by both example and direct activism.79  
Black Kansas Citians who fell short of this set of standards met the contempt of race men and 
women. 
Franklin remained both a Republican and a conservative on economic matters, but often 
found himself tempted to vote for Roosevelt and Truman near the end of his life due to his 
frustrations with the Republicans’ record on civil rights.80  Even during the height of the 
Depression in 1930, Franklin preached free-market capitalism and self-help, bemoaning 
working-class and poor blacks who “bewail their lack of employment but refuse to grasp evident 
opportunity.”81  However, Franklin did not adhere to pure rugged individualism, stating in an 
address to the 1937 Urban League that “the problem of the unemployed mass of Negroes is 
equally the problem of employed Negroes who produce, and it is for all to carry the struggle 
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together.”82  
The meteoric rise of Roy Wilkins to leading activist in Kansas City had a great assist with 
Franklin’s decision to hire Wilkins, a recent journalism graduate from the University of 
Minnesota, as a reporter for the Call.
83
  Wilkins’ influence was felt in that he steered Franklin 
towards relenting on some of the sensationalism in the paper that emphasized scandals and 
murders in favor of more political news.
84
  Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Franklin and 
Wilkins—through the Call—advanced the interests and needs of the Kansas City African 
American community like no others. For example, Franklin and the paper forced the local court 
system to end the slave state-era practice of refusing to allow blacks to serve on juries.
85
  As 
noted earlier, the paper and Franklin bitterly condemned the housing discrimination of Nichols 
and the neighborhood associations, insisting on the right of black men and women to live 
wherever they could afford the housing. In 1930, Wilkins organized a boycott of a local bakery 
that refused to hire black drivers; since much of its customer base was black, the bakery relented 
after two weeks. 
Boycotts and protests against discrimination spread in the 1920s, inspired by Franklin 
and others. In 1922, protests forced the city to cancel a watermelon eating contest scheduled for 
black children as part of the mayor’s picnic.86  The same year, The City Federation of Clubs, a 
combination of black women’s clubs, succeeded in boycotting a segregated showing of a movie 
at a local theater, pressured a furniture store to extend credit to black customers, and convinced a 
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local merchant to stop marketing his candy as “nigger toe brittle.”87  However, other protests at 
the time failed due to white owners’ claims that the bigotry was on the part of white patrons, or 
by denying segregation was their intent. Examples included Swope Park’s unofficial “whites 
only” policy and the VFW’s 1928 decision to ban black women from selling poppies on 
Armistice Day. In the case of Swope Park, in 1927, park attendants ordered a group of black 
Camp Fire Girls to leave a shelterhouse where they were having a picnic.
88
  When the girls’ 
leaders refused to budge until the park confirmed the shelter was for whites only, the attendants 
threatened them. Activists, including one of the fathers of the girls, attempted to take legal action 
but the park board denied having ever given any orders to remove the girls.
89
  As for the VFW 
case, the veterans’ organization used a similar tactic, making the excuse that white women would 
object if they had to attend sales meetings with black women.
90
  
Crowded into isolated black neighborhoods, shut out by many labor unions, 
discriminated against by many private business owners, and oppressed by the police, the black 
working-class had to endure every single racial slight experienced by the black middle-class in 
addition to lacking the financial resources to move or organize against their oppression. African 
American middle-class civil rights activists’ “uplift” programs helped somewhat but often were 
hobbled by middle-class conservatism and distance from the plight of the working-class.  
Franklin, for his part, was a rare case in that he welcomed the activism of radicals such Marcus 
Garvey and A. Philip Randolph and also embraced Gandhi’s philosophy of nonviolent civil 
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disobedience by 1931.
91
  Given Franklin’s previously noted economic conservatism, this may 
seem odd, but Franklin’s admiration for both men as living up to the “race men” ideal probably 
overrode any distaste for separatism and socialism, respectively. 
* * * * * * * 
If the strikes of the 1900s and 1910s had shown that working-class blacks had agency 
independent of black middle-class activists and reformers or the very few whites sympathetic to 
them, African American workers’ political agency became almost synonymous with the Pullman 
railcar porter in the 1920s and 1930s. The railcar porters rose to great prominence in the years 
between World War I and World War II in both in KCMO and nationwide, led by the pioneering 
African American labor leader and Socialist, A. Philip Randolph. Their breakthrough was 
especially critical in a local climate in which most railroad brotherhoods were whites-only.
92
  As 
a vehicle for black working-class agency, they had no equivalent until decades later, when 
Freedom Incorporated ran black political candidates for office in 1962 and later still with the 
appearance of the local version of the Panther Party.
93
  All of the other dominant civil rights and 
black organizations were middle- or upper-class in orientation, in contrast to the Brotherhood. 
Kansas City was one of the first areas organized after the formation of the Brotherhood of 
Sleepingcar Porters Union in 1925.
94
  Randolph and the Brotherhood of Porters would seek to 
overturn the discriminatory practices of the AFL and union locals both in KCMO and nationally 
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in the decades to come. The AFL granting the union a charter was itself a significant crack in the 
old Gompers-era racial discrimination. Even before Randolph’s formation of an African 
American labor union organizing the porters, they held a much higher status in the black 
community than did packinghouse workers in spite of the paradox that the Pullman company 
made playing to white racial stereotypes of blacks part of the porters’ jobs.95  Their status in fact 
was so exceptional among black workers that they were said to constitute “an aristocracy of 
black labor.”96  After 1925 Randolph used the Brotherhood as a springboard for black 
unionization and civil rights, but in addition, the ranks of the porters nationally would generate 
much of the future civil rights and black intellectual leadership to come: Claude McKay of the 
Harlem Renaissance, Roy Wilkins, and Malcolm X were just a few of these figures.
97
   
The ascendancy of the Pullman porter between 1880 and 1925 was rooted in changes in 
transportation in the 1870s and 1880s.
98
  Early in the railroads’ history, from before the Civil War 
until the 1870s, very few trains had sleeping or eating arrangements. As a result, passengers had 
to inconveniently race off the car and grab a quick meal at a stop or wait for vendors to board the 
train to buy food from them. George Pullman’s dining and sleeping cars changed all of that by 
the 1880s; by the turn of the century, the cars, staffed with African American porters and waiters, 
were a “fixture in the railroad industry.”99  Pullman porters’ work could be divided into several 
categories: the busboy, café food service attendant, sleeping-car porter, and the private-car 
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porter.
100
  Kansas City claimed four hundred and sixty-five porters by 1920 , and almost nine out 
of ten were African American.
101
   
Building on the already significant presence of the porters in KCMO, Randolph 
succeeded in enrolling three hundred and one out of three hundred and eighty-six porters in the 
Greater Kansas City area by 1927.
102
  Throughout the remainder of the twenties and into the 
thirties, Randolph visited the city to speak and organize, including an appearance at the first 
Labor Conference in Kansas City in 1928. The Pullman Company aimed to crush the 
Brotherhood locals in KCMO in their infancy since Kansas City was too important as a rail hub 
to allow unionism to get a foothold ; the company favored only company unions.
103
  After the 
company withdrew from negotiations at a federal mediation board in 1928, tensions rose to the 
point where Randolph’s assistant general organizer, Ashley L. Totten, hid weapons in his office 
to repel strikebreakers.
104
  The following year, Totten was beaten severely with a club on a street 
outside of his headquarters in the Lincoln building.
105
  Randolph reassigned Totten to New York 
as national secretary treasurer afterwards, given how terrible his injuries were.
106
  A subsequent 
trial of the assailants failed to prove that the Pullman Company had ordered the attack, but a 
witness swore they were both promised police protection if they attacked Totten.
107
  One of the 
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attackers was identified as a cook for Ellis Burton, a major KCMO crime boss.
108
   
Totten was lucky in that he escaped death, and he was not the only one targeted. Anyone 
who advocated an independent union was attacked. J.H. Williams, a porter active in union 
organizing from Kansas City, was either taken or lured away from his coach in April 1930 and 
murdered.
109
  The killer or killers dumped his body several yards away from the tracks in Locust 
Grove, Oklahoma.
110
  Williams’ murderer was never found, despite investigations by the 
company, the railroad, and later the union itself working with local attorney and Socialist labor 
activist Frank P. Walsh.
111
  It was for this very reason that it was dangerous for Randolph to 
come to KCMO and consequently, he had to be hidden among friends whenever he was in the 
city. Whatever local politicians’ opinion was of Randolph, it was clear that the city did nothing to 
protect him or his allies from the Pullman Company and its hired muscle. It would take until 
1934 before Congress included sleeping-car porters in an amendment to the Railway Labor Act 
that banned company unions. By 1935, the Kansas City Call reported an end to the ten-year 
battle between the union and the Pullman company, noting that Pullman porters voted 
overwhelmingly to join the Brotherhood union.
112
  
Not all working-class blacks turned to the labor and social-democratic left in KCMO, 
however. Many turned instead to Black Nationalism. In fact, before Randolph began organizing 
the porters into the Brotherhood, it was Marcus Garvey’s United Negro Improvement 
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Association that was the largest black working-class political force in the city.
113
  Despite its 
mostly working class membership, the UNIA attracted some prominent supporters from among 
the professional classes as well.
114
  Eschewing both leftism and mainstream black Republican 
politics, Garvey preached black self-help economically, Black Nationalism, anti-colonialism, and 
pan-Africanism. By the early 1920s, the KCMO branch of the UNIA had grown to about three 
hundred members.
115
  Although the arrest and conviction of Garvey in 1925 greatly weakened 
the movement, it survived as a local political force into the 1930s and was larger than the 
Communist Party ever was in KCMO.
116
  Among Black Nationalist groups, an even smaller 
organization was known as “The Red Fez” or the “red caps,” which consisted of followers of 
Mohammed Bey in both KCMO and KCK.
117
  This group followed a vaguely Islamic and race-
conscious religion and was estimated to have fifty followers in 1936.
118
  If Franklin had respect 
for Garvey, he certainly didn’t for Bey, blasting the “red caps” as a “cult” in the pages of the 
Call.
119
  
Beyond railcar porters, the railroads were also critical in offering employment to blacks 
outside of the porter profession; many worked in the rail yards and along rail lines. More than 
two thousand five hundred men from KCMO were employed by the railroads as laborers; almost 
a quarter of those laborers were African-American.
120
  During the First World War, in fact, the 
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railroads had even offered employment to black women. Many of these women were hired by the 
Santa Fe as roundhouse laborers and others occupied unskilled laboring jobs in the railyards.
121
  
Finally, another significant portion of the African-American working-class made their 
livings as janitors or domestic workers. In fact, more than half of the black male population of 
the city was employed as janitors according to the 1920 census.
122
  One of the lowest paying 
jobs, working as a janitor or a domestic could be as dirty as meatpacking or as demeaning as the 
stereotypical behavior porters were expected to exhibit in order to “entertain” or “comfort” white 
Pullman passengers.
123
  For some African-American men, however, the job provided both wages 
and a room in the apartment buildings in which they worked and did so in an environment where 
both were hard to come by for the black working-class.
124
  As with the Urban League study, 
census data at the time often ignored female workers, so while the data doesn’t show it, it is clear 
that occasionally wives or single women worked as janitors as well.
125
  The immediate effect of 
the Great Depression on the black working-class was to dramatically increase the number of 
male janitors by as much as fifty percent.
126
  Faced with this situation, the Urban League 
commissioned a janitor training program in 1932 with help for the unemployed in mind.
127
  
Beyond some white workers in some of the union locals, the black working-class and 
activists for African American civil rights more generally had very few white allies in the early 
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twentieth century, even among the self-styled “enlightened liberals” or further left, in the 
Socialist Party. This very fact was what made Randolph’s Brotherhood so important and 
revolutionary: a labor and socialist left gaining strength within the African American community 
and controlled by its own working-class. Such a black-directed organization was preferable to an 
outside ally tied to white society.  As African Americans had learned from whites in the labor 
movement, whites allies who were allegedly left of center or reformist were, at best,  
unpredictable when it came to race in the early twentieth century. 
White progressives/liberals and democratic-socialists aligned with the NAACP and the 
Urban League had the best records; so-called “clean government” reformers were often vicious 
racists in the Kansas City of the 1910s and 1920s.
128
  As for The Socialist Party of America, its 
leader, Eugene V. Debs, took very courageous and bold stances in refusing to speak in segregated 
venues and understood better than most whites of his day that racism was both morally wrong 
and a factor ensuring capitalist victories over unions and socialists.
129
  In doing so, he had 
overcome much of his own earlier racial prejudices, ones that ran deep in his native Indiana.
130
  
Unfortunately, this was not true of everyone in the Socialist Party and both in Kansas City and 
nationally, the 1910s era party harbored some very racist members.
131
  
Nationally, Victor L. Berger of Milwaukee represented a wing of the Socialist Party that 
was unapologetically white supremacist and virulently anti-black and anti-Chinese.
132
  The writer 
Jack London was also notorious for spouting race hatred and pseudoscientific racism against 
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Asians and blacks as often as he advocated socialism. In Kansas City, sadly, one of the city’s 
most celebrated Socialists, “Red Kate” O’Hare, harbored deeply racist views, despite denouncing 
poll taxes and “oppressive segregated housing ordinances” and lending her support to local black 
struggles in St. Louis.
133
   
Kate O’Hare had been born in Ottawa County Kansas, near Minneapolis, Kansas, in 1876 
but had grown up in Kansas City between 1887 and 1901.
134
  She did most of her subsequent 
political and organizational campaigning in Oklahoma, rural Kansas, rural Missouri, and St. 
Louis. She exposed her own personal bigotry in her campaigns to popularize the party in the 
border states and the South by repeating the Dunning school myths of Reconstruction as “Negro 
domination” and by referring to African Americans as “niggers” and “darkies,” and O’Hare made 
it clear that she considered blacks as “lazy, shiftless, and mentally inferior.”135  One of her most 
infamous racist writings was a 1912 pamphlet called “Nigger Equality” which disavowed 
Democratic claims that Socialists were for “social equality” between the races and advocated a 
racially separate Cooperative Commonwealth for blacks that would be established in land that 
would be severed off from the rest of the United States.
136
  W.E.B. DuBois could have just as 
easily been talking about O’Hare herself when he gave a withering address to the Ninth Annual 
Convention of the Intercollegiate Socialist Society in 1917 by stating of the white socialists: 
Ten indeterminate half-truths will sum up your whole knowledge of the Negro problem  
and the knowledge which you are unwilling to have disturbed. For instance, (1) the Negro 
is lazy; (2) the Negro is unhealthy and is dying out; (3) the Negro is inferior in mind and 
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body; (4) the Negro misused the ballot and the ballot was rightfully taken from him; (5) 
the Negro is lynched for rape; (6) the Negro is abnormally criminal; (7) the Negro’s one 
ambition is to marry your sister; (8) efforts to educate Negroes beyond a certain point are 
a failure; (9) the South is the best friend of the Negro; [and] (10) the Negro problem is 
insoluble.
137
  
 
O’Hare also laced her advocacy of women’s suffrage with attacks on black male voters as 
undeserving of voting rights.
138
  Incidentally, beyond suffrage, O’Hare’s thinking was not 
especially feminist compared to contemporaries such as Elizabeth C. Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, 
Alice Paul, Emma Goldman, Ida B. Wells-Barnett, Mary Church Terrell, or Frances Willard.
139
  
Rather conventionally, she believed that socialism was the path to saving the home and 
motherhood (and presumably, woman’s traditional role) from capitalism.140  O’Hare’s nickname 
of “Red” was given her by the press after she was arrested for opposing the draft during World 
War I, just as Debs had been.
141
  She was indicted for violating the Sedition Act in Devil’s Lake, 
North Dakota, on July 1917, and was sentenced to five years in prison in August, serving four 
months in Jefferson City’s Missouri State Penitentiary beginning in April 1919.142   The 
nickname is incredibly ironic given not only her racist record, but the fact that she sided with 
more conservative and centrist elements in the Party in most disputes; she opposed, for example, 
the IWW.
143
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Frank P. Walsh, another prominent socialist from Kansas City, had a mixed record on 
civil rights for African Americans. As has been seen, his partisan ties to the Democratic Party 
meant that he was not above race-baiting in local political campaigns against Republicans, as in 
1906.
144
  On the other hand, as noted in the cases of the beating of Totten and the murder of 
Williams, Walsh was an indispensable ally of Randolph and the Brotherhood in attempting to 
bring Pullman company thugs to justice for their attacks on porters active in the Brotherhood 
union. Going by these examples, his record was certainly better than O’Hare’s or Berger’s, but 
he was not as strongly anti-racist as Debs himself or socialists in the NAACP such as Mary 
White Ovington. 
The major Socialist paper of KCK from 1904-07, The Line-Up, most closely aligned 
itself with Debs’ attitudes towards African Americans out of all of the major local white voices 
for the Socialist Party. The paper, for example, expressed pleasure when the first black Socialist, 
M.R. Smith, was elected to office in KCK as Park Commissioner.
145
  Smith’s story was 
fascinating. He had been born to escaped slaves from Missouri in 1861 or 62, had been raised in 
Warsaw, Illinois, and in 1896 became a Socialist in a very unlikely place indeed: Springfield, 
Missouri.
146
  He moved to KCK in 1899 and became an active Party member in KCK by 1902.
147
  
As friendly as its coverage was, the paper, like Debs himself, fell short of offering any strategy to 
combat Jim Crow or segregation independent of class struggle. 
In contrast to the Socialists of the 1910s, the Communist Party USA in the 1930s would 
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prove to be a much more consistent and solid ally of black freedom both in Kansas City and 
nationally.
148
  In Kansas City, however, the party was not nearly as successful as elsewhere and 
as we have already seen, Garveyites outnumbered Communists among the city’s black 
population even in the 1930s. The Communists did not come close in Kansas City or the region 
around it to the levels of popularity achieved by the Socialists two decades earlier. Nevertheless, 
unemployed blacks made up the majority of marchers in a Communist demonstration against 
unemployment in the city in 1931 and the party’s failures locally were not from lack of trying.149  
The most prominent black Communist in KCMO was a man named Abner Perry.  Perry was 
arrested and fined in 1933 for “vagrancy,” though many suspected the real reason was both his 
politics and the fact that police caught him talking to a white female Communist.
150
  In a weird 
twist of fate, KCMO would have a strain of Marxist-Leninist thought briefly capture young black 
activists’ allegiance in KCMO in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the form of the Panther Party 
under Pete O’Neal.151  Unlike Self’s study of Oakland, where the national Panther Party had 
local Communist antecedents among the Longshoreman’s and other unions, KCMO’s sixties 
black radicalism was missing a strong predecessor that combined labor radicalism with anti-
racist activism.
152
  Anti-racist activism in KCMO would come either filtered through the CIO or 
from non-Communist radical sources, such as religious dissidents and Randolph’s Brotherhood. 
The newest labor organization of the 1930s, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
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was far more open to black workers than the AFL had ever been, and both Communists and 
leftists of other stripes influenced the new union’s militancy and openness to working-class men 
of all backgrounds. Nationally, the CIO would open unions up to black workers in unprecedented 
ways in a manner similar to Randolph—who was aligned with the AFL—and would pressure the 
Democratic Party to shift to the left in the 1930s. In Kansas City, the CIO had more of an impact 
than the Communist Party USA did, but the nascent labor organization had limited success in 
organizing black workers in the city and did better in some areas of the city’s industrial 
workforce than others.  
For example, the CIO was very thorough in organizing the packinghouse workers, but in 
other sectors, such as steel, clothing, and retail, very few black workers were organized.
153
  In 
steel, one hundred and forty black workers at four plants joined the CIO, but the remaining six 
steel plants had no African American workers at all.
154
  The Amalgamated Clothing Workers had 
about thirty to thirty-five members, while the three locals of the United Retail and Wholesale 
Employees Union had only six black members, all of whom were employed by Montgomery 
Ward.
155
   
As for the packinghouses, on the other hand, the CIO successes in organizing there were 
such that more than a quarter of CIO members in the meatpacking industry were African-
American.  In fact, one of the greatest union victories in 1930s Kansas City was a September 
1938 sit-down strike by the United Packing House Workers of America at the local Armour 
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plant.
156
  The strike was sparked by the Armour company decision to dock the pay of six workers 
for the time they spent before the plant’s grievance committee. Subsequently, eighteen hundred 
workers walked off the job in protest, half of whom were African American.
157
  Wildcat 
solidarity strike actions by black workers also were critical in achieving local victories. An 
example of such an action was the walkout of busboys and dishwashers, which devastated a Fred 
Harvey restaurant until management rehired a busboy viewed as unjustly fired.
158
  
Outside of the Left, white allies were if anything even rarer, especially as KCMO’s 
Republican Party by the 1920s had adopted much of the city’s white middle-class racism.159  The 
party’s betrayal of African-Americans locally was actually worse than the national party’s 
abandonment of civil rights between 1890 and 1925 when one examines the local record.  Here, 
the two cities diverge: KCK’s Republican mayors remained responsive and popular with black 
voters there into the 1940s.  In contrast, in KCMO, just as Democratic campaigns in 1906 and 
1908 had taken on ugly racial tones, Republican racism in the 1920s was a byproduct of 
intraparty factional warfare between party regulars and “anti-boss” reformers.  Just as in the case 
of the anti-machine Democrats, the Republican “reformers” were openly hostile to black 
people.
160
  The party regulars, or “boss Republicans,” had as recently as 1918 run a black 
candidate for alderman for the Eighth Ward, William C. Hueston.
161
  
But in 1920, the “reform” faction ousted black Republican activist Thomas Marks from 
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party councils and captured control of the party by 1922.
162
  A group of African American 
activists also fed up with the corruption of the regulars simultaneously ran an independent 
candidate in 1922, only to see him defeated.
163
  After the defeat of their independent candidate, 
this group initially backed the “anti-boss” Republicans, who also pledged to crack down on 
bootleggers, gamblers, and prostitutes.  A drive against urban vice was something on which the 
black middle-class could concur with the white middle-class.   However, this newly dominant 
Republican faction almost immediately revealed its bigotry and hostility to the city’s black 
community by injecting race-baiting into its antivice campaign invoking “crap-shooting Negroes 
who should either get jobs or get out of town.”164  Worse, the reformers cost blacks 
representation in the local party, and refused to nominate an African American candidate for 
alderman to the shock and outrage of black Republicans throughout the city. Former 1918 
alderman candidate Hueston angrily blasted the reformers as an elite faction of silk-stocking 
suburbanites that conspired to “keep blacks off the Republican ticket.”165  Nelson Crews also 
condemned Matthew Foster, the nominee, as a racist.
166
  As if to confirm these charges, it soon 
leaked out that a Republican committeeman aligned with the reform forces had as early as 1920 
declared that “we want no nigger votes for the anti-boss ticket.”167   
Racial insensitivity and open contempt for blacks by white upper-class Republicans 
continued throughout the decade, alienating the city’s African-American community further from 
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their historical political ties to the Republican Party. In 1924, Republicans decided to delay the 
opening of the newly built Jackson House for Negro Boys.
168
  Democrats immediately publicized 
this slight against the community. Republicans looked all the worse by being quoted as reasoning 
that because “the faucets and tile floors were too plush for black delinquents,” the building 
should be converted to house extra white elderly from an old folks’ home.169  The self-inflicted 
wounds continued: the Kansas City Republican Party segregated its seating by race in 1926 and 
then barred black delegates from the city’s hotels for the first time in history in 1928.170  Instead, 
the party’s leadership arranged to house the party’s African Americans in private homes and in a 
YMCA in the ghetto.
171
  The proverbial final straw politically was a Republican rally in 1930 in 
which a speaker openly used the word “nigger” in a speech.172  Besides these gaffes and acts of 
overt discrimination, the behavior of the Republican governor’s appointed police force as well as 
the party’s reaction to the KKK, detailed below, had made the 1930 speech the final factor in 
moving the city’s black population unambiguously towards the Democratic Party. The election 
totals showed it: in 1922, Republicans had carried the black precincts by margins as high as three 
to one; by 1930, those same precincts went Democratic by majorities from fifty-two to sixty 
percent.
173
  
This open Republican hostility to African Americans was spurred in part by the rise of the 
Second Ku Klux Klan in both Missouri and Kansas in the 1920s. Locally, the Second Klan’s 
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national zenith served to further tie the Republican Party on both sides of the state line to race-
baiting, and Jim Crow, fatally damaging the party’s ties to African-Americans in KCMO 
especially.
174
  The Klan entered western Missouri and eastern Kansas politics in 1922. Two years 
later, both states had one hundred thousand Klan members, five thousand of whom were 
concentrated around KCK and KCMO.
175
  In both states, a large percentage of Klansmen were 
from the white “respectable classes” of professionals and the organization in both states claimed 
to stand for patriotism, Americanism, and morality. In the region, the Klan directed most of its 
animosity against Catholics and immigrants; neither state saw much Klan terror against 
blacks.
176
  However, African-American voters were understandably nervous when the Klan 
entered Missouri politics, knowing all too well the original Klan’s legacy of terror and murder on 
behalf of racist white Democrats in the Deep South as well as its contemporary commitment to 
disfranchising blacks.
177
  The Klan’s claims that it had nothing against blacks “who stayed in 
their place” did nothing to reassure the city’s black community, for obvious reasons. 
Although the effect of the KKK in rural Missouri divided the Democratic Party, in 
Kansas City, the Klan eventually aligned itself exclusively with Republicans to target the Irish 
Catholic bosses Tom Pendergast and Joseph Shannon for defeat after the party had failed to do so 
through its anti-boss “Rabbit” faction.178  Whatever leverage the Klan had gotten in rural 
Democratic circles in Missouri was damaged when it targeted a fellow racist for defeat in a 
Senate race because he was a “wet” Democrat against Prohibition; by 1924, the Democratic 
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Party of Missouri denounced the KKK.
179
  While their gubernatorial candidate could not 
convince voters he had never been in the Klan and the Republican candidate for governor in 
Missouri explicitly rejected Klan support, locally the Democrats condemned the KKK while the 
Republicans actually elected a Kansas City mayor who was openly supported by the KKK.
180
   
If the Klan’s entry into Missouri politics damaged the Missouri Republican Party, the 
links between the KKK and Republicans on the Kansas side of the border reinforced the damage 
done, and unlike in Missouri, the Klan did not divide the Kansas Democratic Party.
181
  The 
Democratic Governor of Kansas, Henry J. Allen, denounced the Klan as soon as they appeared 
and ordered his attorney general to begin legal action that would remove the Klan from the 
state.
182
  The Democratic Mayor of KCK, Harry Burton, debated Klan leaders publicly and 
demanded city employees either resign from the Klan or quit their jobs. The Kansas Republican 
Party was tied even more strongly to the Klan in 1924, when the Republican gubernatorial 
candidate, Ben Paulen, welcomed the KKK’s endorsement and blocked an attempt to insert an 
anti-Klan plank into the Republican Party platform.
183
  For his part, the Democratic candidate for 
Kansas Governor denounced the Klan.  Paulen won; his victory and the strong Klan association 
with the campaign caught the attention of The Kansas City Call and further tied the Republicans 
to the Klan in the view of blacks in both KCMO and KCK.
184
  
Finally, what made Republican insults, discrimination, and alliances with the Klan sting 
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even more as betrayal was the abysmal record of the “anti-boss” Republicans’ police force. 
Although and as noted before, police brutality against the city’s blacks was at least as old as the 
1880s, the behavior of the Kansas City police in the 1920s was especially shameful.
185
  Police 
violence and harassment against African Americans in Kansas City drastically increased after 
1921, when Governor Hyde appointed Matthew Foster to head the Kansas City Board of Police 
Commissioners.
186
  The worst years were between 1922 and 1932. 
Foster was a true believer in the white upper- and middle-class ideology of civic 
housekeeping that linked social status and urban space in racialized and gendered ways. He was 
rumored to hate Italians, which made African Americans and many others in the city even more 
uneasy about him.
187
  His refusal to run or appear with the machine-endorsed African American 
candidate William C. Hueston in 1918 had already made him widely disliked by blacks.
188
  On 
top of these biases, Foster’s previous experience had been as one of the local officials who broke 
the 1918 general strike and was often referred to contemptuously by the labor press as “a silver 
spoon” who’d “never worked a day in his life.”189  Foster carefully tailored his political messages 
as police commissioner to soothing the anxieties of the city’s white middle-class by declaring a 
war on crime in order to create a “sense of security.”190  This discourse of white bourgeois 
“security” directly echoed Nichols’ justification for whites-only covenants almost a decade 
earlier. 
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 Given that the police commission was appointed by the state of Missouri and therefore 
answerable to the governor, Foster was able to direct police affairs in Kansas City without 
interference from local politicians.
191
  The state of Missouri’s Republican governors packed the 
police commission with reformist, anti-crime hardliners between 1921 and 1929. Accordingly, 
while the Pendergast and Shannon machines pledged to eliminate police brutality, in reality they 
had absolutely no authority to control the police commission appointed by Republican 
governors; these statements did, however, make for good politics in swaying the African-
American vote to each Democratic machine in their respective wards.
192
   Foster’s legacy would 
be to make himself, the police, and the Republican Party common enemies of both African 
Americans and labor in ways that overcame the remaining distrust between the two groups and 
drove them both into the city’s Democratic Party orbit. 
One of the most obnoxious and humiliating practices white officers under Foster’s tenure 
employed was the stopping and arresting of African American couples or even in one case, a 
minister and a female parishioner, if the women involved were light-skinned.
193
  All of this was 
carried out without a single official statute against interracial associations; instead, these policies 
were based on a very elastic interpretation of morality statutes.
194
  In several cases, officers 
would not let the couples go until they examined the woman’s fingernails for “Negroid” features 
and determined she was indeed black.
195
   
An infamous example of this zealous policing of perceived interracial romantic and 
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sexual contacts was the case of the Walton couple, Aubrey and Ruth, in 1927.
196
  They were 
arrested on a morals charge for sitting beside each other on a curbside bench; the arresting 
officer, H. H. Byers, thought Ruth Walton was white. When she protested that she was black, 
Byers sneered that she was “the whitest looking nigger I’ve ever seen,” and took the couple to 
the station house anyway.
197
  When the case went to trial, the Waltons proved they were both 
black and legally married to each other, so the prosecutor tore up the charges. However, a police 
court judge named Carlin Smith promptly intervened, and wrote out his own charges that the 
Waltons were “occupying a room for immoral purposes” by sitting together on a park bench.198  
With himself as sole witness, Smith railroaded them into a five hundred dollar fine each and to 
imprisonment in the county “detention farm.”199  Smith’s excuse was his concern for “purity” 
and hatred of interracial marriages.
200
  This case ignited mass protest in the African American 
community, as more than thirteen hundred black residents of KCMO signed a petition 
demanding Byers’ dismissal from the force. 
Despite these protests, Byers was merely transferred and the police crusade against “race 
mixing” continued. Police raided black homes on numerous occasions in the late 1920s when 
they thought white women were having relations with African American men; every time, it 
turned out these women were light-skinned African Americans.
201
  Even Roy Wilkins and his 
wife Minnie were taken in and interrogated by Kansas City police because the glare of the patrol 
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car’s headlights made Minnie look white; the ordeal was so humiliating that Roy and Minnie 
Wilkins left Kansas City permanently for New York City. Roy Wilkins subsequently remarked to 
a New Yorker that “any policeman in Kansas City knows that stopping race mixing is a more 
sacred duty than stopping any bank robber.”202  
The racial double standards behind this policing of real or perceived interracial 
relationships in the name of “white womanhood” enraged the city’s African American 
community even more, making the wounds deeper. Such double standards were nothing new (see 
chapter three), but the degree of police action against even mistaken appearances of black male 
contacts with white women made outrage over lack of police protection of black women all the 
more acute. Schoolgirls as well as grown women who were black were routinely catcalled and 
street harassed by men of both races, yet these same policemen did nothing about any of those 
incidents.
203
  The marchers in the Walton case pointed out that the very same Judge Smith who 
had railroaded the Waltons into a criminal record was notorious for fining white men who 
associated with black women for as little as ten dollars, nothing else.
204
  
Actual police violence only added to black resentment of the police and their Republican 
political patrons. A 1926 example illustrates the brutality that went with the “anticrime” crusade 
of the “reform” Republican police commission. Two police officers spotted a young black man 
named Dorsey Stewart in the act of stealing a ham.
205
  Without warning, an officer forty feet 
away opened fire, wounding Stewart. As he limped home, pursuing officers repeatedly shot him 
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until he died at his doorstep.
206
  Witnesses to the shooting claimed they overheard a policeman 
shout “Take that you black [expletive deleted by The Call]”as he shot Stewart point blank.207  As 
they left the scene, witnesses overheard one of the police officers saying, “Well, that’s one nigger 
I got anyway.”208  Once news of this police killing had spread across the city’s black community, 
African American activists called for the officers involved to be tried for murder.  The police 
commission investigated, and a coroner’s jury was established; only one witness came forward 
and because the assistant coroner could not find the pistol slug in the body, the jury ruled that the 
officers had “fired in the line of duty” and merely admonished them to “take care in the future 
just to cripple suspects.”209  According to Schirmer, issues of The Call are the only records that 
survive of the Stewart case, since white newspapers ignored it, no transcripts of the coroner’s 
proceedings were made, and all autopsy reports from the 1920s were accidentally destroyed in 
the 1950s.
210
  
As the 1920s drew to a close, the situation continued to worsen. Police units, without 
warrants, often raided Kansas City blacks’ homes looking for stolen property, ransacking 
apartments and tearing up furniture, walls, and floors in the process.
211
  By 1928, there was even 
a case of a black minister being beaten by a plainclothes officer when the clergyman intervened 
in a fight between the officer and an African American resident.
212
   The worst of the city’s racial 
profiling and brutality peaked between 1930 and 1932. Darius Hendricks, a janitor at the Waldo 
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Theater, was arrested in early 1931 on suspicion of robbing the theater’s safe. While he was 
being interrogated at the station, five plainclothes officers beat him with a baseball bat, 
gardening tools, and wire coat hangers.
213
  Refusing to confess to a crime he did not commit, 
Hendricks was released with permanent, crippling injuries.
214
  A week later, the police caught the 
actual robbers; the police commission then claimed that Hendricks had been injured by the 
robbers instead of ruthlessly interrogated.
215
  The city police then tried to intimidate the Call 
newspaper into silence on the case and pressured witnesses and Hendricks to change their 
stories, unsuccessfully in both attempts.
216
  
Under the influence of politically ambitious and creative bosses such as the Pendergast 
brothers and Shannon, the Democratic Party had begun to shed, albeit slowly, their old image as 
the party of white supremacy and the Confederacy. In doing so, KCMO’s Democratic Party was 
ahead of the national party, which would not attract significant black support until the Great 
Depression.  
By 1925, Tom Pendergast had solidified his control of local Democratic politics by 
forging alliances with key faction leaders in the party.
217
  He outflanked the Republican 
reformers by using charter reform and a new city management style to take over the city 
government.
218
  By March 1932, the Missouri State Supreme Court dealt a fatal blow to 
Republican reformers’ control of the police by granting Kansas City “home rule” over its own 
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police force and taking the force out of the hands of the Republican Governor in Jefferson 
City.
219
  Pendergast now had almost unlimited control of the police thanks to the Court and a 
1925 city charter that authorized the city manager to appoint a director of police. Pendergast 
made good on his earlier pledges to reign in police brutality against blacks, and purged the force 
of Republican appointees. After this change in 1932, reports of police brutality in the African-
American press declined dramatically, with the Call going so far as to assert and celebrate that 
“the reign of police brutality is over!”220  Indeed, the new Public Safety Director Eugene Reppert 
was praised by the Call’s editor Chester A. Franklin for promptly firing an officer who shot a 
black suspect without cause.
221
  The city’s black community rewarded the Pendergast Democrats 
with an overwhelming vote tally in support. 
In addition to an end to police brutality, KCMO’s new Democratic machine delivered 
other promises and benefits to Kansas City’s African American community. The Judge of the 
County Court (and future US President) Harry S. Truman made sure that blacks won a tubercular 
cottage and girls’ home as well as a boys’ home.222  Truman also ousted Dr. D.M. Miller, head of 
the Jackson County Home for Aged Negroes, when it became clear Miller was abusing 
patients.
223
  Additionally, the machine more than made up for Republican betrayals in the area of 
patronage. 
However, in most other cases, the Democratic machine fell far short of its promises to the 
city’s African American electorate. For example, the machine made a pledge to improve health 
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care for the black community. Pendergast’s Democrats started out well by appointing an African 
American physician named Dr. William J. Thompkins to assistant health commissioner in 
1927.
224
  Thompkins remained at the post until 1934, when President Roosevelt appointed him 
Recorder of Deeds for the District of Columbia.
225
  Thompkins had been born in Jefferson City, 
Missouri in 1884 and in many ways fit Franklin’s archetypal “race man.” He had received a 
medical degree at Howard University and came to KCMO to practice medicine in 1906.
226
  By 
1915, he was the first black doctor to serve as superintendent of Old City Hospital, one of the 
key facilities for black patients. The hospital under his management improved from a class D to a 
class A rating.
227
  
Given such an excellent pick, how could the health care pledge end up a disappointment? 
The sad answer had nothing to do with Thompkins and everything to do with infighting in the 
machine. Thompkins had recommended a new public hospital for blacks after surveying housing 
and tuberculosis rates in the ghetto. Almost immediately after announcing plans to build a new 
facility on Hospital Hill near the public hospital for whites, City Manager McElroy sidetracked 
the project by getting into a dispute over its location.
228
  After tying the project up for two years 
in order to placate whites’ objections to various sites, McElroy opened General Hospital Number 
2 in 1930.
229
  At first, it was the most up to date and ell-equipped black hospital in the country. A 
patronage war within the machine caused conditions to rapidly deteriorate, however. In August 
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1930, Cas Welch fired Dr. Howard Smith, a Pendergast appointee, and replaced him with his ally 
Dr. D.M. Miller, whom Truman had fired from the nursing home.
230
 Months later, reports and 
complaints from patients about false diagnoses, faulty treatment, and at least one malpractice 
case flooded the Call.
231
  As Welch continued to fire Pendergast appointees and replace them 
with his cronies, morale at the hospital deteriorated to the point where bedpans went unemptied 
and patients would go entire shifts without seeing one nurse. Finally, in 1932, Pendergast wrested 
control back from Welch, but the damage had been done. In just two years, the new hospital had 
become a disaster. 
The machine also failed to do anything about segregation and discrimination in city 
spaces, such as Swope Park. Police and park workers continued to eject blacks from the park or 
force them into a shelterhouse “reserved for you people” throughout the 1930s.232  Protests to the 
Pendergast-allied Mayor Bryce Smith over Swope Park’s racist practices received no response. 
Even worse, segregation expanded into city facilities under Pendergast, so that blacks were 
barred from a café in the Municipal Airport for the first time in 1937.
233
  
On top of all of the shortcomings of the machine’s record with African-Americans, there 
was the decades-old issue of urban vice. While the previous Republican police force claimed it 
had “declared war” on vice, the practice was often the old 1910s Marks Plan on steroids: by the 
1920s, the once proud Lincoln High School was surrounded by dens of prostitution, saloons, and 
gambling houses. High school boys were often propositioned on their walk to school by 
prostitutes, while high school girls were often catcalled at by men of both races who frequented 
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the bars and prostitution houses.
234
  When the “morality” oriented Republican police were told of 
this, the most they would offer be token gestures such as assigning extra officers to the area. 
When pressed by the Colored YWCA further about the problem, they were told none of the vice 
industries near the high school could be shut down because they all had police protection.
235
  
This Republican hypocrisy was one policy with which the Pendergast Democratic machine was 
aligned, for its own nakedly political goals of profiting from the vice industry while wooing 
middle-class whites who were afraid of it. If anything, when the Pendergast Democrats took 
over, the main change was that the pretense of fighting vice was dropped and in its place 
emerged a Vegas-like institutionalization of vice around what were often Mafia-linked jazz 
nightclubs.
236
  These clubs, with the exception of the Reno that served patrons of both races on 
opposite sides of a divider, were usually either whites-only or blacks-only.
237
  Worst of all, many 
of the white-only clubs presented blacks as directly connected to gambling, illegal drugs, 
prostitution, pornography, and deviancy, which in turn fed the housing industry stereotypes.
238
  
At the same time, some of these major jazz clubs, such as The Castle or The Cherry Blossom 
(frequently featuring the legendary Count Basie) appealed directly to the black middle-class and 
stressed sophistication.
239
  To say the machine lived and breathed on vice would be an 
understatement. 
The 1920s and 1930s witnessed an acceleration of the previous decade’s move towards 
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segregating the city by color despite significant civil rights pushback against discrimination in 
labor unions and public accommodations.  Next, this study shall explore the role changing  
transportation systems played against an environment of urban race segregation over time. 
 171 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: TRANSPORTATION, RACE, WORLD WAR II, 
AND URBAN CRISIS IN THE TWO KANSAS CITIES, 1890-1945 
 
Three key arguments lie at the core of this chapter. First, the shifting modes of 
transportation over the half century between the 1890s and the Second World War shaped the 
urban crisis directly, as the rise of the automobile culture accelerated trends towards 
suburbanization that were already underway. The development of suburbs had already been 
given a racial character as far back as the 1910s, but the car culture would accelerate the racially 
polarized development of all-white middle class suburbs and an increasingly overcrowded and 
deteriorating majority black inner city in KCMO. Secondly, the New Deal housing programs of 
the early thirties locked in these trends. J.C. Nichols would be consulted by Roosevelt 
administration officials in the creation of the FHA, and Johnson County as it is known today 
would be built with FHA subsidies in the decades between the Depression and the early 1960s. 
Finally, it would be in roughly 1939-40 that the urban crisis would emerge in KCMO full blown, 
with the added stressor of a later wave of Great Migration hitting the city during the Second 
World War.
1
   
Kansas City, Missouri and Kansas City, Kansas, were no exceptions to the general 
postwar shift in US metropolitan areas away from rail and public transit to car-based, urban 
freeway-centered transportation. Just as the routing of the railroads at the beginning of the 
construction of the national rail system in the mid-nineteenth century had tremendous 
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consequences in establishing KCMO and the future KCK as the metropolitan center of the 
region, the shift away from rail and public transit to automobile travel after World War II would 
have consequences for the future of the metro area. It is almost impossible, historically speaking, 
to overestimate the sweeping nature of the alteration of daily life brought about by the internal 
combustion engine, petroleum driven automobile in the first half of the twentieth century. To 
take but one small example, not just Kansas Citians’ but American ways of eating and sleeping 
while on long distance trips would drastically change as a result of the rise of the automobile and 
decline of streetcars between the 1930s and the 1950s. Furthermore, the balance of power within 
the labor movement would shift away from the railroad brotherhoods to the United Auto Workers 
union and the Teamsters’ union by the 1940s. 
Decisions regarding Kansas City’s transportation system did not, of course, occur in a 
social vacuum; racial attitudes had, for example, nearly forced the segregation of streetcars in the 
1910s.
2
  Moreover, just as discriminatory racial stereotypes had long influenced real estate 
practices, they would also play a large role in decisions regarding which neighborhoods would be 
targeted for “urban renewal” in the late 1950s and early 1960s so as to clear the way for the 
building of intracity freeways connecting Kansas City to the interstate highway system.
3
   
Working-class and labor union interests and ways of life were also affected by changing modes 
of transportation.  Obviously, unions connected to railroads would decline while unions 
connected to automobiles and roads benefitted from the change.  Moreover, the new automobile 
culture as well as the abandonment of streetcars and the decline of the railroads after the Second 
World War sharply accelerated both suburban growth and the residential racial segregation that 
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had accompanied it since shortly after the turn of the century.    
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the predominant mode of cross-country travel 
as well as the transport of goods and services was by railroad.  Both KCMO and the relatively 
new city of KCK were no exceptions, and indeed, both were major rail hubs. Cross-town 
transportation in smaller as well as major cities at the dawn of the twentieth century was mostly 
handled by systems of streetcars that ran on rails and were electrically powered. The heyday of 
streetcars both in Greater Kansas City and nationally was “from about 1890 to the early 1920s.”4  
In KCMO, electric streetcars had been established by 1889, having evolved from horse-drawn 
railcars in 1870 and then, cable-run railcars by 1883.
5
  Short-distance travel between cities, too, 
soon became the territory of the streetcars in the form of the interurban lines that developed 
between 1889 and 1916.
6
  Such construction peaked at over fifteen thousand miles nationwide 
before World War I.
7
  Greater Kansas City was the hub of extensive interurban networks by the 
1910s, linking the city to nearby St. Joseph and Excelsior Springs in Missouri and Olathe, 
Lawrence and Topeka in Kansas.
8
   
In fact, the origins of the emergence of Johnson County as a growing, suburban part of 
the metro can be traced to the 1907 opening of William Stang’s Missouri & Kansas Interurban 
Railway between KCMO and Olathe.
9
  This line happened to pass through his new real estate 
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developments, one of which was named Overland Park.
10
  Along with railroads before them and 
interstate highways after them, streetcar lines’ routing had tremendous consequences for spurring 
great growth in certain areas, often at the expense of others. The rise of Johnson County as a 
suburban metropolitan area of both KCK and KCMO thus predated the post-World War II boom 
by about half a century. Again, this demonstrates that suburbanization should not be confused 
with the shift away from rail and streetcars to automobiles, even if it was accelerated by such 
changes.   
Automobiles had been made possible by the introduction of a commercially viable 
internal combustion engine-powered automobile in Germany in 1885 by Karl Benz.
11
  Stuart 
Perry in New York and Etienne Lenoir had both patented primitive versions of it in 1844 and 
1860 respectively; Lenoir’s was closest to what Benz developed, as it introduced use of a spark 
plug to ignite the gasoline engine.
12
  By 1893, Benz had introduced the electric ignition to his 
manufactured automobiles.
13
  Another essential component of the automobile, the tire, was 
pioneered by the Michelin brothers in their successful 1895 Paris-Bordeaux –Paris race.  
Between 1893 and 1904, the industry was dominated by Germany and France.
14
 
 In its earliest years, the story of the rise of the automobile played out so deeply in the 
shadows of the railroads and the streetcars that, around the turn of the century, people assumed 
that the new mode of transportation would complement railroads and streetcars rather than 
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replace them.
15
  After all, both rail and automotive improvements to transportation increased 
mobility, connected goods and services in urban and rural areas to one another, helped to manage 
urban space by decentralizing it and improving cleanliness, and helped to forge a truly “national 
culture, economy, and society.”16  Wiebian notions of “reordering” society, especially that of 
urban society, therefore were interwoven into middle and upper-class reactions to the appearance 
of the automobile. The post-Civil War search for “reunion” and the corporate reordering of 
capitalism in this same time period were also linked strongly to the appearance of new 
technologies under the rubric of “progress.”17  Just as the railroads fulfilled this need in the mid-
nineteenth century, automobiles would usurp the function of national development and progress 
between the 1920s and 1960s. 
What American contemporaries failed to foresee was that the potential “unparalleled 
flexibility” of the automobile set it apart from transit that ran on rails, and that in a country with a 
national mythology that praised individualism as one of the highest values, car ownership by one 
person or a family would take on a life of its own.
18
  Despite the origins of the technology in 
Germany and France, it was not long before the United States began to develop an auto industry 
of its own.
19
  By 1893, bicycle mechanics in Springfield, Massachusetts by the name of Charles 
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and J. Frank Duryeas built the first successful American gasoline car.
20
  By 1896, the Duryeas 
brothers sold the first American gasoline-powered automobile and produced twelve more cars 
that year.
21
  By 1898, Kokomo, Indiana, car manufacturers began building cars there; by 1906, 
the center of US car production would move to Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio.
22
  The 1900 launch 
of the Oldsmobile by Ransom Olds in Detroit completed the shift to Midwestern states of auto 
manufacturers.
23
  Henry Ford and William C. Durant followed suit in establishing their own auto 
companies, Ford Motors and General Motors in 1903 and 1908, respectively.
24
  By 1908, US 
auto production was centered exclusively in Detroit and southern Michigan.
25
   
This relatively new American transportation industry was given some advantages by 
several factors favorable to the development of gasoline-based vehicles in the United States. 
First, a strong institutional network of support for the gasoline-powered automobile already 
existed by the 1880s. This source was the strong social and political influence of John D. 
Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Corporation in the United States. Second, the discovery of large 
deposits of oil in Texas and Oklahoma in 1906 reinforced the favorable conditions for the new 
form of transportation.
26
  Ironically, given that automobiles would eventually become yet another 
corporate giant of the type populists usually despised, the nascent industry found unlikely and 
indirect allies in the Farmers’ Alliances and the Populist movement of the 1890s which pushed 
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for improved roads and highways in reaction to railroad monopolies.
27
 
Such advantages were undercut by the fact that at the turn of the century, the U.S. lacked 
paved roads and there was no signage along existing dust trails to inform a potential driver of 
where to go.
28
  This was still the case despite the Populists’ call for better roads throughout the 
previous decade of the 1890s. Additionally, while the abundance of oil was excellent for a 
gasoline-powered vehicle, gas stations or car repair shops were extremely rare in the 1900s and 
1910s.
29
  Although the change from a brand new foreign invention to an American industry 
centered in Detroit was relatively rapid, the speed with which it became accessible as a means of 
transit to the general public paled in comparison to how rapidly streetcars had risen to 
prominence earlier. Finally, the automobile’s rise was slowed by local, state, and federal 
governments’ lack of interest in, or hostility towards, the new technology. For example, many 
states still viewed transportation by horse as a very high priority as late as the turn of the century 
and passed laws limiting automobiles to four miles per hour while also “requiring that each be 
preceded by a man on foot carrying a red flag” out of concern for scaring horses and large dust 
clouds.
30
  In fact, future U.S. President Woodrow Wilson so distrusted automobiles that he 
warned in 1906 that they would cause a socialist revolution by promoting envy of the rich.
31
  As 
late as the First World War itself, the War Industries Board concluded that out of all American 
industries, a hypothetical shutdown of the auto industry would be “a mere inconvenience.”32  
                                                 
27
 Flink, 4. However, such groups had bicycling largely in mind as an alternative.   
28
 Jackson, 158-59. 
29
 Ibid., 159. 
30
 Ibid., 158. 
31
 Ibid., 159. 
32
 Ibid. 
 178 
 
Despite the fact that American auto production eclipsed French auto production by 1904-05 and 
overtook the German and British auto industries by the start of World War I, the industry was far 
from shaking either the streetcars’ or railroads’ domination of American transportation in the 
1900s and 1910s.
33
  No one then would have believed that the auto industry would be the symbol 
of American capitalism and American global power in less than fifty years. 
KCK and KCMO in 1900 were indeed quite removed from the upstart new vehicle. 
Railroads and streetcars were still the dominant means of transportation for residents of both 
cities, both long- and short-distance. Despite the concern of the local streetcar company over 
competition from bicycles, no serious competition emerged in the city until the mid-1910s.
34
  In 
fact, ridership in 1896 totaled more than thirty-four million and would actually increase over the 
next three decades.
35
    
For the metropolitan area’s black citizens, the streetcars, as noted earlier, were one of the 
few public services not segregated by race by the 1910s in Kansas City, although black 
passengers were still harassed and mistreated by both white drivers and passengers.
36
  In 
practice, this meant that while streetcars were available to the city’s black residents without Jim 
Crow mandates for a separate “colored” section, streetcars were nonetheless far from friendly 
territory for African Americans in a city divided by race.  Busses and automobiles, when they 
emerged as major competing sources of transportation in later decades, would have their own 
effects on the ongoing struggle for basic rights for African-Americans especially when it came to 
employment, restaurant, and lodging discrimination. 
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Railroads, as noted in the previous chapter, were of even greater significance to the 
African American community.  Not only were they were a major source of employment for 
working-class blacks in Kansas City, but they were also central to the growth and continued 
existence of the stockyards and packing plants in both KCMO and KCK were another major 
employer of the African American working class.
37
  Moreover, the Pullman porters among the 
railroad workforce were especially critical to the strengthening of black political influence, both 
in KCMO and nationally, after A. Philip Randolph had organized them into the first African 
American labor union. Randolph’s 1925 formation of the union with the Pullman company 
simultaneously broke the AFL’s color barrier and was one of the developments that linked the 
civil rights and labor movements in the 1930s. Porters held the highest status of all of the city’s 
rail workers and among the working-classes as a whole even though they had to play to white 
racial stereotypes as part of their job description. The importance of railroads to organized labor 
nationally is easily demonstrated by noting that the largest strikes of the late nineteenth century 
included the 1877 Great Railroad Strike and the 1894 Pullman Strike.  Given the lack of paved 
roads in rural areas before 1920, railroads were in far less immediate danger from the newer 
forms of transportation than the primarily urban and suburban streetcars.
38
  
In retrospect, however, it is clear that the dominance of the streetcars and railroads as the 
primary transportation systems was being incrementally threatened by the internal combustion 
engine. Henry Ford opened up a Model T plant in KCMO in 1912, the first of its kind outside of 
                                                 
37
 Arnesen, 46; This was even more true in KCK, as the NAACP found: Untitled Report [in Q&A format], 
December 1931, NAACP Papers, Kansas Branch Office Files of NAACP: Kansas City to Ottawa, c. 1920-39, as 
found in KS State Archives, Topeka. 
38
 Jackson, 158. 
 180 
 
Michigan, at Winchester Avenue in the eastern part of the city.
39
  However, the first major 
challenger to the dominance of Kansas City’s streetcars was from a vehicle called the “jitney.”40  
A jitney was what contemporaries called “any independently operated vehicle that carried groups 
of passengers for a fee.”41  Jitneys varied in size; some were automobiles, while others were 
closer to the size of busses. In this fashion, they were predecessors both to taxis and busses. 
Originating in Los Angeles in 1914, the first jitney appeared in KCMO in 1915. Streetcar 
companies loathed and feared jitneys because they would deliberately follow streetcar lines and 
lure waiting passengers away with rates that either matched or undercut the streetcar fees. Unlike 
the taxi or bus services today, however, jitneys were initially unregulated both in KCMO and in 
other cities. The street railways lobbied local governments fiercely to change this, and area cities 
began to regulate the vehicles, which caused many jitney drivers to quit.
42
  Worse, the jitney 
drivers mostly lacked liability insurance, leaving no recourse for potential injury victims.
43
  In 
1920, the company went into receivership and jitneys rapidly disappeared from Kansas City after 
1921. 
The victory of streetcars over jitneys both locally and nationally proved to be pyrrhic, 
however. The 1920s would witness the rise of a twin threat to the streetcar lines: the automobile 
and the bus system.
44
  The lack of paved roads or a national highway system which had held 
back competition from the automobile was redressed by two congressional acts within a decade 
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of each other: the 1916 Road Act and the 1921 Federal Aid Highway Acts created the 
preconditions for the construction of a national system of two-laned paved highways by 1926.
45
  
The 1916 act had offered federal money to states to set up highway departments, while the 1921 
act set aside two hundred thousand miles of road for federal matching funds.
46
  Locally, this 
meant the streetcars and railroads had competition from newly designated US highways 24, 40, 
50, 69, and 71 after 1926.  After decades of mostly futile advocacy for better roads, the issue had 
been at last given a boost by frustrations in moving military equipment during World War I. 
Henry Ford’s development of the assembly-line method of mass production (following 
from inspiration he took from Gustavus Swift’s meatpacking factory’s use of movable parts on 
conveyor belts) not only meant American global dominance of the industry was insured but that 
the country’s existing oil industry would only be too happy to license filling stations for the 
growing number of Ford, GM, and (after 1920) Chrysler cars on the new roads. The oil 
companies’ supplying of filling stations had an additional subsidizing effect: following the lead 
of Oregon in 1919, every state adopted a one cent gasoline tax by 1929 to finance future 
investment in roads.
47
  Prices for Ford’s Model Ts also began to rapidly decline, from nine 
hundred and fifty dollars in 1910 to two hundred and ninety dollars in 1924.
48
   
Ford revolutionized both the auto industry and American capitalism by becoming the first 
car manufacturer to aim his product at the middle-classes and by raising his own workers’ 
minimum wages so that they too were potential buyers of his cars.
49
  In contrast, all of the earlier 
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French, German, British, and American automakers had intended the vehicle to be a luxury 
product for the rich. Moreover, no capitalist before Ford had ever paid workers higher wages in 
order to cultivate them as customers; this was an entirely new business model. In doing so he 
undercut the labor left as surely as Wilson-era state repression or factional fights within labor and 
the Socialist Party ever did. After all, as one elderly labor sympathizer in Muncie Indiana told a 
reporter, “as long as men have enough money to buy a secondhand Ford and tires and gasoline, 
they’ll be out on the road and paying no attention to union meetings.”50   
Still, most “growth in the motor vehicle market” from working class and other “lower 
income brackets” relied on these classes’ purchase of used cars rather than new cars.51   The 
industry’s own trade journals fretted over a “used car problem” by the mid-1920s, as trade ins 
often had to be disposed of at a loss.  Further, “illiterate, immigrant, and Negro families” were 
dismissed altogether as “obviously outside the market.”52  Despite all of the industry’s advances, 
forty-four percent of American families did not own cars in 1927. Ford and the industry’s 
successes concealed deep divisions in car ownership by class and race as well as rural as opposed 
to urban location. Farmers proved to be one of the major purchasers of automobiles in the 
decade, as they had not been adequately served by rail transportation.
53
  Conversely, both 
ownership and use of cars declined sharply with degree of urbanization.  African-Americans in 
both KCMO and KCK, both for this reason and because of high rates of poverty and job 
discrimination, were very unlikely to own a car in the 1920s nor were they likely to own one 
until after World War II.  
                                                 
50
 Ibid. 
51
 Flink, 131. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Ibid., 131-32. 
 183 
 
As if the availability and affordability of cars to the public wasn’t worrying enough to 
streetcar operators, bus companies came into direct competition with them by 1924.
54
   The first 
city busses were launched in a very similar fashion to the way the streetcars themselves had been 
established: through a private local company. Local entrepreneur T.A. Kennedy had founded the 
Kansas Cities Motor Coach Company as an operation of four twenty-passenger busses that ran 
from the Kansas to the Missouri side of the metro. From what was then the western city limits of 
KCK at 18th street, the bus line ran down Minnesota Avenue to the Intercity Viaduct, and then 
drove to Union Station in downtown KCMO.
55
  As with the jitneys, Kansas City Railways, the 
streetcar company, fought the bus company relentlessly through the legal system, eventually 
defeating it in 1925 by obtaining a court injunction against the bus company’s use of the intercity 
viaduct.
56
   Ironically, the streetcar company quickly discovered that busses were cheaper to 
operate than the streetcars at fifteen to seventeen cents a mile for thirty passengers as opposed to 
the cost of twenty-two to twenty-seven cents a mile for streetcars.  In 1925, the streetcar 
company opened its own Kansas City Motor Coach Company.  Because Jim Crow laws for 
Missouri’s railroad companies had been defeated in the 1900s and 1910s, the company did not 
impose any on its bus line either, but discriminated against both KCK and KCMO blacks by 
refusing to hire them as drivers.
57
  The struggle against job discrimination by the city transit 
company in both its bus and streetcar lines would drag on into the 1950s. 
The rising auto industry was a national juggernaut not so easily held off by legal tactics 
and its products could not be duplicated by Kansas City Railways, unlike the Kansas City Motor 
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Coach Company. Ford’s 1912 plant did not take long in producing cars for regional buyers: the 
number of automobiles in the metro area skyrocketed between 1914 and 1924 from about eight 
thousand six hundred to over eighty-nine thousand.
58
  This constituted a tenfold increase over the 
course of a decade. As early as the 1917 entry of the US into World War I, more than twenty-
three thousand automobiles were registered in the Kansas City area.
59
  The first major warning 
sign that automobiles would come to dominate was that the number of tickets to passenger trains 
peaked in 1920 and the number of passenger trains handled peaked three years earlier. By 1922, 
streetcar ridership peaked at one hundred and thirty-six million; when the 1920s ended, that 
figure had declined to one hundred and thirteen million. But even so, as late as 1929, eighty 
percent of people entering downtown still used mass transit.
60
  
* * * * * * * 
These massive changes to transportation occurred against the backdrop of the civil rights 
and labor struggles discussed last chapter and amid the ongoing residential race segregation that 
had begun in the 1910s. The 1920s had truly been one of the worst decades for racial violence, 
hatred, discrimination, and tension the area had seen. In addition to police brutality and 
harassment, constant private sector discrimination, vice being pressed into black neighborhoods, 
and white terrorism against black homeowners moving into all-white neighborhoods, a lynching 
occurred in nearby Excelsior Springs, Missouri, in August 1925.
61
  There, a thirty-three year old 
man named Walter Mitchell had been accused of sexually assaulting a white woman, arrested, 
taken to the county jail in Liberty, and then taken by a white mob, despite resistance by law 
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enforcement officers and local African-Americans, back to Excelsior Springs and hanged from a 
tree.
62
  Black residents of KCMO who had fled the brutal 1921 race riots in Tulsa just four years 
previously for Kansas City were especially alarmed and the atrocity was widely covered by the 
African American press. The Call conducted its own investigation, concluding that Mitchell 
knew the alleged victim through a white partner in a cattle-stealing gang he belonged to; the 
partner was her boyfriend. The assault resulted from a fight amongst the cattle thieves; Williams 
was guilty of stealing cattle as part of a group of criminals but did not sexually assault her, the 
paper determined.
63
   
With tensions already high from the Williams lynching, two weeks later, the city of 
KCMO itself nearly experienced a lynching of its own.
64
  On a Friday afternoon in September, 
the 18th and Vine district was suddenly invaded by whites from the 21st and Montgall 
neighborhood, some on foot with bloodhounds and others in cars, in pursuit of someone. They 
stopped in front of a nightclub called the “Yellow Front,” and entered the building with their 
bloodhounds.  The dogs stopped in front of an African American man in the club identified by 
the Call only as “Charles”, and the whites grabbed him. As he was being dragged to the car by 
the white mob, another black man named Oliver “Blue” Moore intervened, asking the mob what 
they were going to do with the suspect. When they replied they were looking for a suspect in a 
sexual assault on a white woman and Moore overheard one of them murmur about lynching, he 
grabbed hold of the steering wheel of the car the mob was going to take Charles in, preventing 
the car from leaving and declaring that if Charles was suspected of something that the police 
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should be called. The situation escalated further when a member of the crowd pulled a gun on 
Moore, which led another African American man who had followed the group from the 
poolroom to pull a gun. An armed standoff resulted, with Charles in the car, Moore gripping the 
steering wheel, and large groups of white and black men pointing guns at one another. This 
standoff was only broken when the police showed up, but when they took Charles in for 
questioning both the white and black crowds followed the police closely. When word spread, 
Kansas City Missouri’s black community rallied, vowing “This is not Excelsior Springs!”65  The 
situation diffused when the police brought the victim in to identify her attacker, and she bluntly 
stated the Charles was not the culprit. Still, groups of African Americans chose to stay at the 
station and protect Charles until he was released. 
Given that September 1925 was such a close call for a potential race riot, the new 
automobile was very far down the list of priorities for a civil rights movement that was fighting 
tooth and nail to get existing public transportation to treat black passengers decently and to hire 
African Americans.  A rare exception was Sarah Rector, one of the richest persons in the city 
who had acquired her wealth from oil discoveries on her family property in Oklahoma:  Rector 
was one of the few African Americans who even owned a car and she owned several ones.
66
  
Needless to say, Rector was far from typical of KCMO’s black population, most of whom 
couldn’t dream of affording even one car.  But even had money been no object, car ownership 
could not have solved all the difficulties African Americans faced when they did travel. Travel, in 
whatever dominant form, had always been dangerous for blacks even in the North and was in 
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any case “exhausting and demoralizing.”67  When it came to the automobile, independent black 
publishers in 1937 began to publish a travel guide for African-American car owners called The 
Negro Motorist Green-Book.
68
  It identified which lodging, filling stations, and restaurants were 
hospitable to African American customers and which of these establishments excluded blacks. 
Before the publication of this guide, African American travelers often had to ask porters on 
Pullman and other trains what they had heard about local establishments in different towns and 
cities. Because of hotel and later motel discrimination, many black travelers stayed at Negro 
YMCAs even if the locations were far from train or bus stops. Black oriented newspapers also 
helped by running ads for “race” hotels and restaurants, while Ebony magazine began publishing 
a competing summer vacation travel guide in 1947.
69
  
The automobile’s significance for most working-class blacks lay in its potential to create 
new jobs in the city, especially at the Ford plant, the Chevrolet plant that opened after 1928, and 
the Fisher body plant that opened in 1929.
70
  Unfortunately, job discrimination was rampant in 
the auto plants as well, and even the Urban League of Kansas City barely made a dent in it 
during the 1920s.
71
  For example, the 1920 census had listed only seven black workers at the 
Ford plant in Leeds (eastern KCMO) in semiskilled positions.
72
  Ten years later, the number had 
grown to one hundred and seventy African Americans employed in auto factories, garages, and 
repair work, but these jobs constituted only eight percent of all Kansas City males employed by 
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the automobile companies.
73
 In the case of the Chevrolet plant, large numbers of African 
American men in fact would not be hired to work there until after World War II.   
The emerging car culture also exacerbated racial discrimination in less obvious ways. 
Future decisions about highway building were directly related to the ideology of “colored 
property” that had fuelled the 1911 and 1923-27 white violence against black home purchasers. 
This rhetoric was first articulated by J.C. Nichols and Asa Martin in the 1910s.
74
  Claims about 
African American neighborhoods had instilled in public officials a contempt toward black people 
and their homes, a reality vividly illustrated by the fact that KCMO city officials placed a 
garbage station in the heart of the black neighborhood at Twentieth and Woodland in 1923.
75
  
Garbage from all over the city was collected there until transferred to the city dump.
76
  The 
Attucks School and the Western Baptist Bible College were both within walking distance of the 
garbage station, while a Methodist Episcopal congregation had to deal with the stench at every 
service they attended.
77
  Chester Franklin and Roy Wilkins of the Call railed against this garbage 
station, demanding its removal.
78
  In 1925, it was removed, only to be replaced by another 
garbage station at a different location in the African-American neighborhoods.
79
 This incident 
was a highly symbolic illustration of the meaning of a color line dividing city property up into 
“good” and “bad” neighborhoods, with an overlapping dichotomy of suburban/inner city. In 
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other words, black central city neighborhoods were literally defined by whites as worthy of no 
higher status than a dumping ground for trash, while white neighborhoods and suburbs were to 
be the epitome of cleanliness. Racial insult was thus built in to such urban planning and policy.  
In addition to local, borderline vigilante-like homeowners associations such as the 
Linwood Improvement Association, the National Association of Real Estate Boards emerged by 
the 1920s as a powerful national voice for equating whiteness, homeownership, upward mobility, 
and material success through “Own Your Own Home Campaigns.”80  Founded in 1908, the 
NAREB constituted the first organization composed of builders and real estate agents.
81
  
NAREB had been a leading force (along with figures such as J.C. Nichols) in promoting the idea 
that black residents lowered neighborhoods’ property values. By 1927, NAREB had the ear of 
the US Department of Commerce in defining private land use in urban areas.
82
  NAREB by the 
late 1920s was part of a public-private alliance that included the National Conference on City 
Planning, the National Municipal League, the American Civic Association, the nation’s city 
managers, and Herbert Hoover’s Department of Commerce.83  The consensus this partnership 
and the courts had come to by the late 1920s was that restrictive zoning was pragmatic and “non-
ideological”; the partnership additionally defined segregation of certain land uses as a 
requirement of a free market in housing.
84
  This maneuvering began to harden in place the urban 
segregation implemented in the previous two decades even before the federal government 
officially became involved in housing policy and the highway planning that accompanied it. 
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* * * * * * * 
The Great Depression hit KCMO’s African American population especially hard. First, 
the blue-collar jobs that had sustained the community through the 1920s and in many cases, 
decades back into the nineteenth century disappeared within the first year of the Depression.
85
  
These included the railroads, stockyards, packinghouses, and stone quarries. Worse, there fewer 
job openings for black men than ten years before. Second, the Depression exacerbated 
preexisting housing problems. According to an Urban League study of the 1940 census, the 
1930s had witnessed a racial pattern in housing in which blacks were confined to the east of 
Troost Avenue and north of Thirty-First Street, along with clusters on the city’s West Side and to 
the east, in Leeds.
86
  This was the case despite the fact that KCMO was saved from the worst of 
the Depression compared to other cities, as it had received a huge amount of relief money from 
the federal government.
87
  FDR had given Pendergast control over all relief expenditures in 
Missouri as a reward for Pendergast’s early support of Roosevelt’s presidential nomination at the 
1932 Democratic Convention.
88
  The reason for this disparity between generous federal funding 
to Pendergast and the city and the degree of joblessness among the city’s African-American 
community had everything to do with the Missouri Employment Service being unable or 
unwilling to help black job applicants and the Pendergast machine’s failure to combat racial 
discrimination in hiring.
89
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The New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt was critical to developments in transportation, 
housing, and political alignments that were felt in cities nationwide. First, the New Deal 
reinforced the trends started with the 1916 and 1921 Road Acts towards federal subsidizing of 
road building, as Roosevelt and other officials favored projects that could employ as many 
workers as possible and be planned quickly, of which road building was one.
90
  Highway projects 
easily fit within the rubric of public works, as employment opportunities that not only restored a 
sense of self-worth to those who had been jobless but which were also understood to be part of 
national development and improvement.   
The streetcars and railroads, for their part, were not a priority for an administration more 
worried about stabilizing the banking system, employing people, providing relief, saving 
capitalism from collapse, and creating a housing policy that would renew the housing industry 
the Depression had destroyed. Yet this alone does not explain why the United States, alone 
among the prosperous nations in the world, jettisoned its own transportation systems other than 
the automobile after the war. Part of the answer lies in the fact that state and federal government 
policy subsidized road building and taxed the railroads after the 1920s.
91
  The other reason lay 
not in the public sector, but in the private sector. As early as 1926, General Motors quietly began 
buying out nearly bankrupt streetcar systems through a subsidiary corporation.
92
  Between then 
and 1950, General Motors had been involved in the replacement over a hundred streetcar 
operations in New York City, St. Louis, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Salt Lake City.
93
   
In the case of Kansas City, General Motors’ subsidiary never bought them out and 
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perhaps as a result, the local streetcar system was still in operation on as late as 1957.
94
  The Call 
had been pressing them and the busses they operated to hire African-American drivers just a few 
years before and noted that the city’s blacks made up a significant share of the riders on both the 
bus and streetcar lines of the Kansas City transit company.
95
  Pendergast, for his part, was far 
more interested in bringing the age of air travel to Kansas City by developing the municipal 
airport and its terminal at the mouth of the Kaw as part of his Ten Year Plan of city improvement 
than he was in maintaining his city’s streetcar lines or railroads.96   
By the time the Great Depression ravaged the nation, it was in many ways already too 
late for the United States to choose the option to develop its transportation in the manner Western 
Europe did, in which the automobile and airplane did not replace rail and streetcars as transit but 
instead were part of a range of transportation options. In a weird twist, Americans as early as the 
1920s decided that the road was a public good while mass transit was defined as a private 
business unworthy of taxpayer subsidy.
97
  By 1940, liberals as well as conservatives in the US 
agreed with New York Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia that the trolley was a relic and an “obstacle to 
progress.”98  For urban blacks, even before urban freeways began to be planned, they were to be 
as James Flink put it, “especially disadvantaged by auto-induced urban decentralization.”99  This 
would be one of many ways that most African Americans would be excluded from postwar 
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prosperity.
100
  
One of the most fateful policy decisions the Roosevelt administration made would help to 
exacerbate the nascent urban crisis in the coming decades in every American major city 
including Kansas City, although unintentionally. Seeking to speed the recovery of the housing 
sector in the economy, and to improve access to credit more generally, the Roosevelt 
administration created new agencies in its quest to rebuild the depression-devastated housing 
market.
101
   The five years after 1928 had been particularly bad for the industry, as the number of 
residential permits fell, the number of foreclosed homes rose, and the number of failed building 
and loan associations rose between that year and 1933. Permits dropped by more than one 
hundred thousand, while foreclosures increased by seventy-one percent.
102
  The administration 
turned to advice from the same alliance of private and public officials who had advised the 
Coolidge and Hoover Departments of Commerce.
103
  Unfortunately, this meant that every racist 
notion advocated by Nichols and the NAREB in the 1910s and 1920s that black neighborhoods 
meant low property values would now be implemented as federal government policy.
104
  The 
third major housing policy Roosevelt would enact would be an attempt to set up a system of 
public housing for the poor and working-class, but the results would be far from what he 
intended.
105
  
Two new agencies were created to confront the housing crisis in 1933 and 1934:  the first, 
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with the intention of protecting the small homeowner from foreclosure, and the second, with a 
plan that could stimulate building through private enterprise.
106
  These were the Homeowners’ 
Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration, respectively. Together, they 
completed the process of creating the modern mortgage and real estate market as it is known 
today. The HOLC introduced and institutionalized “the long-term, self-amortizing (paying down) 
mortgage with uniform payments spread over the whole life of the debt.”107  Before, in the 
nineteenth century, mortgages had been viewed negatively, and it was expected of established 
families that they purchase homes with full payment at the time of purchase. The mortgage had 
arisen after World War I, when rising costs and consumer debt had necessitated its use in 
financing a home. During the 1920s housing bubble, these mortgages tended to last five to ten 
years and the loan was not fully paid off when the final settlement was due. This meant the 
mortgage went into immediate foreclosure unless renewals for five to seven years were 
obtained.
108
   Extensions such as these were nearly impossible to obtain with the onset of the 
Great Depression. The homeowner was thus at the mercy of the unpredictability of market 
forces. The HOLC changed that, as the repayment period was extended to twenty years and the 
principal of the loan was repaid over the life of the loan.
109
  
In a move that would have tremendous ramifications as one of the major ways urban 
African-Americans were shut out of postwar prosperity, the HOLC also introduced redlining.
110
  
The very name in fact came from HOLC maps of major cities that were color-coded into “A” 
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through “D” grades.111  “Red” neighborhoods were grade “D” neighborhoods as determined by 
the HOLC, while grade “A” neighborhoods were marked green on maps.112  In a way that 
reflected how casual and commonplace anti-Semitism as well as racism was in the United States 
before World War II, Jewish neighborhoods were graded lower than “American neighborhoods” 
and “neighborhoods with an infiltration of Jews” as determined by HOLC officials were also 
given lower grades.
113
  Race and ethnicity were used arbitrarily along with age and material 
conditions to rate city blocks, but the key assumptions were that green grade “A” neighborhoods 
were homogenous, new, white, and inhabited by businessmen and professionals, while African-
American and Jewish neighborhoods could not possibly be considered “best” under any 
circumstances.  Neighborhoods in between were given grade “B,” colored blue, and grade “C”, 
which were yellow.
114
  Grade “B” neighborhoods were often Jewish, Catholic, or white working-
class while grade “C” neighborhoods were often racially mixed.115  Black neighborhoods were 
automatically rated “D” regardless of income or condition of property.116  
The Federal Housing Administration was created by the passage of the National Housing 
Act of 1934.
117
  Its purpose was to insure home mortgages, and to this end, the Housing Act 
included three main provisions. First, the federal government established an emergency 
temporary national credit plan between 1934 and 1936 that insured lenders up to twenty percent 
losses on all property loans. The purpose was stimulate home building and renovate existing 
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homes.
118
  Secondly, the FHA created “national mortgage associations” to buy and sell FHA 
mortgages in order to make mortgage insurance available nationwide and maintain a circulation 
of funds.
119
  Finally, the FHA established the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation to 
insure the accounts of savings and loan associations.  
The FHA, too, discriminated against African Americans in Kansas City. It refused to 
insure mortgages in neighborhoods that were poor or racially mixed, so builders and prospective 
home buyers could only obtain lower FHA down payments and rates if they relocated to 
suburban areas.
120
  The Agency warned personnel not to insure mortgages on homes unless they 
had racially restrictive covenants, were in “homogenous” neighborhoods, and were removed 
from “blight” such as poor schools and older housing.121   
FHA subsidies helped J.C. Nichols create one of the Kansas City area’s largest suburban 
subdivisions, Prairie Village in Johnson County, Kansas.
122
  Using the racially restrictive 
covenants even after the Supreme Court ruled them unconstitutional, Prairie Village excluded 
Blacks and Jews for decades with FHA approval.
123
  Flush with money from the FHA, Nichols 
and other suburban land developers began to ring KCMO and KCK around with white-only 
subdivisions in Jackson, Platte, Clay, and Johnson counties.
124
  Another housing development 
firm, the Kroh Brothers, built the entire city of Leawood in Johnson county using racial 
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restrictions and FHA funding.
125
  The FHA would insure more than seventy-seven thousand 
homes in the metro area between 1934 and 1962, but only one percent would go to Black 
families. A former president and chairman of the Board of the City Bond and Mortgage 
Company between 1934 and 1965 later recalled that the “FHA and VA wouldn’t insure and 
guarantee loans in Kansas City unless there was a racial restriction involved.”126   
In a way that was further damaging, the justifications for these policies by agencies 
originating in the New Deal helped to forge a new language white suburbanites would use in 
later decades to justify housing segregation by claiming these were natural “free market” forces 
and that white homeowners had “property rights” to exclude blacks.127   In a twist of irony, the 
far right-wing John Birch Society—an organization whose members despised FDR and the New 
Deal—would make the same arguments in its defense of Kansas City businesses that practiced 
Jim Crow in the 1960s.
128
  
Mindful that the HOLC and FHA were not aimed at the poor, FDR persuaded Congress 
to pass the Federal Housing Act of 1937.
129
  Liberals and the administration hoped the law could 
wipe out slums and give the poor and lower classes better places to live.
130
   Conservatives and 
the real estate industry hated the idea and staunchly resisted it from the beginning, screaming that 
it was a form of socialism or communism.
131
  The real estate industry also wanted to wipe out 
slums, by knocking them down to build subdivisions or commercial businesses, but was 
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staunchly opposed to public housing.
132
  Kansas City was authorized by the state of Missouri to 
begin building public housing in accordance with the act in 1941, only to have World War II halt 
such efforts altogether.
133
   
Initially, and from one point of view, the act was a success.
134
  After all, within a year, 
thirty-three states had passed laws enabling public housing and two-hundred and twenty one 
local authorities had been established. Despite all of their efforts, the real estate industry and 
conservatives were not able to kill the program or divert all of its funding to eminent domain, 
and by 1941, the US Housing Authority had built one hundred and thirty-thousand units in three 
hundred projects nationwide. By 1962, more than two million people lived in the half-million 
units built under housing programs. While their condition was mocked and decried, the units 
were certainly better than the dilapidated buildings they often replaced.
135
  
Despite early successes and the good intentions of President Roosevelt and Senator 
Robert Wagner, instead of a public housing system for the poor and working-classes, public 
housing became one more symbol of urban segregation.  The new housing became known 
generically as “the projects” and they became a potent symbol of the exclusion of inner-city 
blacks from postwar prosperity.  Right wing opposition along with the real estate industry’s 
attempts to turn the act into a blank check for eminent domain and urban renewal schemes, and 
ultimately, the act’s reliance on state and local officials to administer the program, led to such a 
development.
136
  Moreover, the intent of the act was geared towards stimulus rather than need, so 
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that when the war and the postwar boom came, the public sector was relegated to a lower 
priority.
137
  To make matters worse, Republican Congresses (with the help of conservative 
Democrats) repeatedly cut funding for the program after the war.  
Despite the very real limitations of the New Deal’s outreach to African Americans, the 
Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt marked the beginning of the end of African American 
political allegiance to the Republican Party as millions of northern Blacks voted for FDR, 
especially in 1936 and afterward.
138
  This development would create a situation after World War 
II in which northern Black voters’ leverage over both political parties increased as a swing voting 
bloc. Locally, the Pendergast brothers had been decades ahead of the national party in trying to 
woo the African American vote, and black Kansas Citians voted Democratic for Pendergast and 
Roosevelt in large numbers in the 1930s. 
* * * * * * * 
Roosevelt’s New Deal had additional implications for Greater Kansas City and the 
region.  The role of the Urban League in the KCMO job market changed after 1934, as the 
organization served as the main job broker for the city’s African American communities.139  
Between 1934 and 1939, the Urban League handled the cases of at least fifty individuals a 
month.
140
  Few of these individuals made just one appearance; after 1935, monthly appearances 
jumped from two hundred to around five hundred and fifty. Throughout this period, there were 
always more job applicants than jobs available. Another persistent problem was that of low 
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wages or even, in some cases, the refusal of employers to pay for work done. In one case, when 
black workers in Kansas City successfully struck for a three cent an hour raise in 1934, they had 
their hours cut by twenty percent.
141
  Many industries in the city were adamant in their refusal to 
hire African American workers, despite Urban League pressure and negotiation.  
Nonetheless, the Urban League won a few small victories in persuading the Jones Store 
in 1936, the utility companies in 1937, and the Ford plant in October 1939 to hire or, in the case 
of the Jones Store, rehire black workers.
142
  The Jones Store had appointed a new manager, who 
dismissed eight porters, five of whom were black.
143
  The Industrial Relations staff of the Urban 
League then met with the manager, persuading him to not only rehire the porters but hire ten 
additional porters. Additionally, the manager agreed to raise wages for African American elevator 
operators in the store.
144
  As for the Ford plant in Leeds, all that is known is that six workers 
were hired by the plant, but no records survive of what the plant assigned them to do as part of 
its workforce.
145
 Given the pervasive racism and hiring discrimination of the era, the League also 
had to pressure the Public Works Administration and the city’s labor unions to give African 
American workers a chance.
146
  Besides small victories, the Urban League was unable to make a 
breakthrough in any one job or industry until World War II.
147
  Through 1939, the Urban League 
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had an especially difficult time finding work for African American women.
148
  
Despite Randolph’s successes with the Brotherhood of Sleepingcar Porters and the AFL 
recognition of his union, union locals associated with the AFL still held on to racially 
exclusionary practices in the late 1930s. In fact Randolph and other civil rights activists would be 
fighting racist exclusion policies in AFL locals into the 1960s.
149
  As a result, when Kansas City 
had a wave of strikes and labor unrest in 1936-37, African Americans were put it an odd position. 
On the one hand, because the garment workers excluded them, black workers at the Gordon 
Brothers Company did not participate in a strike against that company by garment workers.
150
  
However, they did participate in strikes at the Ford plant and (as noted in the previous chapter) in 
the meatpacking plants in 1938, as both were CIO locals open to African American workers.
151
  
The work stoppage at the Leeds Ford plant was nowhere near as brutal and violent as the River 
Rouge strike in Michigan earlier in the decade had been. The danger when black workers did 
participate in strikes was that their jobs could be put in direct peril at a time when jobs were 
scarce and discrimination was as rampant as ever. These strikes were followed in 1938 by a 
citywide strike in the produce industry and a Sheffield Steel Plant walkout that included twenty-
eight black workers.
152
  The produce strike had left many without work, while the steel plant 
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workers only returned to work after the Urban League’s intervention.153  
As for New Deal programs beyond public works and housing, their record towards 
Kansas City’s black population was a mixed one. Some, like the HOLC and NHA, actually 
harmed the community. Others did very little. The late 1930s revival of relief programs did little 
to help African American families, as the monthly allotment of eleven dollars was insufficient to 
meet the needs of unskilled laborers who had not worked in two or three years.
154
  In addition, 
the National Recovery Act discriminated against black workers in order to curry favor with racist 
locals of the AFL and the southern wing of the Democratic Party.
155
   
Still other agencies were very helpful or were turned around after initially behaving in a 
discriminatory fashion. The Civil Works Administration at first offered very few opportunities to 
blacks until the federal government threatened to cut off funding for Missouri unless it removed 
racial barriers to CWA projects in Jackson County.
156
  Once the barriers were lifted and African 
American workers were admitted to the CWA, the Kansas City Urban League assumed some 
oversight of the program.
157
  The National Youth Administration began its first project in Jackson 
County at the Thomas Swope Settlement House near Campbell Street. Young men and women 
between ages sixteen and twenty-five who came from families on relief were eligible to 
participate in the NYA, and the agency hoped to enlist thirty-nine young women and twenty-one 
young men in helping to expand recreational and vocational programs at local community 
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centers. The NYA awarded the Kansas City Urban League a federal grant to hire students to 
repair toys used in African American childrens’ hospitals and other institutions for black 
children.
158
   
By 1935, the Urban League was supervising seven federal programs which were part of 
the New Deal, including the NYA and the WPA.
159
  Adult education courses for the city’s African 
American population provided by the WPA became very popular.
160
  Like the CWA, the CCC at 
first had problems with racial discrimination. In 1937, four black employees at the CCC camp at 
Lone Star lake near Lawrence, Kansas complained of racial discrimination by the camp 
commander.
161
  The most serious of these complaints mentioned incidents that resulted in jail 
sentences for three black youths who had participated in the CCC. An investigation by Thomas 
Webster of the Urban League resulted in a formal complaint to the CCC office in Omaha.
162
                                                                                                                                                      
In the early years of the Depression, African Americans in both KCMO and KCK 
received some aid from the charities bureau of the Chamber of Commerce. In 1932 for KCMO, 
the agency set a quota of African Americans on a federal reforestation project on the basis of the 
percentage of black men seeking assistance through the Provident Association.
163
  As a result, 
more than eighty African American men were hired on the crew of four hundred.
164
  For KCK, 
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black workers were hired to build a new Missouri river bridge from the Fairfax industrial district 
to Platte County, Missouri.
165
  There, one hundred black men were employed as cement 
mixers.
166
  
As for Pendergast, his record on jobs for African Americans was only slightly better than 
his record on the city’s segregation and discriminatory practices. The number of African 
Americans on the city’s payroll rose from twenty nine under the previous city government in 
1924 to four hundred and thirty-eight in 1938.
167
  However, most of these were patronage 
appointments and job barriers elsewhere remained untouched.
168
  Like FDR, Pendergast was 
averse to antagonizing the more racist locals of the AFL.  The city’s inspection department 
denied permits that would have allowed African American plumbers, electricians, masons, 
carpenters, plasterers, and tile settlers to work on buildings that required city inspections.
169
   
This was especially glaring given that the Pendergast machine liked to boast that Tom 
Pendergast’s “Ten Year Plan” kept the city working through the Depression. His Ten Year Plan 
was an ambitious program of civic improvement that had three main goals: to improve 
infrastructure, put the unemployed back to work and keep them off the relief rolls, and, not 
incidentally, to enrich Pendergast and his friends. To these ends, the machine accomplished a 
staggering amount: it built a new city hall and Jackson county courthouse, the Municipal 
Auditorium and greatly expanded the zoo, the Municipal Airport, and Municipal Hospital.
170
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That the Urban League was having so much trouble getting African-Americans hired and that 
there were so many black families struggling in extreme poverty in the midst of this frenzy of 
city-subsidized building exposed how racially biased the city’s hiring practices were and how the 
Pendergast machine’s record fell far short of what black voters had hoped for. Beyond this, the 
Pendergast Ten Year Plan was myopic in that any construction project or sector of the economy 
that wasn’t one of the machine’s pet projects languished.171  The machine did nothing, for 
example, to help housing, the railroads, or the stockyards.
172
  In any event, Pendergast rapidly 
fell from grace when he and several of his associates were given federal sentences for income tax 
evasion in 1939.
173
  Despite all of his flaws on civil rights and the city’s treatment of African 
Americans, Pendergast and his machine still had a much better record on civil rights than his 
fellow Democrats in the early 1900s or the Republican state-appointed police department in the 
1920s. 
Activists such as Chester Franklin seized on the fall of Pendergast to create the Non-
Partisan Citizens’ Movement in June 1939, as the fall of the machine swept a Citizens’ Reform 
political ticket into power in 1940.
174
  The Citizens’ Reform ticket was in fact deeply hostile to 
blacks and definitely worse than the Pendergast machine on matter of race, since it reflected the 
city’s own pattern of racism informed by a gendered white middle-class ideology of civic 
housekeeping. Franklin and the Non-Partisans did not know this at first, and initially actually 
believed they would be able to influence the new reform government.The platform of the Non-
Partisan Citizens Movement was a preview of black activists’ agenda during the 1940s. Its 
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platform called for equitable employment based on merit in city and county positions, proposed 
public housing projects, demanded an end to racial discrimination in tax-supported facilities, and 
called for the election of African-Americans to the city council.
175
  
Franklin and other civil rights activists in Kansas City took up the cause of attacking 
segregation of Missouri’s university system in the 1930s through legal action, galvanized by the 
case of Lloyd Gaines.
176
  This was an important first step in attacking KCMO’s segregated 
schools, by means of undermining Jim Crow at the state level. Given that chronic school 
segregation by race even after Brown was an interrelated problem in the story of KCMO’s urban 
crisis, this is important to note as the first step in a long legal battle over KCMO’s segregated 
school system that would drag on well past the 1960s, into the 1980s.
177
  Gaines was a young 
black man from St. Louis who had sued the University of Missouri after being denied entry to 
the University law school on the basis of his race. After a series of court battles, the US Supreme 
Court ruled in 1938 that the University of Missouri had to admit Gaines to its law school or else 
provide equal facilities for blacks.
178
  The University of Missouri chose the latter option, but 
thought setting aside a law school for African Americans in an abandoned beauty college with 
two hundred thousand dollars in funding constituted “equal facilities.”179  Sadly, Gaines never 
attended that or any other school, since he disappeared shortly after giving a speech in Kansas 
City in March 1939 thanking his supporters.
180
  He was never seen again and a nationwide search 
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by the NAACP the following October found no trace of Gaines.
181
  It was assumed by many 
contemporaries that he was murdered. 
Gaines’ fate only emboldened activists in Kansas City, who refused to be intimidated. A 
month before Gaines made his last speech, Lucile Bluford was barred from enrolling in the 
University of Missouri’s graduate school of journalism on the basis of her color.182  Bluford, an 
honors degree graduate of the University of Kansas, had been a reporter for the Call since her 
graduation in 1932. She actually had been accepted on the basis of her transcript, only to have 
the registrar refuse to enroll her once he discovered she was African-American. The excuse used 
by the registrar and the University was that the Gaines case had not yet been completely settled. 
Bluford refused to be intimidated by Gaines disappearance, renewed her application, and was 
again denied admittance.
183
  For more than a decade, Bluford and her allies would battle in the 
courts to make segregated schooling too expensive for Missouri by demanding truly equal 
facilities for higher education. Additionally, Bluford would become a major force for civil rights 
in KCMO, as she would later serve on the advisory board of the Urban League until the early 
1960s.
184
  
During these battles, Chester Franklin’s conservatism was shaken and he openly began to 
draw parallels between Jim Crow in America and British colonial rule in India in the pages of the 
Call.
185
  Franklin closely examined Gandhi’s “program of nonviolence and non-cooperation” as a 
                                                 
181
 Ibid., October 27, 1939. 
182
 Ibid., February 3, 1939. 
183
 Ibid. October 13, 1939. 
184
 “Annual Report: Report For 1959,” Spring 1960, p.3, KCULP, Box KCULP-2, File 18, MO Valley Special 
Collections, Jefferson City. 
185
 Kansas City Call, February 13, 1931, March 20, 1931. 
 208 
 
tactic for civil rights struggle.
186
  Franklin was not alone in admiring Gandhi’s teachings and 
methods among KCMO’s black leadership; the Reverend Joseph Gomez of the Allen Chapel 
A.M.E. also greatly admired Gandhi and spoke to black audiences about him.
187
  Gomez 
believed Western acceptance of Gandhi’s philosophy would have the power to eliminate “all 
class and color prejudice.”188  In Black Kansas City in the late 1930s, the tactical and 
philosophical shapes that the 1950s and 1960s civil rights and black freedom movement would 
take were starting to emerge. 
* * * * * * * 
World War II provided African American activists nationwide with a powerful weapon 
against domestic Jim Crow—a foreign enemy of the United States whose entire ideology, 
Nazism, was based on racism; the new language of anti-fascism was also a language with which 
to attack Jim Crow.  This would have the long-term effect of inverting the international climate 
that had reinforced American racism at home; especially after the war, the association of 
pseudoscientific racism with the Nazi enemy and its atrocities would put racism and anti-
Semitism on the defensive. The slogan of activists for black freedom and civil rights during 
wartime nationwide became the “Double V”: victory over the Axis abroad and Jim Crow at 
home. African American veterans’ attitudes were best summed up by William Ashby of the 
Newark Urban League who said “I’m tired of this goddamn crap. Tired of hearing the white man 
say, ‘I can serve no niggers in my restaurant.’ . . . . Hitler leveled his bullets at me. Missed. I 
went to the Pacific. Mr. Hirohito sent his madmen to blow me to hell in their planes. I’m still 
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here. Why don’t I tell the white man, “Take your goddamn boots off of my neck!”189   
Accordingly, more African Americans were willing to take collective, direct action 
against racist exclusion.
190
  They aimed protests, demonstrations, and court challenges at the 
heart of the mythology and institutions that protected racism.  By late 1940, manufacturers and 
public officials were getting ready to produce weaponry and munitions, the war production that 
FDR had promised to help supply the Allied effort in Europe, especially Britain. At first, it 
appeared blacks would be frozen out of the benefits of war production in Kansas City.
191
  The 
KCMO School District launched a martial arts program to train defense workers, but refused to 
hire African Americans.
192
  The Call noted with much irritation that state employments bureaus 
in both Kansas and Missouri were quietly refusing to send blacks to fill defense contractors’ 
requisitions and it took a mass protest to force the hiring of twenty-five black carpenters from 
Kansas City for construction work at Fort Riley, Kansas.
193
  
It was the aircraft industry, however, that held the most promise for unemployed workers 
of all races and backgrounds for good-paying jobs. In March 1941, defense contractors began 
building an enormous bomber plant in Fairfax, Kansas, an industrial district of KCK.
194
  Built 
with federal monies, the plant would be operated by a California-based subsidiary of General 
Motors named North American Aviation. The company promised it would employ as many as ten 
thousand at the plant. KCK’s Mayor, Don McCombs, in the excitement, assured black voters that 
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the company would hire them too.  
Unfortunately, McCombs spoke too soon, as the company announced its intent was to 
hire blacks only as janitors.
195
  The Call immediately went on the offensive, using antifascist 
language to shame the city and company with the all-upper case lettered headline, “NAZISM IN 
KANSAS CITY.”196  North American’s President, James H. Kindelberger, dug his heels in and 
told the Kansas City Star by phone that the firm would refuse to employ African Americans on 
factory lines regardless of their skills.
197
  Hours later, blacks in both Kansas Cities fired off an 
avalanche of letters and telegrams to Washington D.C.
198
  Republican Senator Arthur Capper of 
Kansas and the NAACP sponsored a resolution calling for an investigation of race discrimination 
in defense and Walter White of the NAACP demanded that Kindelberger be subpoenaed to 
appear before the Senate.
199
  In the House, another Republican, U.S. Guyer condemned North 
American Aviation’s “gross discrimination” on the House floor.200  In Topeka, the Kansas House 
passed its own resolution condemning North American’s race discrimination. 
 A. Philip Randolph’s March on Washington Movement provided just the outlet for both 
Kansas Cities’ blacks to express their outrage at Kindelberger’s policies. In January, Randolph 
made it known that he was displeased with President Roosevelt’s attempts to sidestep a ban on 
racial discrimination in the defense industries. He announced a “pilgrimage” to the capital by 
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African Americans demanding their rights to “work and fight.”201  Of what he wished this to 
achieve, Randolph wrote, “Our demand would be simple, single, and central. Namely: jobs in 
National Defense and placement as soldiers and officers of all ranks we are qualified for in the 
armed forces.”202  Unless these key demands were met, tens of thousands of African-American 
citizens would march on the nation’s capital on July 1, 1941. Even so, President Roosevelt 
refused to meet with a national conference on “Negro Participation in National Defense” held in 
March.
203
  Instead, he issued a fireside chat in which he warned that if blacks were not given any 
stake in their country’s defense then “their full loyalty and unstinted support” could not be 
expected, but he still refused to use executive powers to guarantee African-American workers 
would be included in the war effort.
204
  
The Call joined the vast majority of black publications in endorsing the March,  
Randolph had particularly close ties to both Kansas Cities dating back to the days when the Call 
was one of the only black newspapers to cover his labor organizing fairly and the Reverend D.A. 
Holmes was the only pastor in the Midwest who permitted him to use the pulpit.
205
  A mass local 
protest paralleling the March Movement was organized to make Kansas City’s black voices 
heard.
206
  It was hosted by both Kansas Cities’ NAACP chapters, and an estimated thirty-five 
hundred to five thousand black men and women from Greater Kansas City attended the March 
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30, 1941 rally in Memorial Hall in KCK.
207
  By a voice vote, the attendees of the rally passed a 
resolution demanding cancellation of North America’s defense contract and called for delegates 
from both cities to go to Washington to meet with White House and congressional officials. The 
Mayor attended and was jeered at first, but loudly applauded after he read an angry letter he sent 
to Kindelberger, attacking him for lying to the mayor and black voters about his hiring 
intentions.
208
  
After the demonstration, KCK’s city commission passed a resolution banning 
discrimination against black workers at the Fairfax plant and the packinghouse local of the CIO 
sent a delegation to Washington DC to issue its own protest.
209
  Both houses of the Kansas state 
legislature passed a bill that outlawed racial discrimination in the state’s labor unions.  
Meanwhile, the Office of Production Management had been flooded with letters, telegrams, and 
phone calls from Kansas Citians demanding action against North American.
210
   
Sidney Hillman, the co-director of the Office of Production Management (OPM), sent 
what became known as “the Hillman letter” to the nation’s defense contractors in April.211  In it, 
Hillman cited reports that some contractors were not hiring “qualified and available Negro 
workers.”212  The letter continued, bemoaning how “extremely wasteful of our human resources” 
discrimination was.
213
  It urged contractors “to examine their employment and training policies” 
in order that it could be decided if “those policies make ample provision for the full utilization of 
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Negro workers.”214   
By mid-May, the Kansas City delegation of protestors reached Washington to find 
Capper’s bill bottled up in the Senate committee.215  When they left, all they had were non-
specific assurances from the Senate and OPM that “everything practical” was being done to open 
up the defense plants to black workers.
216
  Worse, the Call reported that although Hillman had 
gotten guarantees from several contractors to hire twelve hundred black workers, he  had not 
received any response from Kindelberger. Randolph, out of patience, declared he was tired of the 
“runaround” and called for a “thundering march on Washington, ending in a monster and huge 
demonstration at Lincoln’s monument that will shake up white America.”217  Randolph hoped to 
force Roosevelt’s hand to issue an executive order banning racial discrimination in all federal 
departments, one way or another. 
Still, Roosevelt balked, arguing that Randolph’s planned march “would stir up race 
hatred” and several of his advisors warned of a race riot.218  In mid-June, thanks largely to First 
Lady Eleanor Roosevelt’s intervention, the president issued his first public statement supporting 
the Hillman letter.
219
  The protest movement was far from satisfied and Randolph refused to call 
off the July 1st march. Finally, on June 18, FDR met with Randolph, Walter White, and other 
delegates from the March Movement as well as New York Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia. Roosevelt 
and his staff probed Randolph and others with questions to see if the march was a bluff; White 
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rather rashly disposed of that conception by pledging one hundred thousand marchers.
220
  Finally 
convinced, Roosevelt joined Randolph and LaGuardia in constructing a compromise that omitted 
desegregation of the military itself.
221
  On June 25, 1941, FDR issued Executive Order 8802 
banning racial discrimination in defense plants, the first action of a presidential administration in 
support of civil rights since the Grant administration in the 1870s. The African American 
communities of both KCMO and KCK had helped make it happen by refusing to allow a defense 
corporation to engage in frustratingly familiar job discrimination, and forced the OPM to break 
with the administration’s indifference to Jim Crow. 
After their success in pressuring the White House to end racial discrimination in 
munitions plants, the city’s middle class activists became more cautious, preferring not to disrupt 
the war effort.
222
  Working-class blacks, however, were inspired by Randolph’s example to 
launch protests of their own. Between 1943 and 1945, there were a series of wildcat strikes by 
black workers. In May 1943, forty black employees of a local garment company stopped work 
for one day in protest of the firing of black machine operators
223
.  A month later, eight black 
employees of an Army mess hall in Kansas City walked off the job after they saw two black GIs 
denied service there.
224
  In March 1945, African American women who operated elevators in the 
Jackson County Courthouse struck to protest the beating of a black woman by county 
deputies.
225
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Perhaps the largest wildcat strike by black workers in Kansas City took place at the Pratt-
Whitney aircraft engine plant strike of July 1944. What occurred there was rooted in the tried and 
true tactic of deflection by employers and unions who claimed that the bigotry of “customers” or 
“rank and file” were the reason for Jim Crow policies.226  At Pratt-Whitney, this theory was 
tested and proven false in the most blatant fashion. Early in the war, the plant had no separate 
facilities for blacks and whites except for restrooms and black workers found relations with their 
white counterparts “harmonious.”227  As a result, they were shocked when they came to work one 
morning and saw “whites only” and “coloreds only” signs at the factory’s six cafeterias.228  
Within an hour, most African American workers on the first shift walked off their jobs, followed 
by second and third shifts when they learned of this discriminatory act by management. When 
confronted, management claimed that the signs had been posted at the request of officials of the 
International Association of Machinists. The striking black workers were puzzled, since neither 
they nor the Machinists’ union were aware of any objections to integrated cafeterias from white 
workers in the plant.
229
  
Once the wildcat action was underway however, Pratt-Whitney’s African American 
workforce registered other complaints against the plant’s management. White workers with less 
training and seniority were steadily promoted, while many black workers had been denied 
promotion.
230
  Foremen assigned black workers to the lowest level and least desirable jobs, gave 
them old or faulty machines, and verbally harassed them with racist insults and language. An 
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outraged woman worker who was the mother of two sons pointed out, nearly in tears, that there 
certainly wasn’t any “segregation of” German or Japanese “bullets being shelled on our boys 
overseas.”231  These workers only called off their strike so as not to delay war production, but 
while the cafeterias remained segregated, most African American workers refused to use them. 
During the war, KCMO continued some of the worst Jim Crow practices that had marked 
both the Republican “reform” and Pendergast years in the 1920s and 1930s. An infamous 
example that almost caused Franklin and other middle-class blacks to reconsider eschewing 
protest for the sake of the war effort was a February 1942 performance by Paul Robeson at 
Kansas City’s Municipal Auditorium. Robeson vowed he would never perform in front of a 
segregated audience and had been promised by Auditorium officials that his audience would be 
integrated.
232
  During the intermission, Lucile Bluford asked Robeson directly why he had 
broken his pledge by singing in a Jim Crow hall. In shock, Robeson replied that he did not know 
his audience was a segregated one. He had been tricked by a tactic the Auditorium often used, 
since the blocs of seats for blacks were scattered throughout the auditorium in a way that gave 
off the illusion it was integrated. After intermission, Robeson returned to announce that he would 
only continue the concert under protest. He then proceeded to sing the most rousing freedom and 
protest songs he knew, eschewing his prepared music.
233
  Angry whites began leaving the 
auditorium. 
As a result, the NAACP launched a campaign to target segregation in the auditorium, its 
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music hall, and Swope Park.
234
  The Call recommended a conference with the authorities, since, 
after all, black Republicans were allies of the Citizens’ Association, the nonpartisan group that 
came to office after Pendergast’s fall. However, the nonpartisan city government, including 
Mayor Gage, ducked responsibility for Auditorium discrimination, claiming that private 
promoters who rented the auditorium were at fault for segregated seating. Not only did Gage and 
his “reformers” refuse to eliminate racial segregation in the auditorium, they actually tightened 
racial boundaries in Swope Park by sending mounted park attendants and police officers in squad 
cars to herd black picnickers into a designated “colored area” of the Park.235  
The Kansas City Philharmonic was worse, banning African-Americans from attending 
altogether.
236
  Ruth Seufert, chair of the Philharmonic, denied that she was racist or prejudiced 
herself, since she had “a colored maid” who “sometimes eats at my own table with my 
family.”237  She trotted out the familiar deflecting tactic that it was the fault of bigoted patrons. 
However, neither the musicians nor their conductor approved of these racist policies. When the 
Board of Trustees finally agreed to sell tickets to African Americans in 1943, they seated them in 
the upper balcony only. 
238
 
This wave of activism energized a new type of white racial liberal, by challenging them 
to live up to their principles.  Interracial activist partnerships forged this way created a new 
conception of race and race relations among a minority of white Kansas Citians.
239
   This small 
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group of white allies was further emboldened by newer works in science and anthropology that 
worked to discredit pseudoscientific racism.  Of particular importance was Gunnar Myrdal’s 
seminal work on American racism, The American Dilemma in 1944. The “dilemma” alluded to in 
the work’s title was in fact at the core of Myrdal’s chief argument: that the United States was at 
its core defined by “the ever raging conflict between . . . the American Creed” where Americans 
thought and spoke the language of “high national and Christian precepts” but “on the other hand, 
[behaved in accordance with] the valuations on specific planes of individual and group living” 
that included “group prejudice.”240  Myrdal was the first to identify white racism as at fault for 
the so-called “Negro problem,” and to frame white racism as a moral failing that threatened the 
country’s democracy. 
Applying Myrdal’s ideas, KCMO’s liberal integrationists reversed the idea among white 
middle-class Kansas Citians that racial separation was a critical ingredient for “a peaceable, 
secure, and wholesome place.”241   Instead, integrationists said that segregation jeopardized 
communal peace and safety by corrupting individual character with bigotry and race prejudice.  
Given how weak the Communists’ political presence in KCMO had been, it’s not surprising that 
in the case of Kansas City, more of the impetus for these antiracist ideas came from Christian 
pacifists and Quakers than the secular radical Left. By 1943, a group of white Kansas Citians 
emerged who were genuinely upset at the treatment African-Americans were receiving and were 
alarmed at the possible consequences if these grievances continued to be ignored.
242
   They 
would form a religiously ecumenical civil rights group called the Fellowship House that would 
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become especially active after the war.
243
  The next chapter will examine the Fellowship in much 
greater detail. 
As in 1919, the 1943 Detroit race riot convinced a growing number of Kansas Citians of 
both races that some interracial cooperation was necessary to squelch rumors and prevent 
something similar from happening in KCMO.
244
  Given how close the city came in 1919 and 
1925 to racial violence and how close KCK came to racial violence in 1904, their worry was not 
unrealistic. Among incendiary rumors circulating were false claims that a riot had already started 
in the city, that a “bump club” of blacks deliberately jostled whites on busses and streetcars, that 
“Eleanor Clubs” of black domestics were inspired by the First Lady to abandon their employers’ 
kitchens on Sundays and holidays, and that blacks were planning to leap in mass numbers into 
the Swope Park swimming pool on the Fourth of July.
245
  In August 1943, the Kansas City 
Council of Social Agencies named a forty-nine member interracial committee to combat the 
rumors and ease tension over housing.
246
  The Citizens’ Interracial Committee was hobbled from 
the start by the refusal of Mayor Gage to call an interracial conference.
247
  Instead, he passed this 
task onto a nongovernmental organization. His failure to give the committee official standing 
doomed it to toothlessness and it was clear Gage considered it a means to smooth over problems 
and denounce radicals rather than a chance to make any real changes.
248
  
As the Second World War drew to a close, Kansas City and the nation were in a 
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transitional period in which change sometimes moved in ways that were ultimately untenable or 
had contradictory effects. The war years would be the last time in US history that the streetcar 
and passenger train in the United States would be major forms of transportation, as the 
automobile was becoming dominant over American society in ways that served to highlight 
American exceptionalism. No other wealthy society with an auto industry chose to eliminate its 
streetcars or allow its passenger rail system to deteriorate. The directions the New Deal took in 
national housing policy were completely contradictory, as it attempted to set up a two-tiered 
private system for the middle class and a public system for the poor and working-classes, but 
ended up setting up a two-tiered racial housing policy instead based around the dichotomy of 
white suburban subdivisions and black inner city “projects.” Openly racist social theories were 
directly inscribed into federal housing plans and agencies at the very moment that the heinous 
crimes of Nazi Germany discredited such ideas. The United States’ rise to global preeminence 
meant that first Japan, then the USSR, and then the People’s Republic of China would be able to 
point to Jim Crow as a way to undermine the US in Asia and Africa during World War II and the 
Cold War. The Black freedom movement would continue to grow after the war, its ranks swelled 
by returning veterans. In the next chapter, the postwar civil rights movement in Greater Kansas 
City, the entrenchment of redlining and urban segregation despite the success of integration 
elsewhere, and the impact of the new interstates on black neighborhoods will be discussed and 
analyzed. The paradox looming largest of all was that the urban crisis had arrived full blown in 
KCMO at the very same time that Jim Crow was finally on the defensive and as the United 
States emerged from the war as the wealthiest and most powerful nation on the planet. 
 
  
 221 
 
CHAPTER SIX: GREATER KANSAS CITY IN THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS ERA, 1940-68 
Both Kansas Cities emerged from the Second World War in the midst of several 
transformations that would alter the course of the future of the metropolitan area. The city had 
already crossed the threshold for urban crisis conditions in the overcrowding and increasing 
residential inequality by race and income, as numerous Urban League studies had warned 
repeatedly between 1940 and 1945.
1
  The Great Migration happened to peak in its effects on 
KCMO at the same time, hitting with the greatest force during the war, and in the process 
exacerbating these conditions.
2
  The three transformations ongoing at the close of the Second 
World War would work to exacerbate the urban crisis to the point where conditions would 
become favorable for the kind of upheaval seen in 1968.  
First, both cities entered the postwar era with a ring of FHA subsidized suburbs 
surrounding them in Johnson, Platte, Clay, and Jackson counties in Kansas and Missouri that had 
racially restrictive covenants.
3
  These suburbs would grow rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s, and 
despite the Supreme Court’s 1948 decision outlawing whites-only covenants, they would prove 
stubbornly resistant to integration.
4
   As shall be seen, attempts by Roosevelt, Truman, and even 
Eisenhower to provide public housing for a more egalitarian urban housing system were 
undermined and misdirected by both conservatives in Congress and the real estate industry 
                                                 
1
 “Annual Report, 1942,” KCULP, File 6, Box KCULP-2, MO State Archives, Jefferson City;  “Annual Report: The 
Urban League of Kansas City in 1944,” p.2, KCULP, Box KCULP-2, File 8, MO State Archives, Jefferson City; 
A Matter of Fact 1:2 (August –September 1945), KCULP, Box KCULP-1, File 1, MO State Archives, Jefferson 
City. 
2
 “Annual Report, 1942,” KCULP, File 6, Box KCULP-2, MO State Archives, Jefferson City. 
3
 Gotham, 61. 
4
 Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 50. 
 222 
 
between 1937 and 1955. Instead, what KCMO—and other cities—ended up with by the 1960s 
was a public housing that was enfolded into the predominant dichotomy of racial and class urban 
equality: suburban white middle-class private homeownership as the antithesis of inner city black 
poor “projects.” The injection of racism into the original housing program that subsidized private 
homes and the failure of the government to provide adequate public housing would prove costly 
indeed. 
Secondly, struggles against Jim Crow racism in the state of Missouri and both cities were 
ongoing. The war had created a spirit of determination both in the city and nationwide that the 
African American community would directly fight for their liberation from oppression and 
discrimination.
5
  Therefore, the long term effects of national housing and transportation policies 
were explosive in that they helped exclude inner city blacks from sharing in postwar prosperity 
at the very moment that there was a determined resistance to Jim Crow, a resistance that began to 
extract concessions and promises from U.S. Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and 
Kennedy. The signals regarding race that the Executive Branch sent out in the 1940s—through 
its intervention in housing on the one hand and its intervention to open up munitions factories 
and later, the military, to African Americans on the other—were more than mixed: they directly 
contradicted each other. As Douglas Masset and Nancy Denton put it in their study of the 
creation of the ghetto, American Apartheid, “what was new about the postwar era was the extent 
to which the federal government became involved in perpetuating racial segregation.”6   
Presidential politics also drove such mixed signals, as both liberal Democrats and moderate 
Republicans after FDR sought to win both the northern African American vote and the southern 
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white vote. Meanwhile, the city had barely escaped outbreaks of racial violence in 1919 and 
1925 and there had been worries during World War II as well of the potential for race riots.
7
  As 
shall be seen, in the case of Kansas City, the fight against Jim Crow would be a long one, 
stretching into the early 1960s. 
Third, the structure of the city’s transportation and economy was in the process of being 
restructured.   The stockyards and packinghouses gave way to bomber and defense plants, and 
though the city’s streetcar system limped into the 1950s, the city’s own Ford and Chevrolet 
plants churned out cars for what would become a “drive-in” decade.8  The railroad, which 
originally had launched the two cities to regional metropolitan status, was now dethroned in the 
very city it helped to make in the nineteenth century. As Monroe Dodd put it in speaking of the 
fate of the streetcars, “Detroit sold Americans the dream. The government gave them the roads to 
live that dream.”9  Even before the war, both coasts signaled what was coming: Robert Moses 
started his parkway building spree in New York in the 1930s, while Los Angeles began building 
some of the first freeways in the US in 1942.
10
  Additionally, Pennsylvania constructed a 
turnpike that ended up being the oldest of all Interstate Highway sections as early as 1940. When 
General Eisenhower had waged the final campaigns in the European Theater, the impression the 
German autobahns made on him sealed this trend; as president, he vigorously backed the plan for 
a nationwide interstate highway system. 
These developments were occurring at the very moment when the international climate 
                                                 
7
 “Annual Report: The Urban League of Kansas City in 1944,” p.2, KCULP, Box KCULP-2, File 8, MO State 
Archives, Jefferson City. 
8
 “Drive-in” decade a paraphrase of Jackson, 246. 
   
9
 Dodd, 186. 
10
 Jackson, 167-68, 251. 
 224 
 
alluded to in chapter two had altered drastically.  Hitler’s Third Reich and its Holocaust of 
millions of Jews, Slavs, Romas, and others put racism and anti-Semitism on the defensive at the 
very moment the United States emerged as the dominant world power center. This meant that all 
domestic activity, including Jim Crow, were on display for coverage by news presses around the 
world. Secondly, the discrediting of both pseudoscientific racism and colonialism by their 
association with defeated fascist ideology helped to spark independence movements throughout 
Africa and Asia that were highly sensitive to American racism’s similarity to the racism of 
former European colonial overlords. Third, World War II and the ensuing Cold War exposed the 
United States’ domestic record of Jim Crow for use by rival powers.  Imperial Japan during the 
war, and the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China following the war, all sought to 
seek the allegiance of anti-colonial forces in Africa and Asia by exploiting the American record 
on race.
11
  Again, Gunnar Myrdal’s American Dilemma in 1944 expressed the growing 
international consensus that racial prejudice was morally wrong as did the 1948 Declaration of 
Human Rights at the United Nations.  And at home, four years of war with fascism had 
underscored for many Americans, particularly African Americans, the link between fighting the 
German enemy abroad and fighting racism at home.   
A turning point in the momentum for civil rights in KCMO was the emergence of a group 
of white integrationists in KCMO who were not satisfied with Kansas City Mayor Gage’s largely 
empty gestures at “interracial cooperation.”12  Before their emergence, white allies for the city’s 
African American community were few and limited to a few labor locals, some segments of the 
Socialist Party (their record would be better in the 1930s than it had been in the 1910s), the CIO, 
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and a very small and weak Communist Party. Interracial direct action in KCMO came largely 
from a small group of pacifists who launched a branch of the Fellowship of Reconciliation (or 
FOR) in KCMO in the 1930s that would reorient itself towards battling racism and segregation 
after 1942.
13
  Given the notable weakness of the Communists in Kansas City in the 1930s 
compared to other cities in the decade, it makes sense that the main influence on white anti-racist 
and pro-civil rights activism would come from a religious dissident source in alliance with the 
left wing of the CIO and with social-democrats, especially Randolph and those allied with him.  
Originally a British Christian pacifist organization, the Fellowship’s history in the United 
States dated back to 1915, with the original goal of achieving a “world order based on peace and 
love.”14  Members of the Fellowship saw pacifism and social change as reinforcing one another. 
By 1942, the national organization under the leadership of A.J. Muste began to take a more 
assertive approach and steered the organization towards both direct action and anti-racist 
principles. War and racism, Muste said, were twin evils and both were anti-Christian in origin 
and impulse.
15
   Later in the same year, The Fellowship followed up on its new rhetoric by 
forming a Department of Race Relations, staffed by African-American Christian activists 
including future CORE director and Freedom Rider James Farmer and future Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. ally Bayard Rustin. Farmer, a Christian Socialist, pushed for a more radical approach 
than interracial committees had sanctioned in the past; he pushed for “relentless non-
cooperation” with Jim Crow, aiming “not to make housing in ghettoes more tolerable, but to 
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destroy residential segregation.”16  He would found the Congress of Racial Equality at the 
University of Chicago late in 1942. 
Locally, the Fellowship of Reconciliation went through changes as well, asking the 
Quakers for assistance. Emma Cadbury, chair of the Wider Quaker Fellowship, was sent to help 
FOR organize a Kansas City Society of Friends. Out of this contact came the Penn Valley 
Meeting for the Religious Society of Friends, who held their initial meeting in January 1942.
17
  
The Penn Valley Friends would provide religious and ethical advice and training for several 
Kansas City white civil rights activists. Given that the CIO was the only other major white 
institution in the city to speak out against Jim Crow, FOR needed all the help they could get in 
taking a stand against racism and segregation in the city. 
FOR accordingly shifted their objectives away from pacifism, since after Pearly Harbor, 
they gave up trying to prevent World War II under orders from the national organization. The 
national office instead advised that “we should begin to work on this problem of race” because 
“peace begins at home” and race was one of “the things that caused dissension and 
difficulties.”18  In 1942, Kansas City’s FOR invited people of both races whom they thought 
might be interested in forming a civil rights organization. Although sympathetic to CORE, the 
group decided against openly naming themselves an auxiliary of the group for fear of generating 
public and political backlash against themselves. Instead, they christened themselves the 
Committee on the Practice of Democracy (COPOD), a name less likely to generate controversy 
and which they picked in order to highlight their belief that integration was the application of 
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true democracy.
19
  COPOD activists concluded that “something had to be done about the 
segregation of people in Kansas City.”20  To that end, one of its founding goals was to “create 
opportunities for persons of varied backgrounds to get together on an equal basis.”21   
The first COPOD meeting attracted very few African-Americans from either KCMO or 
KCK, because as Girard Bryant—one of the few blacks who did attend the first meeting—
recalled, most “were afraid to come.”22  Eventually, the COPOD did attract black membership, 
most of whom came from the black professional classes. Bryant himself had been a teacher; he 
came to KCMO in 1926 to teach at Western Baptist Bible College.
23
  In 1930, Bryant joined the 
faculty of the KCMO School District, serving as a high school principal, and later serving as a 
college president. Bryant would then chair COPOD and its child agency Fellowship House.
24
  
Another major African American figure in the Fellowship would be the very active Lucille 
Bluford, who was also deeply involved with the local Urban League.
25
  Bluford would become 
chair of the Publicity Committee after the war.
26
  The white membership of the group, too, came 
mostly from the teaching, social service, and health professions. Ruth Gordon, one of the few 
Penn Valley Friends actually raised as a Quaker, had been a professor of dietetics and nutrition at 
the University of Kansas Medical Center in KCK.
27
  While there, she initiated desegregation of 
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the teaching hospital at the start of the war by hiring its first black staffer. 
Virginia Oldham, who became one of Kansas City’s leading antiwar, prison reform, and 
civil rights activists came to social activism less directly than Gordon or many others. While 
attending Wellesley College, Oldham was mystified and upset by the isolation her black 
classmates faced, despite their obvious talents and intellectual brilliance. However, Oldham 
herself had been raised with a racist family background, as her father and brother were 
prejudiced, and (perhaps as a result) the first interracial meeting she attended in Chicago in the 
1920s made her feel “strange” and “self-conscious.”28  When Oldham returned to Kansas City, 
she became an English teacher at Central High School, as there were few careers open to women 
in the 1920s and as she had given up her plans to become a journalist.   Oldham stumbled into 
FOR and Penn Valley Friends quite accidentally, as she accompanied a friend who was a great 
admirer of A.J. Muste to a pacifist rally in the 1930s. Oldham ended up being so impressed by 
Muste that she joined the movement, signing a card that stated she had taken a vow to be a 
pacifist.
29
  As a result, Oldham became one of the founders of Kansas City’s FOR branch and a 
force behind the COPOD as well.
30
  She would be elected chair of the entire organization after 
the war.
31
  
For its first two years, the COPOD met in an informal fashion in the homes of its 
activists,   but by March of 1946, the Fellowship/COPOD had established an official 
headquarters.
32
  From its inception, the organization began to directly attack segregation. In the 
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spring of 1944, hundreds of whites and blacks gathered at the Grand Avenue Temple in Kansas 
City for a Race Relations Institute, a sort of teach-in on racism and how to fight it held by FOR 
in several northern cities.
33
  These institutes followed similar patterns wherever they were: 
different days would be set aside for particular topics related to race relations; for example, on 
Institute’s Fridays, a scientist would speak of the lack of scientific evidence for racial inferiority 
and a local clergyman would follow, to speak on racism as a moral issue. Over the course of the 
three days the institute was held, participants in Kansas City also studied the philosophy and 
techniques of nonviolent direct action with speakers John Nevin Sayre and CORE leader and 
FOR race relations secretary James Farmer. 
Out of this three-day gathering, a variety of strategies were proposed for activists to 
employ against the private and official evasions that protected the city’s color line.  COPOD and 
CORE activists formed interracial teams to probe downtown theaters, restaurants, hotels, and 
drugstores for the true boundaries of segregation in KCMO’s public accommodations.34  These 
activists soon discovered that KCMO’s version of Jim Crow was drawn with somewhat irregular 
boundaries.
35
  Movie theaters in the city varied in their discriminatory practices: one theater 
might throw mixed groups out before they could take their seats; others might not ask the mixed 
group to leave until after it had already sat through an entire film. Likewise, some Kansas City 
restaurants and lunch counters seated the mixed groups in out of the way corners and provided 
poor service, while others barred them completely. Participants noted that they failed to 
encounter hostility from the general public and found managers courteous but confused by their 
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appearance. When pressed by the activists about their practices, the managers would often either 
admit segregation was morally wrong or, as was more typical, claim “it’s not me personally.”36  
They would fall back on the “bigoted patron” myth, with one theater owner claiming some white 
theater goers had complained about a sunburned man when the group pressed him on how he 
could possibly “know” what white customers reactions would be since the theater had never 
admitted blacks.
37
  
The Kansas City Call reported that what the interracial activists discovered in 1944 
vindicated what itself and the Urban League had long asserted: that it was “the officials, the 
management of private business” who were responsible for what Chester Franklin called “all the 
petty limitations put on us.”38  To further test this hypothesis, COPOD launched a demonstration 
in more than one sense of the word when they started a protest to illustrate that the white public 
was “ready” for integration. To this end, a mixed party of seven young women asked for and 
received service at a KCMO cafeteria in 1945.
39
  The only indication of hostility was that the 
cashier abandoned her post rather than serve them and one white customer abruptly left. Besides 
these incidents, the only other negative reactions were a few whispers and glances.  Other diners 
shared tables with smaller numbers of activists and actually told them “they were glad to have 
them.”40  Unfortunately, attempts to integrate housing and the city’s school system would prove 
far from this encouraging. 
In another play on the meaning of “demonstration,” the activists next targeted Municipal 
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Auditorium and the Music Hall in order to expose to the city’s whites that discrimination in the 
city against blacks was real. In these city institutions, camouflage of Jim Crow segregation by 
scattering “colored sections” was so effective and notorious that it had fooled even Paul 
Robeson; COPOD was determined to expose this sneaky tactic.
41
  The Philharmonic, too, 
remained segregated and was also targeted for protest action.
42
  Interracial teams from the 
COPOD attended the Philharmonic concerts, demanding to be seated together. The NAACP 
joined in and began to picket the Music Hall and Municipal Auditorium in November 1945 to 
force both races to admit auditorium seating was segregated and to see if they could “flush out” 
white support.
43
  
By the winter of 1946, this protest had expanded to include the involvement of several 
black social clubs and veterans’ organizations; these groups  began to picket performances such 
as Carmen Jones and Anna Lucatasa, performances which had black themes and were thus likely 
to attract large black audiences.
44
  The Call, for its part, refused to advertise these performances 
in its pages and in its editorials advocated that readers boycott them.
45
  Such tactics built upon 
1930s era “More Jobs For Negroes” campaign by the Community League, with the boycott as a 
weapon in the fight for the principle of “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work.”46  This was a very 
effective strategy: of the eight hundred to nine hundred African Americans who would have 
normally attended, only thirteen did so, and even among whites, so many boycotted the 
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performance that over a third of “white only” seating was empty.47  Whites who did attempt to 
attend and encountered pickets were shocked to learn the facilities were racially segregated.
48
  
Unfortunately, the biggest target of all, the white politicians and officials of the city, fell 
back on their old deflecting tactics in the face of the pickets. They claimed no control over the 
auditorium and halls, claiming that the city only “rented” them to performing companies.49    
These renters, the city officials said, determined segregation in the events they staged and the 
city had no control over those policies. With municipal elections around the corner in March 
1946, the Citizens’ Association, the political party then in power, promised all future events at 
the auditorium would not be segregated, but that private promoters could set whatever seating 
arrangement they wanted.
50
  The Call was delighted, since promoters who had wished to 
integrate audiences in the past reported that city officials pressured them to segregate the 
seating.
51
  
City officials, however, waffled on the promise by “advising” event sponsors to “follow 
the custom in seating Negroes.”52  Tired of this double-talk and deflecting tactics by the city 
government, an African American group confronted the city council directly in 1947, demanding 
that the council set seating policy in favor of integration at the Municipal Auditorium.
53
  When 
City Manager L.P. Cookingham repeated the same tired old excuses that the city had no legal 
authority over promoters, the group pointed out that a recent Golden Gloves event had been 
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segregated against the wishes of its sponsor, The Kansas City Star.
54
  Cookingham then claimed 
that the segregation was ordered by the Star, which the Call scoffed at as an obvious lie.
55
  The 
picketing continued. 
In March 1947, two events took place in the Auditorium without segregated seating; city 
officials accordingly upped security, as they were certain there would be fistfights and brawls by 
whites.
56
  Instead, no such things occurred and, according to the Call, whites even applauded 
when Carl Johnson of the NAACP took the microphone to say “This crowd here tonight 
demonstrates that Negro and white people can enjoy an event sitting side by side without any 
trouble.”57  As a result, the NAACP proposed an ordinance banning racial discrimination in 
public facilities, but withdrew it because Citizen Association Mayor William Kemp objected out 
of fear that the proposed law would include Swope Park’s swimming pool.58  The city council 
refused to even introduce or debate a second proposed measure that would ban discrimination in 
the Municipal Auditorium alone.
59
  The council quickly backpedaled when the Call’s business 
manager, Dowdal Davis, ran for office as a Citizens’ Association candidate for a council seat 
with the ordinances as a campaign issue. Although he failed to defeat Pendergast Democrat 
Thomas Gavin, Davis syphoned off enough of the African American vote to finally force the 
council’s hand. In May 1951, they finally passed a law banning discrimination in the Municipal 
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Auditorium, the air terminal restaurant, and the new Starlight Theater in Swope Park.
60
  The fight 
over the pool, however, was just beginning, as NAACP chair Carl Johnson pledged it would.
61
   
Meanwhile, the housing question would prove to be the most vexing of all challenges 
facing the black freedom movement. While two main agencies of the New Deal’s housing 
program would bolster the color line in the housing market, a third housing program was being 
hotly debated and fought over by a coalition of New Dealers, leftists, and unions against  
conservatives in both parties and real estate companies.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
public housing, provided for in the 1937 Housing Act, had been authorized by Missouri in 1941 
for Kansas City, but interrupted by the war.
62
  That was the second delay in the history of the 
Housing Act in Kansas City. Authorization had been delayed for four years after the act initially 
passed due to the obstruction of Pendergast and his crony Henry McElroy, who refused to admit 
the city had any slums.
63
   
With the war over and Pendergast long gone, the housing authority resumed its Kansas 
City activities in March 1946 amid a storm of protest from Missouri state legislators and real 
estate company officials.
64
  Because of this intense opposition from the Missouri State House in 
Jefferson City and business interests, the state legislature failed to amend the enabling act for 
slum clearance in 1949.
65
  Members of the Real Estate Board strongly supported the idea of slum 
clearance with eminent domain, but were adamant that the private sector should carry out 
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redevelopment and construction products.
66
  Above all, they loathed and staunchly opposed any 
efforts to build public housing for low-income people.
67
  Therefore, although Kansas City’s 
government took tentative steps in the 1940s towards a permanent housing authority with the 
legal power to acquire private property, these efforts rendered null by the intense opposition of a 
Real Estate Board that refused to invest in a public agency geared towards fighting slum 
conditions and building public housing for the poor and working-classes.
68
  
The NAREB and other real estate elites launched a concerted propaganda attack on 
public housing throughout the 1940s as “creeping socialism” that constituted “the cutting edge of 
the Communist front” in the United States; the campaign reached  a peak between 1946 and 
1949.
69
  The organization’s Vice President, Herbert Nelson, demanded that “no further funds be 
appropriated for public housing” since “public housing is European socialism in its most 
insidious form.”70  It was unacceptable to this business lobby to have the government competing 
with private home construction and real estate; ironically, the very same government was 
lavishly subsidizing their private subdivision construction through the FHA, which somehow 
wasn’t “socialism” to them. Nelson was more brutally honest than most in 1950, when he 
explained that in reality “I do not oppose government intervention in housing. I only believe the 
powers of government should be used to assist private enterprise.”71   
Very similar arguments to those used by the New Right and neoconservatives in the 
                                                 
66
 “Public Housing,” Kansas City Realtor, May 25, 1944; “Postwar Housing,” Kansas City Realtor, December 7, 
1944. 
67
 Ibid. 
68
 Ibid. 
69
 Gotham, 76. 
70
 “Nelson Proposes Eight-Point Plan to Beat Shortage,” Kansas City Realtor, January 9, 1947. 
71
 Gotham, 76. 
 236 
 
1970s and 1980s to attack the Great Society programs and “welfare” (Aid to Families With 
Dependent Children) were used by the real estate industry to attack public housing in the late 
1940s as they railed against it for putting “a premium on dependency.”72  In a climate of Cold 
War mobilization for potential war with the Soviet Union and a full-blown Second Red Scare led 
by Senators Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy, NAREB and other real estate interests’ red-
baiting tactics succeeded. By the 1950s, the industry had redefined the terms of debate towards 
“slum clearance” and what would become the buzzword for the next two decades, “urban 
renewal.”73  Left-liberal and social-democratic voices in favor of public housing were 
marginalized in the debate by then, and civil rights and labor organizations would have almost no 
say over housing policy made in the 1950s. In fact, it could be said that this development capped 
off a series of events that marked the transition from New Deal liberalism to a type of corporate 
liberalism based upon economic growth and political moderation.
74
  With this shift in 
interpretation of the 1937 Housing Act and the defeat of its original vision of public housing for 
the working-classes and poor and the Republican Congress’ similar defeat of most of President 
Truman’s Fair Deal proposals, postwar liberalism would jettison more expansive social-
democratic visions in favor of Keynesian growth policies. 
The great irony of Kansas City’s experience in the 1940s was that at the very moment a 
significant group of white civil rights activists were willing to join in interracial protests to 
achieve integration, housing segregation in the city reached a crisis point.
75
  If the Depression 
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had exacerbated the problem of housing, the outbreak of the war and resulting increase in 
industrial war jobs had created a situation of serious overcrowding in the city’s black district.   
Seventy-one percent of the city’s entire black population lived in the area bound by Troost and 
Jackson, Independence Avenue to the north, and 31st Street to the south.
76
  In three of the 1940 
census tracts of the area, blacks made up more than seventy-five percent of residents. 
77
 In three 
others, African Americans made up more than half the population.
78
  This data was confirmed by 
African Americans alive at the time interviewed decades later by Kevin Fox Gotham for his 
study on Kansas City’s history of housing segregation, Race, Real Estate and Urban 
Development. One, Albert Elliot, remembered that “once you got past 27th Street . . . it was just 
all white, I mean the businesses were white, the houses were white, . . . everything was white.”79  
This was due to the rampant use of whites-only covenants in those blocks of the city. 
By 1943, an Urban League report through their Community War Services division noted 
that most of this African American population on the East Side lived in “deteriorating 
neighborhoods” in which only fifty new houses had built for African Americans in the area since 
the 1920s.
80
  Most of these housing units were in a state of disrepair or lacked bathing facilities. 
Rents in these dwellings ranged from ten dollars to twenty-four dollars a month. The highest 
rents did not guarantee better facilities or privacy. A fifth of all of these housing units averaged 
three people for every two rooms in the building.  The study deduced that the worst crowding 
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was in areas with the lowest number of rental properties.
81
  It noted that African Americans were 
beginning to move into areas south of Twenty-Seventh Street, but that this meant they were 
“merely taking over [other] older and deteriorating neighborhoods.”82  The bottom line, the study 
concluded, was a problem of “increasing population and dearth of new construction.”83  
Paradoxically, this same residential segregation temporarily boosted African American 
businesses and fuelled further development in the Eighteenth and Vine district.
84
   
Still, if Eighteenth and Vine prosperity temporarily masked full-blown urban crisis 
conditions in KCMO, the Great Migration, white flight, urban renewal, and urban freeway 
construction would worsen the situation in decades to come. By the end of World War II, over 
thirty percent of all housing in KCMO was rated as substandard and eighty-five percent of 
housing occupied by blacks was determined to be in need of repair or replacement.
85
   KCMO’s 
total population had increased by twenty-three percent in the 1920s, while its black population 
increased by twenty-five percent.
86
  Although the city’s African American population increased 
only seven to eight percent in the 1930s, white population in the city started declining. Once the 
Depression ended, the KCMO African American population grew by a drastic thirty-four percent 
in the 1940s and by fifty percent in the 1950s.
87
  As dramatic as these increases were, when one 
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considers that they occurred after the FHA and HOLC had made redlining and white-only 
covenants federal policy, this meant these ever growing numbers of black urban residents were 
confined to the same neighborhoods identified as in trouble by the Urban League during World 
War II. 
Just as in 1911 and 1923-27, the population pressures of overcrowding caused black 
residents to move outward, setting off a new wave of white violence, threats, and bombings that 
would be intermittently ongoing between 1941 and 1962.
88
  As early as 1940, white vandals 
smashed windows of homes that had recently been inhabited by African Americans who were 
moving into neighborhoods near Fifteenth Street.
89
  In 1941, the Linwood Improvement 
Association sponsored a rally of one hundred white homeowners opposed to blacks moving 
across Twenty-Seventh Street and a black family who had just moved south of twenty-seventh 
received an anonymous letter threatening them with termite infestation if they didn’t move.90   
Perhaps the most vicious reactions came from Johnson County, Kansas, whites reacting 
to African Americans who wished to move anywhere in the county.  In 1949, African-American 
families moving into Shawnee, Kansas, were met with cross burnings and rocks thrown through 
windows with notes reading, “All the niggers that want to be alive in Shawnee in 1950 be out of 
Shawnee in December 1949.”91  Speaking of the Kansas side of the metropolitan area, KCK did 
not even have large apartment complexes until World War II, nor did it enact public housing until 
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1957.
92
   But most clashes over housing occurred in KCMO, where the overcrowding was the 
worst. One elderly African American resident recalled seeing a house “on east 47th street where 
the garage door was painted with swastikas” while another remembered that in the Kansas City 
of the 1940s, “you had a lot of animosity, you didn’t have a lot of instances of outward violence, 
but you had it . . . You had rocks thrown through windows.”93  
In addition to the city’s east side, the North End also experienced tensions over housing 
during the war. The Call investigated in 1945, both out of concern for what had happened in 
Detroit two years earlier, and out of a genuine puzzlement given that Italians and blacks had 
lived side by side in the neighborhood for decades without conflict.
94
  What had changed was 
that with the war, Italian-Americans had discovered better paying and more secure jobs. As a 
result, Italian-American businessmen and community leaders joined forces to build more housing 
for Italian families in the North End. The projects included buying property the city has seized 
for unpaid taxes, many of these properties having African American occupants. Another plan of 
the Italian-American business community was to replace Garrison Center with a housing facility 
for Italian newlyweds. African-Americans in the North End were convinced their Italian-
American neighbors were trying to drive them out, and the Call sadly agreed given the 
evidence.
95
  The scarcity of housing available to African-Americans meant the North End’s black 
population had nowhere else to go. 
After 1945, the NAACP took the lead in organizing civil rights protests, so the COPOD 
reoriented itself and established a Fellowship House headquarters modeled on the national 
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organization in Philadelphia. There, the organization sponsored a variety of activities, including 
talks on international affairs and peace, weekend workshops for students to study labor and race 
relations issues, and training in direct action in civil rights marches.
96
  Most importantly, 
Fellowship House was a safe place where African American, Hispanic, Asian, and white men and 
women could discuss great books and debate public affairs of the day.
97
  Before, according to 
Feazel, COPOD members had met “practically on street corners” because public meeting places 
in KCMO banned interracial socializing on their property.
98
  Worse, police brutality against 
blacks and oppressive policing of any perceived interracial contacts returned after the fall of 
Pendergast, as the state legislature in Jefferson City rammed through a bill once again stripping 
Kansas City’s police force of home rule in 1939.99  This development made COPOD’s activities 
all the riskier. 
This time, a Democratic Governor, Lloyd Stark, appointed a fourteen-year veteran of the 
FBI and a fervent J. Edgar Hoover admirer, Lear B. Reed, to chief of police over a new Board of 
Police Commissioners.
100
  Reed was obsessed with saving Kansas City from criminals and 
Communists, the latter of which he deemed “more of a threat to America than the British 
Redcoats ever were.”101  He launched a cleanup of the police department and the city’s streets 
that greatly weakened organized crime’s power in Kansas City. In accordance with his 
anticommunist zealotry, two of Reed’s zanier schemes were to establish a database of every 
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Kansas Citian’s fingerprints and to establish a paramilitary organization of civilians working side 
by side with the police.
102
  
Predictably, it was in the African-American sections of the city where Reed’s methods 
were most felt by citizens. By 1941, Reed’s police became as feared and hated in the black 
neighborhoods of the city as Matthew Foster’s police department had been in the 1920s. When 
he purged the Pendergast police ranks, Reed removed more than twenty black officers; only three 
of Reed’s replacements were African American103.   
Perhaps the worst incident was the August 1941 shooting of Harrison Ware by Kansas 
City police.  Ware was in the Autumn Leaf Club when the vice squad raided it. According to 
those present during the event, Officers Charles LeBaugh and Dewey Ellis then began to beat the 
unarmed Ware without any provocation. When Ware, in response, began hitting them with a cue 
ball, they shot him in the back three times, and proceeded to kick Ware as he was dying.
104
  
Following a funeral march of over one thousand demonstrators, the police commissioners 
suspended LeBaugh.
105
  
For the city’s African American population, the Ware killing was the last straw as far as 
dealing with Lear Reed and his police force. A group of black Kansas Citians travelled to 
Jefferson City to meet with Republican Governor Forrest C. Donnell to plead for him to improve 
relations between law enforcement and Kansas City’s black community.106  The visiting Kansas 
City delegation read off a list of abuses over the time period between Reed’s appointment and the 
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Ware shooting. These included multiple instances of police brutality, harassment of young black 
men by the police on street corners near dance halls, and the resumption of harassment of light-
skinned black women to determine if they were white when they were on dates with black 
men.
107
  The governor responded by demanding an explanation from the KCMO police 
commission.
108
   
The Commission, feeling the wrath of the Governor, then called Reed before an executive 
session.
109
  Declaring to the board of commissioners that “if I can not enforce the law in the 
colored belt, then I won’t be chief of police,” Reed resigned.110  William Reddig, a contemporary 
observer and historian of the Pendergast era, dryly remarked of Reed: “Besides suppressing 
criminals and scattering Reds, he antagonized workingmen and union officials, Negroes, liberals, 
and a wide variety of ordinary individuals who began to wonder if democracy could stand the 
strain of absolute rectitude.”111  Few missed him, even among the nonpartisan citizen reformers.  
Harold Anderson, Reed’s replacement, generated hopes and positive expectations in the 
African American community, as his father had been widely respected as captain of the Flora 
Avenue police station.
112
  They were especially encouraged by pledges he made to hire more 
black officers, including detectives.
113
  However, just like the 1920s “good government” 
reformers, their 1940s counterparts were hostile to the city’s African American community. The 
Board of Police Commissioners examined the list of nineteen incidents of police brutality and 
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dismissed every single one as exaggerations by the black community.
114
  The board opined that 
officers had been justified in every case, including even in their harassment of light-skinned 
black women at a Greek letter convention with their dark-skinned husbands.
115
  Outraged, the 
NAACP promptly demanded that the governor fire the entire board; Donnell then proceeded to 
reorganize the board with a new president to replace the man who had hired Reed.
116
  After a 
grand jury failed to indict officers LeBaugh and Ellis, a second grand jury brought an 
indictment.
117
  However, despite impressive medical evidence and eyewitness testimony against 
them, a jury acquitted both officers of the Ware shooting and both were restored to active duty.
118
  
Nonetheless, the frequency of police brutality in Kansas City declined sharply after 1941, 
and this trend continued into the 1950s.
119
  The officers continued to police any perceived 
interracial romantic relationships; accordingly, they stopped whites who tried to enter the Hot 
Club, a weekly jam session by jazz musicians of both races at the Chez Paree nightclub.
120
  
When Anderson was criticized, he responded that “violations of the law were certain to occur 
wherever liquor, hot jazz, and interracial dancing were found.”121  The Urban League’s Dorothy 
Davis responded that if the club was criminal in nature, then police should bar blacks too.
122
  In 
1946-47, these Kansas City police practices attracted national attention when they resulted in 
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altercations with two of the biggest swing band stars of the day, Cab Calloway and Duke 
Ellington. 
Cab Calloway was trying to enter the Pla-Mor Ballroom to hear Lionel Hampton 
perform, when patrolman William Todd clubbed him over the head with the butt of his revolver 
for trying to enter a “white club.”123  Charges of resisting arrest against Calloway were dropped 
and Todd resigned, but Calloway sued the club.
124
  The defense attorneys for the Pla-Mor then 
proceeded to play to the basest white fears of black men seeking white women.  They also 
exploited anti-Eastern feeling among whites in the city, impugning Calloway’s character by 
suggesting he tried to inject the “New York angle” into the “Kansas City way of life.”125  As a 
result of this demagoguery, an all-white jury found in favor of the Pla-Mor. In the case of Duke 
Ellington, he was stopped by a Kansas City patrolman for questioning because he was seen by 
the officer in a cab with three light-skinned women that the officer thought could be potentially 
be white.
126
  In this case, Police Chief Anderson actually apologized to Ellington for the incident. 
 The Hot Club case greatly alarmed African American activists in the city because it 
appeared to imperil interracial organizing just as it was becoming a real force for change in the 
city.
127
  After all, if the city police could break up interracial social gatherings in nightclubs or on 
streets by law-abiding men and women of both races, what could stop them from ordering the 
arrests of Urban League, NAACP, COPOD, or Fellowship activists?
128
  Even worse, assumptions 
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by the police that interracial mixing led to crime made it harder to convince city officials to 
desegregate public accommodations.
129
  
The other side of the problem the Hot Club incident represented was equally tricky to 
negotiate. No one wanted to openly address interracial relationships, least of all civil rights 
activists trying desperately to convince nervous whites that integration did not mean interracial 
sex. As Roy Wilkins warned his fellow NAACP members after he became the national assistant 
secretary, mounting a challenge to police action at the Hot Club could be easily misinterpreted 
“as a fight to associate with white people on the most intimate social terms” that would outrage 
and drive away respectable blacks and whites.
130
  More conservative clerical elements in the 
African American community insisted that the Hot Club should be shut down completely.
131
  
Carl Johnson decided one way out of the dilemma created by the Hot Club action was to press 
Anderson and the police to issue an unambiguous policy prohibiting officers from interfering in 
the actions of citizens when there was no violation of the law.
132
  The only concession the Board 
would allow for was that police were not permitted to interfere with whites and blacks who 
visited each others’ homes and churches. 
This type of preemptive policing of potential interracial liasons continued into the 1950s, 
as the very fear expressed by activists manifested itself in several incidents between 1950 and 
1953.  In 1950, “a young white woman described as being in the vanguard of the fight for civil 
rights and racial equality in the Kansas City area” was stopped by officers in the Eighteenth and 
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Vine area.
133
  During questioning, one of the officers justified stopping her by saying, “It’s for 
your own protection. One of these niggers might jump out of a doorway and hit you over the 
head.”134  After releasing her, the officers told her to stay out of black neighborhoods, saying, 
“Lady, you don’t know these niggers like we do.”135  Shaken, she reported the incident to the 
Call, asking them to withhold her name, out of fear the policemen would hurt civil rights 
workers.  
Over the next three years, indeed, letters of complaint continued to flow to the city’s 
Human Relations Commission, set up by the city council in 1951 to handle racial issues.
136
  One 
of those who wrote the commission in 1953 was a young jazz musician and waitress who was 
picked up in her own car for talking with a young black man, who was also a musician.
137
  When 
she asked what she was being arrested for, the police told her the only reason was that she was a 
white girl in a black neighborhood. She was searched at the station house and questioned by the 
Kansas City Police Vice Squad unit for several hours. Then, she was released with a warning that 
she would be arrested again if officers saw her in the black district. She stated sadly that, when 
she moved to Kansas City from New York, “I was unprepared for the treatment I have received 
by the Kansas City police force due to my association with jazz musicians of the Negro race.”138  
She concluded her letter by claiming to have been arrested three times “for riding in a car in 
mixed company” and that she hoped in the future “to avoid more confrontations with the ugly, 
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prejudiced attitudes of the Kansas City police.”139  
A second woman complained that she had also been arrested three times for socializing in 
a “colored tavern” with three other white women.140  She noted that an officer had threatened her 
with picking her “up on investigation every time he sees me their [sic]” and asked whether that 
was true because she and her friends really liked the new African American friends they had 
made.
141
  The worst fears of COPOD and Fellowship activists were realized when, incredibly, a 
white woman was arrested in her own home along with her guests, six social workers she had 
invited over for coffee.
142
  Four of these six guests were black, and two of these four were 
men.
143
  This also occurred in 1953. 
The signs of impending crisis were therefore manifest by the 1950s.   There was 
overcrowding in old and deteriorating housing accompanied by white violence when blacks 
sought housing s in “white” neighborhoods.  This was as the steady practice of police harassment 
and brutality.   But there was more.  The city’s health care system had been subjected to Jim 
Crow segregation since the early 1900s and the emerging, state-subsidized urban order of 
residential segregation by racially motivated appraisements of property helped to lock in 
inequalities in health care by race and residence.  
As shown in chapter four, in-fighting for patronage in machine politics was shown to be 
part of the culprit for General Hospital Number 2 falling into disrepair. According to Urban 
League records, however, problems were documented that suggested race discrimination much 
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deeper than fights over personnel. These reports are additional evidence of a state of increasing 
urban crisis in the KCMO of the 1940s. For example, an Urban League report conducted in 1940 
concerning the conditions at General Hospital Number 2 found that patients’ “housing facilities” 
there routinely had cracks in the walls.
144
  Room Number Ten in the facility’s basement was 
noted as especially bad, with large cracks which “on numerous occasions, snakes have come 
through . . and into the room.”145  Amongst other complaints registered by black patients were 
seven overarching problems. These were: “treatment and care of patients, . . housing facilities of 
patients confined in the basement, . . insufficient supervision over nurses, orderlies, and ..other 
staff, . . lack of sufficient number of attendants and doctors, . . lack of communication between 
basement and first floor, . . brutality exercised by orderlies, [and] . .  lack of occupational 
therapeutic training.”146  In at least two cases, Urban League investigators found that that a 
patient had died because the first floor was never told that they needed emergency care.
147
  All of 
this was the case years after Pendergast had removed Dr. Miller for his neglect and abuse. 
Moreover, employment continued to be a constant source of frustration for African 
Americans.  Employment discrimination had continued through the war years.  The Urban 
League compiled a three page list of complaints stretching from the start of the war to the first 
full postwar year of 1946 by black residents against local employers.
148
  Rampant workplace 
discrimination continued despite civil rights victories in the Fairfax and other area munitions 
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plants and despite victories by FOR/COPOD, CORE, the NAACP, and Urban League against the 
city’s Jim Crow in the late 1940s. As shall be seen, it was not until the early 1960s that the city 
passed any anti-discrimination ordinance and legal battles would tie the law’s implementation up 
another several years into the 1960s. The effect was a cumulative build up of tension around the 
deepening urban crisis over time; the mixed messages out of white officials, the delays, and the 
contradiction between the reality of black inner city life and the aspirations of a local and 
national civil rights movement all worked to create a long fuse. KCMO officials had said the city 
was “a tinderbox” in 1925 and had again worried during the war. The ominous problem was that 
the city remained the proverbial “tinderbox” after the war, into the 1950s, whether the city or 
middle-class civil rights leaders chose to acknowledge it or not. 
For example, 1941 witnessed three complaints. Walter Caldwell had applied for a job as a 
storeroom clerk by taking a merit exam; he was told he could only apply for the General Hospital 
2 or in the storeroom of the Recreation Department.
149
  He was told this despite scoring in the 
top ten.
150
  Caldwell’s employers implied that blacks were not fit to work alongside white 
employees as storeroom clerks, and put him to work in the storeroom of the Recreation 
Department. That same year, a qualified accountant by the name of Guy Davis, was never called 
for an interview even after successfully passing the merit examination for the Finance 
Department. A woman by the name of Alberta Gilmore was treated similarly, also never 
receiving a follow up call for an interview after taking the Finance Department’s exam. Finally, 
S.S. Dunson took an exam to work as an inspector in a tax office but received no referral.
151
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The start of the war did little to change the situation: in 1942, there were at least thirty 
cases of such discriminatory hiring practices.
152
   Even veteran status for some applicants did no 
good. One such veteran, Dennis Woodard, applied to be a guard at the city’s Personnel 
Department. He was then told by an interviewer in the Personnel Department that he should 
“apply for a job as a coal shoveler in which he could find better opportunity.”153  When The Call 
and the Urban League contacted the City Manager about this incident, Woodard was refused 
employment as either a guard or a coal shoveler. Three days later, when the Urban League 
requested a conference to discuss the difficulties blacks faced in obtaining municipal jobs with 
the city’s Director of Personnel, they were ignored. It took until 1946 for twenty-three qualified 
blacks who applied to be firemen to be hired at city stations 11 and 15. Elouise Phillips passed an 
exam to be a junior typist but was never referred to any city department for employment.
154
  The 
city’s race discrimination was not limited to employment: two African-American messengers 
were passed over for wage increases two years in a row. 
The following year, as many as ten applicants were on registers after interviews but never 
referred to any city departments.
155
  In the case of Irma Graves, she passed an exam as a junior 
typist and received offers from the Water and Traffic Departments. When her racial identity 
became known, however, she was referred to General Hospital Number 2 at a salary lower than 
the previous two offers. Peacetime changed little. In 1946, there were at least four complaints 
registered to the Urban League. One, Edmond Adams, was blatantly told by the secretary that the 
sign repair job he sought was “a white man’s job” after having passed an exam to be a semi-
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skilled laborer.
156
   Basil North passed an examination for Sanitary Inspector; when he inquired 
about the job, he was told that “the positions would not supplement those already existent,” 
which was probably an archaic and evasive way of telling him the position has been filled.
157
  
North, like many others in these complaint cases, was never called for work. In another fire 
department case, Henry Bausby was sent a letter informing him of certification for Fire Inspector 
and instructed him to report to Fire Headquarters if interested in the job and ask for Mr. Wornall. 
After some run around in which Bausby was told Wornall was not in his office, The Kansas City 
Call finally reached Wornall and told him of the situation. Wornall then told them he did not 
know why Bausby received the letter, as “there were no such openings for him.”158  Wornall then 
took Bausby’s name and number and said he would call him if such a position did open; he never 
did. All of this occurred after Bausby had passed an exam the year before for Fire Inspector. 
Finally, Sylvester Hill had taken an exam for Sanitary Inspector, also during the previous year 
and passed. He received a similar letter as Bausby’s, telling him to report to the Sanitation 
Department if he wished to take the job a few months later. When Hill arrived, the Director of 
the Department of Transportation told him that while Hill “was fully qualified for the job,” he 
“could not be accepted because” Hill would then “have to deal with the white public at their 
homes which he felt would be resented by them.”159  
* * * * * * * 
The tragic irony of the history of African Americans and civil rights in Kansas City in this 
time period was that just as Jim Crow barriers were beginning to come down and interracial civil 
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rights organizations were making headway, the conditions of urban crisis continued to worsen. 
Virginia Oldham and COPOD luckily managed to escape police harassment of interracial 
gatherings. Lucile Bluford, prospective Missouri journalism student, Urban League activist,  and 
COPOD member said of the Fellowship House that it was about “trying to eliminate segregation 
and discrimination by letting people know each other as individuals and persons.”160  It was to be 
“brotherhood through example” and to that end, COPOD activists held interracial luncheons 
every Wednesday in public places to educate whites and restaurant owners in Kansas City that 
integration and interracial harmony was possible.
161
  All other days of the week, the popular 
KCMO restaurant Bretton’s refused service to blacks, but on Wednesdays, owner Max Bretton 
set aside a special table for Fellowship members in the hope that the Restaurant Owners’ 
Association would decide to drop Jim Crow after seeing their example.
162
  Bretton himself was 
active in Jewish community relations work. As shall be seen, Jewish civil rights activism would 
be inspired by both the wide-open inclusiveness of the Fellowship and fighting persistent anti-
Semitism in Kansas City.  It would be one more element in a powerful coalition that would do 
battle with Kansas City’s Jim Crow in public accommodations between 1945 and 1963. 
Jews, like Italians, Mexicans, Native Americans, and African Americans, had been long 
discriminated against in the Greater Kansas City area. In KCK, remnants of the once 
predominant Wyandots and other Native Americans were discriminated against in labor locals 
such as the railroad brotherhoods, which barred them as well as blacks and Mexicans from 
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membership as late as 1940.
163
  Nichols’ suburban tracts in Johnson County had excluded all five 
groups as late as the early 1960s.
164
  The benefits of civil rights activism and the degree to which 
the urban crisis and related developments such as urban renewal effected each group was far 
from equal or even remotely similar in the postwar years. When the dust settled from the urban 
crisis, Jews and Italians would end up on the “white, middle-class, suburban” side of the real 
estate industry and FHA-manufactured color line, while African Americans and many Mexican-
Americans would stay in the “low-income, nonwhite, inner city” side of this urban divide.165  
This occurred despite the participation of the city’s Jewish population in the civil rights 
movement with middle-class blacks who themselves were exceptionally well-off compared to the 
majority of the metro area’s black population. Further complicating the picture with Mexican-
Americans is that, in this time period, it widely varied whether they were labeled by data 
collectors as “white”, “colored,” or as a separate “race” from either whites or blacks.166   
Esther Brown was the most important figure in the story of KCMO’s Jewish community 
allying itself with the cause of civil rights for African Americans. Brown had been born Esther 
Swirk in 1917 to Russian-Jewish parents in a working-class neighborhood in Kansas City, 
Missouri.
167
   She began her political activism as a high school student when she picketed with 
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garment workers and then, she studied at the leftist Commonwealth College in Arkansas.
168
   She 
would launch the opening lawsuit in what would be a long, anguished battle over Kansas City 
metro school desegregation over the next three decades.  
In 1947, in Merriam, Kansas, School District Number 90 in South Park built a ninety-
thousand dollar building for two hundred and twenty-two white children.
169
   Though the 
building had been built with taxpayer money from all residents, the district excluded forty-four 
black children, keeping them in a separate two-room schoolhouse with no indoor restrooms and 
one outhouse.   This was actually in violation of existing Kansas segregation law back to the 
1880s, which stated that only cities over fifteen thousand were allowed to maintain segregated 
school systems, while smaller communities such as South Park were required to operate 
integrated school systems.
170
    
Brown wouldn’t have even have known about the plight of African American children in 
the South Park district had it not been for the fact that the Browns had purchased a two bedroom 
home in Merriam and hired a black South Park woman, Helen Swan, to help around the house.
171
   
Swan told Esther and Paul Brown all about the plight of South Park’s black children and Esther 
Brown immediately took action.  She spoke across the state of Kansas, raising money and 
organizing.
172
   In February 1948, she helped black parents in South Park set up a branch of the 
NAACP.
173
   In May 1948, the South Park NAACP sued the school district and board.  The 
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Browns were immediately subjected to harassment and intimidation as a result of Esther’s 
courageous stand against Jim Crow, including threatening nighttime phone calls every night and 
a burned cross in their front yard.
174
   
In June 1949, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the South Park school board’s actions 
violated Kansas law by segregating through “subterfuge.”175  Brown continued her activism, 
taking her fight against segregation to Topeka, where African Americans in 1950 had written 
Thurgood Marshall of the NAACP to inform him that segregation of Topeka schools had grown 
unbearable.  Esther Brown, for her part, helped to persuade Oliver Brown, a railroad welder and 
minister, to allow his daughter Linda to be the main plaintiff in the landmark Brown v. Board of 
Education case.
176
   Throughout 1951, she helped Topeka and national NAACP lawyers to find 
Topeka hotels that would provide them lodging and helped them find education officials to 
testify about the damage segregation did to black children.
177
   Though a three-judge panel ruled 
in favor of Topeka schools, the NAACP’s appeal to the Supreme Court would result in the 
overturning of the 1896 Plessy decision by 1954. 
Unfortunately for Esther and Paul Brown, her activity had attracted the ire of J. Edgar 
Hoover and the FBI, who accused her of “agitating the Negro to demand their rights;”  he further 
claimed that the couple were both communists.
178
  Paul Brown lost his job and was asked to 
resign his commission as a captain with the US Air Force reserves when he was brought up on 
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charges in 1951 for “loyalty reasons.”179   Unidentified informants had brought the couple to the 
FBI’s attention, and agents repeatedly badgered Esther about past or present communist 
affiliation.  “She denies that she is a communist or that she has ever been a communist, and said 
that she was only fighting what she considered to be an injustice,” an FBI agent wrote of Esther 
Brown in 1951.
180
   By 1957, the charges were dropped against Paul, but throughout the six years 
the FBI was investigating them, Paul Brown remembered that he and Esther “endured sleepless 
nights and an ever-present gnawing fear.”181   It is no coincidence that the lone figure among this 
group of Kansas City white civil rights activists with strong ties to the labor left, Esther Brown, 
would be targeted by J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI. Thus, anticommunism was yet another force that 
drove the federal government to send out mixed messages when it came to civil rights and race: 
on the one hand, one of the key motives for postwar politicians to support civil rights reforms 
was the bad image Jim Crow was giving the US overseas but on the other, civil rights progress 
was delayed by a Red Scare climate that viewed civil rights as subversive. 
Refusing to be intimidated, Brown continued her activism on behalf of civil rights and 
integration. She worked to establish an anti-discrimination commission in the state of Kansas in 
1953.
182
   She organized a Panel of American Women through the B’nai Jehuda Temple 
Sisterhood in 1957, a national organization dedicated to creating dialogue between women of 
diverse backgrounds.  Throughout the turbulent 1960s, Brown served on the Jackson County, 
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Missouri, Civil Rights Commission.
183
   
 In the case of Kansas City, Jewish alliance with the civil rights movement was not only 
out of a sense of moral duty, political leaning, or a shared history of discrimination, but was 
motivated by continuing discrimination against and segregation of Jews.
184
   Such segregation 
dated as far back as at least 1908, and the city’s Jewish population in the early twentieth century 
resided mostly in the North End and another neighborhood called “McClure flats and 
Wardencourt.”185   Conversely, removal of racial barriers made religious or ethnic ones look all 
the more ridiculous.  Sidney Lawrence of the Fellowship accordingly steered the Jewish 
Community Relations Bureau (JCRB) towards an official policy that “the civil rights movement 
was vitally significant to the removal of social barriers affecting Jews.”186   In 1945, when the 
Bureau learned that a new subdivision in Leawood, Kansas, included covenants against both 
Jews and African Americans, the Board considered issuing a religious discrimination complaint 
alone because it was more likely to succeed than a racial discrimination complaint.  Consultation 
with black activists convinced the Board to forge stronger ties to the Fellowship to coordinate the 
attacks on the restrictive covenants.
187
  
The Fellowship examined public accommodations to find out what their racial policies 
were.
188
  At the Forum Cafeteria, Bluford and Oldham would stand in line until Bluford was 
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refused service. Then Oldham would fill a tray with food and sat down with Bluford to share a 
meal. The purpose was to demonstrate to white observers that “black people and white people 
could enjoy things together” without any incident or problem.189  Activists noted that whites 
always acted as if “the sky would fall” if whites and blacks ever sat, talked, and ate together.190   
Despite this unity of purpose, black and white activists in the group had very different ways of 
viewing why segregation was wrong and what its consequences among white Kansas Citians 
were.  
Obviously, for African American activists who fought Jim Crow in the 1950s, the 
consequences of segregation were deeply personal in nature. Margaret Holliday said she fought 
segregation because “it limits the individual so very much . . . . Every thing that is wrong is 
black; right is white. When you do that to a group of people, they begin to think that, and they 
will be less than what they could or should be.”191  Dorothy Davis Johnson of the Urban League 
staff recalled that her feeling was “what segregation did to us, we have not recovered from . . . It 
is an injustice to people to imply there is something so different about them that they must be 
separated.”192  Johnson felt that just as importantly, segregation placed her and other African 
Americans under constant threat of violence or humiliation if they crossed certain boundaries. 
“Segregation causes incidents,” she explained. “You see if, you have a whole bunch of blacks . . . 
and they’re told they can’t go here, they can’t go there, then the tiniest infraction can cause a 
scene.”193  Johnson noted that the worst part was variation in what exactly segregationist rules 
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were and the fact that they were not always clearly defined.  As she put it, “The variation is what 
is important. You never know what to expect. That’s the black side of it.”194  Experiencing this 
created “a discomfort that I don’t think may white people had to experience.”195  
Chester Franklin, for his part, simply saw segregation as an affront to democracy. He 
repeatedly stressed this theme throughout World War II and into the height of the Cold War.
196
  
Using both liberal and old-fashioned labor republican language, Franklin defined democracy as a 
man having “a right to make a living and to enjoy the fruits of his labor equally with his 
neighbors.”197  Franklin noted that segregation robbed African Americans of that right by forcing 
them into substandard schools and housing, by denying them gainful employment, and by 
excluding them from full enjoyment of public facilities.  In the spirit of that argument, Franklin 
stated, “A man should not have to remain hungry . . . when he has money in his pocket simply 
because of the color of his skin.”198  Franklin noted that the system of segregation was self-
reinforcing since it prevented whites from personal contact with African Americans who would 
disprove their racial stereotypes, which were the same ones used to justify segregation and racial 
exclusion.  Worst of all, “in order to prove Negroes bad,” segregationists committed a type of 
slow-motion extermination, as they “railroaded them into prison, lynched them by the score, and 
denied them work and homes,” practices that were “entirely at variance with Christianity and 
real Americanism.”199  Franklin believed segregation must go because of the obvious and direct 
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harm it did to the African American community.  
In contrast, white civil rights activists and members of the Fellowship tended to focus on 
the harm segregation did to whites, following Myrdal’s key thesis. These activists believed that 
ignorance, not character flaws, caused bigotry.  Ignorance was much easier to combat than 
stupidity or evil, which they quickly ruled out as causes of bigotry and prejudice.  Overcoming 
ignorance through education and through providing whites personal contact with blacks formed a 
critical part of 1940s and 1950s white integrationists’ activism. When COPOD activist Betty 
Feazel was asked why she protested against segregation in the 1940s and 1950s, she replied that 
the very people who degraded others through segregation were themselves degraded because of 
it. As she explained further, “It lowers their[white people’s] character; it brings out the worst in 
people.”200  She warned further that “you can’t keep a man down in the gutter without getting 
down there with him.”201  White Kansas Citians who protested segregation did so because they 
thought it lowered the character of their fellow citizens and created an uncivil society in which 
they had no desire to live. Another activist, Rhea Kalhorn, believed that segregation was wrong 
because it undermined social values that underpinned civility and decency. Like Franklin, 
Kalhorn saw segregation as a horrendous violation of the spirit of democracy.  Segregation “took 
dignity away from men” by generating inequality, Kalhorn said.202  
With the force of these beliefs, white civil rights activists in the city sought to attack 
segregation in order to create “the peaceable kingdom.”203  They believed integration possessed a 
transformative power that would uplift human character and human society.  The activists 
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experienced different spiritual responses to the fight for justice between 1945 and 1957, as 
reflected in the wide spectrum of religious belief systems they held. Oldham was the least 
religious of the activists, despite the fact she converted to the Quaker faith. Her attraction to the 
Quakers was “that they were people who did something about their religion” since conventional 
Christianity left her unimpressed. Her admiration for the Quakers was underpinned by her 
commitment to the teachings of Gandhi. She believed in an “inner light in everybody” and 
“Truth and Love,” not in “somebody off in heaven who ought to do better for the world than he 
does.”204  
In comparison to Oldham, John Swomley was more conventionally Christian, but this 
observation concealed the depth of his commitment to pacifism and to the Social Gospel.
205
  
Swomley had come from a Methodist background, met future ally James Farmer in the 
Methodist youth movement, and by 1939, became by his own account “radicalized” out of his 
discussions with pacifists.   He adopted left of center positions on any number of social issues as 
a result. Going to work for the Fellowship in 1939, he became its executive secretary and then its 
director. Swomley than hired his old friend Farmer as the FOR’s race relations secretary; later, he 
was behind the hiring of Bayard Rustin as well. Together, the three men would develop the 
Gandhian techniques Farmer and Rustin advanced as the chief philosophical underpinning of the 
Congress of Racial Equality.
206
  After completing his doctorate on hiatus from FOR leadership, 
Swomley came to Kansas City to join the Methodist college St. Paul’s Theological Seminary.  
Once he came to KCMO, Swomley was one of the city’s leading activists for peace, civil 
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liberties, and civil rights. One of the key ideas he brought to the budding interracial Kansas City 
civil rights movement was the notion that Christians were obligated to seek social change 
especially around race and that the struggle to transform society would bring the Christian closer 
to the “communion with God” because “in confronting the fact of evil,  . . . the Christian is 
constrained to act as fully as he can in the spirit of love.”207  
With a coalition of the NAACP, the Urban League, JCRB, COPOD, FOR, and later, 
CORE, the group was actually diverse community of Quakers, African-American professionals 
and clergy, Jews, Unitarians, Christian pacifists, and Social Gospel advocates.  Their protests 
against segregated public accommodations would gain momentum in the 1950s. The next major 
fight would be, as the NAACP pledged at the end of its successful effort to topple segregation in 
the auditoriums and Philharmonic, the Swope Park swimming pool. It was the only remaining 
city-owned facility still segregated.
208
   
As early as June 1951, Carl Johnson of the NAACP announced that unless the park board 
changed its policies and allowed African Americans to use the Swope park swimming pool, a 
lawsuit would be filed to test whether the board could legally do so.
209
  NAACP attorneys in 
New York, Johnson warned, had been studying recent court decisions in Missouri and had 
decided to fight the park board in the courts.
210
  He said this lawsuit would be made on behalf of 
blacks who were refused the right to purchase tickets to the pool.  After Johnson left, the Swope 
Park officials stated that they would refuse to make any changes and that it was their official 
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position that “the Paseo swimming pool at Seventeenth Street and Paseo already provides equal 
swimming facilities for Negroes.”211  This would prove to be the opening salvo in a three-year 
battle over the Swope pool. 
On August 9, 1951, three African Americans named Esther Williams, Lena Smith, and 
Joseph Moore, filed suit in the US District court, seeking an injunction against the city and fifty-
two thousand dollars in damages because they were refused admittance to the Swope park 
pool.
212
  Infamously, the city managers stated that “no rights have been violated” because the 
“policy of operating separate swimming pools for the two races is reinforced by a recognized 
natural aversion to physical intimacy inherent in the use of swimming pools by members of races 
that do not mingle socially.”213  The Kansas City Call pointed out, in another symbolic slap in the 
face, that the city managers’ statement spelled “Negro” with a small “n.”   City managers 
repeated the excuse that the separate Paseo pool already provided “equal swimming facilities.”214  
They also claimed that pool segregation was part of a custom that benefitted both “races” and 
that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply in this case in any event because the practice was a 
custom rather than a law.  
The suit was litigated by NAACP attorney Thurgood Marshall on behalf of the three 
plaintiffs.
215
  Federal district court Judge Albert A. Ridge saw through the city’s flimsy attempt at 
a “custom” loophole, and ruled in April 9, 1952, in a twenty-eight page opinion that Fourteenth 
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Amendment most definitely did apply, that the Paseo “colored” pool was not equal to the Swope 
facilities, that the city was definitely in violation of equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and that the state of Missouri itself had no laws segregating pools on the books.
216
  
Moreover, Albert said, the city itself had no such provision to separate races in its city charter.  
David M. Proctor, the city’s counsel, immediately declared the city would fight all the way to the 
Supreme Court.  The decision was praised by NAACP president Johnson, who said of the suit 
that it was “of tremendous importance to the people of this community” because “it clearly 
defines the established rights of all citizens without limitations based on race. We believe it is the 
second major decision in the field of human rights by a judge in this vicinity in the last thirty 
years, but it is by far the most outstanding. Contrary to some isolated notions, we believe that the 
decency and self-respect of the citizens of this community white and Negro, will meet the new 
experiences resulting from this decision with fairness and pride.”217  
As the city sent its case on a two-year appeal process through the courts, it closed Swope 
pool rather than comply with Ridge’s ruling.218  An additional reason KCMO officials closed the 
pool was out of fear of repetition of the 1949 race riot in St. Louis following desegregation of a 
public pool, and because of similar violence in Chicago throughout the 1930s along its 
waterfront.
219
   In June 1953, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth District rejected 
Proctor’s appeal, and in an editorial, the Kansas City Call heaped scorn on the park board’s 
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“waste [of] the taxpayers’ money by keeping the case in court” since “there is not a chance for 
the city to win.”220  Their prediction was proven correct when the Supreme Court permitted the 
lower court decisions to stand months later. The Call declared that Proctor and the city council 
had been defeated and ridiculed Proctor’s blustering statement that the city’s policy would await 
the Supreme Court’s decision in the school segregation cases.221  The paper additionally found 
talk of city officials trying to sidestep all of the rulings by building another “colored-only” 
swimming pool for blacks that would be the same size as Swope to be incredibly asinine and 
mocked Proctor for suggesting it.
222
  To signal to the city the NAACP was not in the least 
interested in another segregated pool, Johnson announced that he would launch more lawsuits to 
force compliance with the courts. Even Mayor Kemp’s own Kansas City Commission on Human 
Relations was pressuring the city council to reopen the Swope park pool, and open it to 
everyone.
223
  
Swope Park pool finally reopened in 1954, integrated at last
224
.  Unlike in St. Louis, the 
city launched a public education program about the upcoming changes to the Swope pool over a 
period of months.
225
  The feared violence did not materialize, but white attendance fell by a third 
of its usual level and only slightly increased in 1955. In May 1955, civil rights activists’ victory 
for integrated Kansas City pools was complete, as the Board completely reversed course and 
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opened all city pools to everyone.
226
  With this victory over the last holdout of city-sponsored 
segregation, the movement turned its sights towards fighting private sector segregation in the 
city, which would last another decade. 
* * * * * * * 
Housing discrimination proved to be a more difficult challenge than the city’s swimming 
pools.  In the late 1940s, the Santa Fe neighborhood in KCMO south of Twenty-Seventh Street 
was beginning to experience neighborhood transition, as the first African American families 
began to move in after World War II.
227
  At first, whites attempted to sue in court to enforce racist 
neighborhood covenants. When the courts threw these suits out and declared the covenants 
illegal, whites began putting their homes up for sale and moving out, convinced property values 
would plummet. By 1952, neighborhood turnover in the Santa Fe district was so advanced that 
black parents petitioned the Kansas City Missouri School District to convert the Benton 
elementary school from a “white” to a “colored” school (this was before Brown v. Board of 
Education).
228
  Later that year, the school district approved the change much to the anger of 
whites living in the area. Protests from neighborhood whites delayed the conversion of the 
school, but in September 1953 it opened as an all-black school. Six days after it opened, a fire 
destroyed the school and students were forced to attend split shifts for the rest of 1953.
229
  The 
destruction of the school coincided with a wave of bombings and arsons of homes purchased by 
black families in the 1940s and early 1950s. 
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Indeed, the series of bombings in 1952 were so horrific that even The Kansas City Times 
called them “a reign of terror” and dubbed the perpetrators “terrorists.”230  On May 21, 1952, 
Charles C. Chrittenden, a Navy veteran, and his family were nearly killed when a homemade 
bomb destroyed the house on the Paseo block they had recently purchased.
231
  They survived 
largely because one family member threw the bomb out on the driveway upon discovering it.
232
  
The Chrittenden family had received anonymous telephone calls warning them not to buy in 
neighborhoods that had been white and threatening them with non-specific reprisals.  The 
bombing had culminated a series of attacks by whites that included a previous arson attempt on 
the Chrittenden home and another bombing in the same neighborhood that did minor damage to 
another house.
233
     
Four months later, on September 7, 1952, the home of another African-American family 
in the Paseo block was bombed.
234
  Luckily for Sam Miller and his wife, they had already moved 
out of the home due to repeated earlier harassment.
235
  The Kansas City Call claimed that the 
harassment included the explosions of large firecrackers in their backyards and a telephone caller 
claiming to be a member of the Ku Klux Klan.  The explosion ripped a hole in the foundation of 
the two-story home, greatly damaged the furnace pipes, shattered several windows, and wrecked 
cabinets and a sink in the kitchen.  Additionally, it blew out twenty-nine window panes and 
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shattered dishes in the home of a white family living across the street.  The Chrittendens had sold 
the home to the Millers and were in the process of trying to find another buyer after the Millers 
left.  The Call noted that this was the third bombing in that block so Far, and Mayor Kemp 
condemned the bombings in a speech.  Kemp called it “a despicable crime” and an act of 
“terrorism” that threatened the city as a “law abiding community.”236   
After 1952, the violence became more sporadic as white flight accelerated, and the 
majority of whites had opted to move to suburbs in places such as Raytown or Johnson County, 
Kansas.
237
  Evidence of the lingering hostility could be found in a 1956 sign posted in the white 
neighborhood of East 39th Street that read “For Sale By Owner to the Blackest Negro In K.C.”238  
The Kansas City Call drew attention to the whites who put up signs saying “Not For Sale” and “I 
Believe in my Neighborhood;” unfortunately, they were outnumbered by those who fled to 
suburbs on either the Kansas or Missouri side of the metro.
239
   Nor did the bombings stop 
entirely after 1952:  as late as 1962, African Americans who moved into Raytown had their 
homes subjected to terror bombings and arson.
240
  
What made these outbreaks of racial violence between 1940 and 1962 different from their 
predecessors in 1911 and 1923-27 was the fact that that fears that African American purchases of 
homes would destroy the value of neighborhoods were no longer features of local housing 
markets or private prejudice but were now “a permanent and uncontested belief shared by all 
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segments of the real estate and banking industries and disseminated on a national scale by the 
federal government through the FHA.”241  Despite the US Supreme Court Kraemer ruling against 
racially exclusive covenants in 1948, not only did the FHA do nothing to change discriminatory 
practices by its private clients in the real estate and lending industries, but continued itself to use 
a racist system for evaluating neighborhoods all the while denying that the practices were racist 
and insisting that they only reflected “private market conditions.”242  The result would be what 
Kevin Fox Gotham termed “the racialization of metropolitan space.”243    
The real estate industry’s red-baiting regarding public housing concealed the fact that it 
did not just see public housing as a potential competitor but was also worried about it as a 
vehicle for attacking housing discrimination, which was the underpinning of the entire federally-
subsidized and segregated private real estate market from which NAREB drew its political and 
economic power.
244
  In the case of Kansas City, the industry had allies in the city council, who 
were adamantly opposed to placing any public housing in white neighborhoods. The Housing 
Acts of 1949 and 1954 would finalize the transition away from the original public housing intent 
of the 1937 act towards urban renewal. This development was the fruit of real estate lobbying 
efforts to block public housing, create local redevelopment agencies with broad powers of 
eminent domain, and secure generous government subsidies for its private redevelopment 
ambitions. Alarmed at “blight” and “decentralization” affecting downtown property values, 
NAREB had been planning since 1935 to undertake a “slum clearance” initiative with 
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government assistance in order to resell the property to private redevelopers.
245
  What they 
neglected to acknowledge was that “blight” and “decentralization” were the consequences of 
their own disinvestment in the central cities in favor of suburbanization of whites through the 
FHA in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. 
The real estate industry achieved one of these chief goals in the form of the 1949 Housing 
Act’s Title I, which provided federal subsidies for property acquisition and clearance.246  
Elsewhere in the Act, Title II raised by five hundred million the amount the FHA was allowed to 
offer as mortgage insurance.
247
  The most liberal section of the act, Title III, authorized the 
federal government to build eight hundred and ten thousand new public housing units over a ten 
year period and required local housing authorities to demolish or renovate one slum dwelling for 
every unit they built.  Title III survived conservative congressional budget cuts and real estate 
industry opposition, but was gravely weakened and never came close to meeting the target 
spelled out in the bill. Instead, by 1960, only one hundred and fifty housing units had been built. 
Sadly, it was clear much sooner than 1960 that two things had resulted:  “(1) there were no 
houses available for slum-dwellers displaced in the cities; (2) these slum dwellers were largely 
minorities to whom housing in new areas was banned.”248  
It was the Housing Act of 1954 that provided a blank check for “urban renewal,” with all 
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of the connotations that term implies today.
249
  Roosevelt and Truman had been apparently 
sincere in desiring public housing, but both presidents either delegated too much authority to 
locals and the private sector or, in the case of Truman, were too weakened by divided 
government to deliver it.  In contrast, Eisenhower showed no enthusiasm whatsoever for 
expanding existing public housing. Eisenhower and the Republican Congress made one 
exception to that point of view:  the 1954 act established the first specific housing for the elderly 
through the public housing program.
250
  Though Eisenhower, like Truman and Roosevelt before 
him, also called for relocation of displaced residents of slums that were cleared, urban leaders 
and the industry ignored this aspect of the 1954 law much like they had similar clauses in the 
1949 act. Counties in Missouri would ensure such a decline of KCK. 
Moreover, the Cold War itself provided a rationale for both the growth of FHA-
subsidized suburbia and the construction of the interstates.
251
  In the 1951 issue of The Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists was an article entitled “Defense through Decentralization,” which argued 
that the ideal in case of a nuclear attack by the USSR was a depopulated urban core surrounded 
by smaller settlements and low-density suburbs.
252
  Likewise, the interstates could be used for 
rapid evacuation of cities in case of nuclear attack, as stated by President Eisenhower himself in 
signing the 1956 Act.
253
  
Two developments in 1956 and 1957 would set the course for future transportation in 
KCMO, and the former event would combine with urban renewal to create disastrous 
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consequences for African-American neighborhoods in the city. First, President Eisenhower 
introduced and Congress signed into law the 1956 Interstate Highway Act, solidifying the 
dominance of the automobile over American transportation. The following year, in 1957, Kansas 
City’s transit company retired its streetcars permanently.254  
Both developments were culminations of trends in American transportation going back to 
previous decades. The streetcar, for its part, had been in slow decline since the 1920s. As for the 
Interstate Highway System, as far back as the 1939 New York World’s Fair, General Motors had 
presented an exhibit called “Futurama, “complete with “elevated freeways, [with] traffic moving 
at one hundred miles an hour.”255  California built freeways and Pennsylvania built a turnpike 
back in the early 1940s that would become absorbed into the Interstates after 1956, and the 
President had been greatly impressed as Allied commander by the German autobahn system in 
the last campaigns of the European Front in World War II. As early as 1943 in the US, a diverse 
group of lobbyists came together to form the American Road Builders Association. They 
included initially the Automobile Manufacturers Association, state highway chairmen, motor-bus 
companies and operators, the American Trucking Association, and the American Parking 
Association.
256
  By the mid-1950s, this coalition of lobbyists was broad-based enough that it had 
grown to also include: “the oil, rubber, asphalt, and construction industries; car dealers and rental 
car agencies; . . .  the banks and advertising agencies that depended upon the companies 
involved” and labor unions such as the UAW and the Teamsters’ union.257  
 The latter’s inclusion served to highlight two developments in organized labor after 
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World War II: the peak of the power of organized labor as part of the postwar Cold War 
consensus and the shift in the transportation sector of the labor movement away from the 
Railroad Brotherhoods to the UAW and the Teamsters. The latter shift had been underway since 
at least the victory of Walter Reuther’s UAW at the 1937 sit-down strike at the General Motors 
plant. The expulsion of leftist radicals from the CIO in 1949, the postwar accord between 
business and labor, and the 1955 merger of the AFL and CIO signaled a retreat from more radical 
visions for organized labor. Such a change made such an alliance for road lobbying with 
management possible. Given that the UAW helped fund liberal Democrats and the Teamsters 
supported Republicans like Eisenhower and Nixon, the pressure from transportation unions for 
road projects was bipartisan. A. Philip Randolph would remain a labor and civil rights giant 
despite these shifts, but the Pullman company and the Brotherhood’s heyday was now behind 
them, as the country’s “once magnificent passenger railroad system” went through bankruptcy 
and deteriorating service in the 1950s as an “inevitable result of a national transportation policy 
that subsidized air and automobile travel and taxed the railroads.”258   
In the middle of 1946, advocates of interracial and black unionism in KCK won a 
significant court case in the fight against racism and segregation in labor unions.
259
  One hundred 
black workers at the Santa Fe railroad repair shops had been fighting the AFL local Brotherhood 
of Railway Carmen for two years in court in order to obtain membership in the union.
260
  The 
Kansas Supreme Court ruled in June of 1946 that segregated, auxiliary union locals were 
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unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment.
261
  Despite such victories, as late as the 
1960s, many AFL locals still excluded blacks. The decline of the railroads and the Brotherhood 
further harmed urban working-class blacks by depriving them of union wage-paying jobs and 
rendered the benefits from victories in rail unions sadly short term.
262
  By 1962, an open fight 
broke out between Randolph and George Meany in the national AFL-CIO over discrimination in 
union locals; Meany refused to admit that the problem of racist locals was a major one and also 
refused to appoint an African-American to head the AFL-CIO’s civil rights department.263  
Meany dismissed such a potential measure as “discrimination in reverse.”264  In any event, the 
boost the interstates would give to the UAW (including black auto workers at the Ford and GM 
plants) and Teamsters would only be temporary, as became clear once capital broke its postwar 
accord with labor in the 1970s.  In the long term, the capital mobility and low-wage service jobs 
spurred by the interstates in the form of fast food chains and chain malls would greatly 
undermine the labor movement in the late twentieth century.   
For KCK, an additional blow to the labor movement came much earlier, in the form of 
the 1958 Kansas right-to-work law.
265
  The long-established International Brotherhood of 
Boilermakers were so enraged at the right-to-work law’s passage that they threatened to abandon 
KCK as their headquarters; they ended up remaining.
266
  The Attorney General of Kansas, John  
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Anderson, Jr., ruled that all union security contracts had been abrogated by the November 4, 
1958 adoption of the right-to-work amendment to the Kansas state constitution, with only 
railroads, airlines, and other firms involved in congressionally-defined “interstate commerce” 
exempt from the law.
267
  The 1958 right-to-work act altered KCK’s working class by removing a 
culture of industrialized unionism around the stockyards and packing plants that had already lost 
the packing industry and stockyards to economic depression and flooding between the early 
1930s and early 1950s. The long-term effects would be devastating: by the end of the century, 
Wyandotte County would become “one of the poorest counties in Kansas and the metropolitan 
area” while Johnson County would be “one of the richest counties in the United States.”268  The 
hollowing out of its urban core along with KCMO’s through federally subsidized suburbs in 
Johnson County and other metro suburbs in Jackson, Platte, and Clay Counties in Missouri 
would ensure such a decline of KCK. 
* * * * * * * 
In 1953, in accordance with the federal 1949 Housing Act, the state of Missouri formed 
the Land Clearance For Redevelopment Authority, or LCRA, for carrying out urban renewal 
projects in Kansas City and St. Louis.
269
  KCMO’s city council established the LCRA as a 
separate legal agency responsible to its own board of private sector figures not directly 
answerable to city hall or the city manager. Although the bulk of the funding came from the 
federal government, the decisions were entirely made by LCRA officials working closely with 
downtown Kansas City business elites, including the Downtown Committee, the Building 
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Owners and Managers Association, the Citizens Regional Planning Council, the Hotel 
Association, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Merchants Association.
270
  Between 1953 and 
1969, the federal government supplied two-thirds of the eighty million dollars it cost to finance 
KCMO’s urban redevelopment and renewal programs. 
For the next two and a half decades, the undertaking of large scale slum clearance and 
public housing building in KCMO would further transform the character of an urban core already 
deeply altered by white flight and the collapse of the streetcar system. Residential neighborhoods 
began being cleared away for commercial and industrial land use, and both in Kansas City and 
nationally, urban renewal was celebrated by the press and public officials.
271
  Early on, both of 
the city’s major newspapers, the Kansas City Star and the Kansas City Times, threw their full 
support behind the effort with glowing coverage.
272
  Nationally, Look magazine in 1958 awarded 
Kansas City the Community Home Achievement Award for its urban renewal program.
273
   
The LCRA launched eighteen urban renewal projects in the sixteen year period between 
1953 and 1969.
274
  The Northside area was the first area targeted for slum clearance, with 
Attucks, South Humbolt, and Eastside urban renewal projects following each other consecutively 
in the 1950s. The purpose of the urban renewal project on the Northside between 1953 and 1960 
                                                 
270
 Ibid. 
271
 There are myriad examples of this celebration: “To Redeem the Whole West Side,” Kansas City Times, July 6, 
1953; “Praise Kansas City Renewal Projects,” Kansas City Times, May 2, 1959; “Dream City Without Slums,” 
Kansas City Star, December 19, 1952; “For A City Without Slums,” Kansas City Star, February 24, 1952; 
“Slum War Is On,” Kansas City Star, July 3,1955; “New Housing Leads Way to a City Without Slums,” Kansas 
City Star, April 7, 1957; “Out of the Rubble A New Kansas City Arises,” Kansas City Star, June 1, 1958; “City 
Faces Great Era,” Kansas City Star, October 2, 1958; “Kansas City’s Battle on Blight Is A Major Feat,” Kansas 
City Star, January 3, 1960. 
272
 “Denver Praise For Kansas City 1980,” Kansas City Times, December 30, 1958; “Out of the Rubble,” Kansas 
City Star, June 1, 1958. 
273
 “City Honored For Face Lift,” Kansas City Times, April 9, 1958; “Award for a Program that is Rebuilding A 
City,” Kansas City Times, April 10, 1958. 
274
 Gotham, 79-80. 
 278 
 
was to build parking lots near downtown, and resulted in four-hundred and thirty-two white and 
eighty-eight black residents being displaced as well as the demolition of seventy-one 
businesses.
275
  The entire purpose of the Attucks project of 1955-65 was to clear out African 
American neighborhoods adjacent to downtown. As a result, four hundred and seventy-eight 
African Americans lost their homes and eighty-five businesses were destroyed, many of them 
Black-owned.
276
   
 
The hunger for interstate projects accelerated the demolition trend.  Locally, there had 
been a hunger for expressway projects in both cities as far back as the 1930s. KCK had acted 
first, building the 7th Street Trafficway in 1933 as an upgrade of US 69.
277
  While a Senator, 
Harry Truman had been an enthusiastic booster of the Kansas City highway system in the 
1930s.
278
  By 1947, the largest items in the KCMO bond program were funding for future 
airports and trafficways.
279
  And, as early as 1953, before Eisenhower’s first full year as 
president and well before he proposed the Interstate Highway System, the Urban League was 
already warning that the construction of the Paseo bridge  and the “proposed system of 
expressways would necessitate the “relocation of 700 Negro families.”280  
 After the urban renewal funding from the 1949 and 1954 Housing Acts and the 1956 
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Interstate Highway Act, the city enthusiastically started building the new superhighways, 
clearing out eighty-nine and a half acres of South Humbolt and Eastside between 1956 and 1965 
in order to build the eastern downtown loop portion of I-70.
281
  As a result, one hundred and 
sixteen blacks, seven hundred and eighty-five whites, and one hundred and sixty-one businesses 
were displaced. All of this was quite on purpose, as the new interstates and freeways were “a 
handy device for razing” what to city officials were a blighting “jumble of slums and aging 
buildings” that needed to be eliminated so that the city would be instead “a place to do business 
and find entertainment.”282  City officials in KCMO and in other cities saw building urban 
interstates as part of urban renewal. There was no place for residential neighborhoods deemed 
eyesores in the bright future imagined by municipal officials of “Kansas City 1980.”283  Also 
excluded from this consumerist future was the Hispanic Westside, literally cut in half by the 
construction of I-35 in KCMO between the downtown loop and the Kansas state line.
284
  The 
start of construction on I-670 in the late 1960s further damaged the neighborhood.
285
  Unlike 
other cities in the Midwest, the Mexican-American population in both Kansas Cities (as well as 
Topeka and Wichita) was as old as 1882, and like African Americans, had been very connected to 
the railroad and meatpacking jobs in the area.
286
  
Together, the construction of the downtown loop, I-35, and I-70 between 1956 and 1965 
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removed more than five thousand four hundred houses, one thousand one hundred and eighty 
two of which were black.
287
  Twenty-eight point six percent of all households displaced for 
freeway construction were African American even though they made up only seventeen and a 
half percent of the city’s population in 1960. The construction of the US 71 freeway, or South 
Mid-Town Freeway, on the southern part of the city between 1966 and 1975 displaced an 
additional three thousand houses, over forty percent of which were black.
288
   
Besides the Attucks and Northside urban renewal projects and the interstate highway 
construction, the LCRA authorized fourteen additional urban redevelopment projects in the 
1960s.
289
  They were in the following areas: the Woodland, Garfield, Hospital Hill, West Main, 
Trinity-St. Mary’s, Manual, Town Fort Creek, Independence Plaza, Columbus Park, Attucks 
East, the Central Business District, East 23rd Street, Oak Park, and 12th and Vine.
290
  These 
actions displaced thousands of individuals and businesses, and forty-eight percent of those 
persons displaced were African American. 
The language in both the 1949 and 1954 Housing Acts stated that in order to qualify for 
urban renewal funding, cities had to provide sufficient housing for those displaced.
291
  In 
KCMO, the city council turned to public housing to absorb those dislocated by the city’s urban 
renewal and freeway construction initiatives. In 1953, the city had built one of its first public 
housing units for African Americans, the T.B. Watkins homes. As mentioned before, the city 
refused to build any of these housing units in white neighborhoods, and until 1964, the Housing 
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Authority of Kansas City, Missouri (or HAKC) segregated its public housing residents by race as 
well.
292
  By 1954, HAKC had three major public housing developments that were racially 
segregated: T.B. Watkins was for African Americans only, while Guinotte Manor and Riverview 
were whites-only. Other public housing projects being planned or built during the mid-1950s 
included Wayne Miner Court for Blacks and Choteau Court, West Bluff, and Pennway Plaza for 
whites. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, HAKC built all of these housing projects within six 
miles of each other, so that public housing was concentrated in the inner city.
293
   
The Greater Kansas City Urban League and the Call both protested repeatedly against the 
segregationist policies of HAKC and insisted that they build these housing units on vacant land 
outside of the city. The Call was especially upset that a racially mixed neighborhood of Blacks, 
Italians, and other white ethnic groups had been demolished to build the all-white Guniotte 
public housing project.
294
  The paper continued its criticism of the local housing authority, 
blasting it for its segregationist policies and for expecting the Watkins housing project to take 
care of all of the city’s housing needs.295  
 The damage done to African American neighborhoods was severe:  former CORE 
activist and present-day police commissioner Alvin Brooks remembered that “urban renewal 
became the synonym for ‘Black removal’” and that it “broke the back of stable Black 
neighborhoods.”296  Other residents recalled how many thriving Black businesses and 
convenience stores were lost when the urban renewal projects and the construction of I-70 cut off 
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the northern section of the Vine district after 1962.
297
  In several cases, small businesses and 
neighborhood stores were destroyed or forced to move in favor of parking lots and corporate 
chain stores.
298
  This two decade process transformed Kansas City’s urban core and many of 
those displaced were minorities banned from purchasing suburban homes by real estate 
companies.
299
  From 1953 through 1969, neither the LCRA nor the Missouri Department of 
Highways and Transportation provided financial assistance to help these residents find new 
housing. The LCRA for its part, like the HAKC, perpetuated housing segregation and 
discrimination by keeping separate lists of available homes “for Blacks” and “for Whites.”300  
Whatever benefits that I-70 between Kansas City and St. Louis offered black middle-
class Kansas Citians who owned cars had was greatly undermined by the persistence of Jim 
Crow at motels, gas stations, and restaurants on the patchwork quilt of Highway 40 and newly 
completed segments of I-70 that was that route in the early sixties; the situation was much the 
same in the rest of the state on Highway 50 and Route 66/ newly completed I-44.
301
  Gas stations 
along all three of these routes often wouldn’t let black families use their rest rooms, a practice 
ongoing since the 1930s.
302
  As the Kansas City Times (finally) acknowledged in 1963, “a Negro 
family can drive between Kansas City and St. Louis and spend a good part of the time looking 
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for a place to eat.”303  Worse, “a Negro family can be caught in a blizzard and be turned away 
from one motel or hotel after another.”304  Appealing to liberal and moderate whites, the paper 
noted “this is a hazard of travel that other Americans never consider.”305  While it was a sign of 
changing times that the Negro Motorists’ Green Book steadily lost readers in the 1950s and 
ceased publishing in 1964, it would ultimately take action by both the state of Missouri and the 
federal government to bring an end to the discriminatory practices against the black middle-class 
that had made the green book necessary in the first place.
306
                 
* * * * * * * 
The struggle against Jim Crow in hotels, lunch counters, stores, bars, restaurants, and 
amusement parks by the city’s civil rights movement between 1955 and 1963 would therefore 
play out against this backdrop of bulldozers and wrecking balls destroying long-established 
African American neighborhoods.  Despite a few victories in the early 1950s against segregated 
public facilities, it was in the aftermath of the victory over segregation at the Swope pool and 
especially after 1958, that there would be the greatest push against racial discrimination. 
The Call’s November 19, 1954 headline, “Rip Downtown Race Bias,” signaled how fed 
up the city’s black middle-class and civil rights activists were with private sector discrimination 
and the slow pace of change after World War II.
307
  Prompted by a letter written by an African 
American woman named Julia Adams who had visited from Los Angeles, the Call’s readership 
responded by stating their agreement with her feelings that the refusal of service to African 
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Americans by downtown businesses was “a terrible situation and is having a damaging effect on 
the future morale of our young people.”308  One of those who responded was a civil rights 
activist herself and a member of the Women’s Civil Rights Club named Floyd Fine. She stated 
that her organization had been at work for several years to remedy the situation. The Women’s 
Civil Rights Club had drawn up a proposed ordinance which it submitted to the city council that 
made it illegal for any public accommodations to discriminate against citizens because of “race, 
color, or creed.”309  When a large delegation went to a council meeting, Mrs. Fine recalled that 
they presented it but that Mayor William E. Kemp said that the matter should be presented to all 
the members of the council rather than a special council committee. Mayor Kemp further said 
that a later date would be set for such a meeting, but months passed, and only one councilman 
responded to the letter. Another letter writer to the Call identified as Mrs. Strickland agreed with 
Julia Adams’ criticism of the city and added that it was “so embarrassing to one when with out of 
town guests, we have to say to them that we cannot eat at but two places, the dime store and 
Carver’s Grill.”310  Strickland angrily noted that some of the same large department stores that 
refused to serve blacks at their cafeterias greatly profited from African American customers’ 
purchase of their products; she implicitly suggested a boycott of these stores until they changed 
their lunch counter policies. Finally, a male letter writer identified as Mr. Thompson criticized 
activists for being too content with the Swope pool victory to the point that “a first-run movie 
and a hot dinner at some restaurant or hotel seems forgotten” and reminding readers that even 
“some of your larger and smaller cities in the South aren’t as bad as good old K.C.” when it came 
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to racial discrimination.
311
  
Other complaints voiced by the Call and its readers was the frustrating feeling that St. 
Louis’ African American community, at the other end of the state, was making more progress 
towards civil rights than Kansas City’s was.312  As examples, the Call listed St. Louis’ public 
utilities being opened to that city’s black population. In 1952, St. Louis’ public transit company 
had begun to hire African American bus drivers, and in 1954, Southwestern Bell began to 
integrate its black employees into the main office and other branches throughout St. Louis. The 
Call rhetorically asked, “What does St. Louis have that Kansas City doesn’t have?”313  It 
concluded that “the St. Louis Negro community pushes a little harder for what it wants than do 
the citizens of Kansas City” and noted that Southwestern Bell had set up first segregated offices 
and then integrated black telephone workers into the main offices because “they [civil rights 
activists] continued to agitate for integration of employees” after having made “constant 
demands for employment.”314  The column concluded by bemoaning the fact that “there is not a 
single bus or trolley car driver in Kansas City” even though Tulsa, Oklahoma employed African 
American drivers.
315
  In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Brown decision ending school 
segregation in nearby Topeka and reversing Plessy, this mood only grew. 
 By the end of 1955, the city’s downtown hotels and theaters had largely abandoned 
segregation, but segregation at diners and restaurants continued. One of the first local drugstore 
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giants to abandon segregation was Katz, in 1956.
316
  This decision in August ended a  month of 
protests prompted by the refusal in July of service at the restaurant section of Katz to the 
Reverend Arthur Marshall, Jr. of the Metropolitan AME Zion Church. 
 Marshall had followed up the incident with a letter to the management informing them if 
their discriminatory practices weren’t changed, he would subject them to a boycott of all Katz 
stores.
317
  Marshall’s letter prompted a quick response from the manager, Ross B. Meyers, who 
informed him that the store would be willing to open service to all if other merchants in the area 
would follow suit.  Meyers, according to Marshall, was afraid of being “the first” to integrate his 
lunch counters among the other drug stores.  After conducting a survey of other drug stores in the 
city, Marshall was served at the Parkview Rexall Drug store counter; this Rexall also employed 
black women as waitresses.  After getting feedback from Mowrey and Crown drug stores and the 
Knowles restaurant similar to what Meyers had told him, he brought all of these findings to 
Meyers.  As a result, Katz drug stores began serving all customers at their lunch counters.  
Crown Drug stores also began hiring African-American girls as waitresses, thanks to Marshall’s 
efforts.
318
  
The Mayor’s own Human Relations Commission censured segregated restaurants for 
“disrupting peace and harmony between groups of our community” and concluded that they 
“invited criticism of Kansas City from foreign dignitaries and conventioneers.”319  The city 
indeed lost conventions from large national and international organizations due to discrimination 
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in downtown restaurants. Building on the attempts made earlier in 1954 by the Women’s Civil 
Rights activists, KCMO’s NAACP drew up a public accommodations ordinance in August 1956, 
which even some KCMO restaurants were in favor of because it would give them cover from the 
“first to integrate” fear Meyers had and they all shared.320  However, the city council, as with the 
1954 petition, refused to pass the ordinance. As a result, the Greater Kansas City Restaurant 
Association set up a committee of its own to work with the Human Relations Commission’s 
public accommodations committee, and by 1958, several KCMO downtown restaurants began 
serving African American customers. 
With drug stores and restaurants now beginning to serve African Americans, the last 
major hold outs were the department stores.
321
  The Human Relations Commission and the Call 
both requested a meeting with William G. Austin, head of the Merchants’ Association in March 
1957. Austin stalled, and unfortunately, Dowdal Davis—the president of the Call—died, which 
allowed Austin to avoid a meeting entirely. Still, pressure was steadily building in 1957, as the 
National Conference of Christians and Jews spoke to the Human Relations Council in favor of 
ending racial discrimination in public restaurants.
322
  
1958 would prove to be a momentous year for the civil rights movement in both KCMO 
and KCK, as activists in both cities mobilized against Jim Crow in what turned into a five year 
campaign between 1958 and 1963. In KCMO, these mass protests would launch what would turn 
out to be a six year long battle for equal treatment under the law at both the city and state levels 
through boycotts, sit-ins, and other actions. Seasoned COPOD, NAACP, and Women’s Civil 
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Rights Club activists were joined by younger CORE activists such as Alvin Brooks who had 
served as a police officer in 1954 and had himself experienced Jim Crow discrimination at a 
drugstore as a child in the 1940s.
323
  Inspired by the 1955-56 Montgomery Bus Boycott and 
enraged at the inaction of William G. Austin’s Merchants Association, a black woman’s social 
club known as the Twin Citians had several of its members join with activists to form the 
Community Committee For Social Action (CCSA) to carry out mass demonstrations targeting 
five department stores. These stores were: Macy’s, the Jones Store, Kline’s, Peck’s, and Emery, 
Bird, Thayer.
324
   
  The CCSA launched its campaign by mailing five hundred protest letters to all five of 
the stores’ respective managers in October 1958.325  The letter-writing campaign was requested 
after the organization was unsuccessful in its efforts to meet with representatives of the stores.  If 
stores refused to change their policies, the group hinted that boycotts were possible.  They 
requested a reply by November 29.  Additionally, the group issued stickers for black customers 
to add to their bill payments that protested discrimination.
326
  By December 15, two of the stores’ 
managers requested conferences with representatives of the CCSA.
327
   
However, two days later, a special meeting of the Merchants’ Association called by 
Austin resulted in all five store owners turning down CCSA’s requests.328  This refusal was the 
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result of five weeks of negotiation between the five stores and CCSA.  The president of CCSA, 
Mrs. Kenneth Kerford, undeterred, called for a boycott of all five stores since the two had been 
most amenable would only agree to serve blacks if the other three stores did.
329
  She added that 
other direct action, including picketing, would also ensue until the stores changed their policies.  
CCSA also added a men’s auxillary unit of activists.  In doing so, she ignored the pleading of the 
Human Relations Commission’s chairman, William Gremley, who wanted more time for 
negotiations.  The Reverend Marshall shot back, “This group has attempted to organize in a fair 
way, and it is now necessary to take overt action.”330  When Mayor H. Roe Bartle offered to 
mediate a settlement, relayed to CCSA through the Human Relations Commission, CCSA went 
ahead with the boycott but held back the pickets until Mayor Bartle had an opportunity to try to 
talk the store managers into negotiations.  Unfortunately for the mayor, the parties in question 
gave him the run around: the managers said that the Merchants’ Organization had to decide, 
while Austin claimed all the power to decide was with the store managers themselves.    
On  December 19, 1958, CCSA launched mass demonstrations, including pickets, against 
the five stores despite the freezing weather.
331
  The demonstrators carried signs protesting 
discrimination at the stores’ restaurants.  Reverends Arthur Marshall and L. Sylvester Odum were 
among the first picketers on the 19th.  At first, store managers dismissed the group’s ability to 
hurt their business, believing that they would give up. One store manager sneered that it was 
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“typical of you people to raise sand for a while and then it will die out.”332  Austin, for his part, 
officially said that because of “the holiday rush,” he had not been able to give the situation the 
attention it warranted.
333
  He then told the Star that he intended to meet with CCSA after the 
Christmas shopping season ended.
334
  When sales dropped, managers tried the old deflective 
tactics to get the pickets to stop, by claiming that they wanted to open their restaurants but that it 
was the Merchants’ Association who was maintaining the discrimination. This tactic failed to 
placate the demonstrators, as the boycotts and protests stretched on through the rest of December 
1958 into January 1959, and business continued to drop as most African Americans and a 
significant number of whites stayed away from the stores.  The demonstration grew, attracting 
blue-collar and white-collar black demonstrators and in addition to Marshall and Odum, attracted 
six other clergymen, including Bethany Baptist Church Reverend F.D. Gregory.
335
   
When it became clear the demonstrations were affecting post-Christmas sales, William 
Gremley of the Human Relations Commission intervened to try to restart negotiations among the 
stores, the CCSA, and Austin’s Merchants Association.336  On February 9, 1959, CCSA stopped 
picketing as part of a precondition for talks with the five stores and with the Merchants’ 
Association, but made plans to march downtown if the talks failed again.   
On February 25, 1959, in a letter to CCSA, the Chamber of Commerce president Carl 
Rechner announced an offer to negotiate a settlement if CCSA would suspend its protests for 
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sixty days.
337
 Rechner infuriated the Reverend Odom by leaking the letter to the press before 
Odom could receive it and by asserting that “your more mature and well-known leaders” thought 
a solution was impossible with protest ongoing.
338
  Deeply resenting being publicly undercut in 
such a fashion, Odom tersely responded that CCSA was itself in the midst of negotiations 
through “calm deliberation” and it was in fact the very same “mature and well known leaders” 
who were insisting on marching if CCSA received no concessions from the stores.
339
   
Finally, on February 27, 1959, after meetings Austin, the store managers, and CCSA, it 
was announced that Macy’s and Peck’s would open their dining areas immediately to all 
customers.
340
  Macy’s, Peck’s, and Kline’s further agreed to open their dining facilities after “an 
education and orientation program,” which prompted the CCSA to organize workshops on proper 
dress, etiquette, and table manners for African American customers to comply with this 
condition.
341
   This condition had been prompted by employer anxieties that their white 
customers would be driven away by their stores being “overrun by Negroes.”  CCSA also 
established a scheduling system to guarantee a significant number of black diners were present 
each day to monitor the stores’ faithfulness to their end of the bargain. Satisfied with the results, 
the last two stores, the Jones Store and EBT (Emery, Bird, and Thayer) integrated their dining 
areas two months later.  
By 1960, activists had succeeded in finally passing the antidiscrimination ordinance that 
had been proposed by the Women’s Civil Rights Club six years before and by the NAACP four 
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years earlier.
342
  The city council voted six to two in favor of the ordinance, which outlawed 
refusal of service by hotels and restaurants on the basis of race or color.
343
  However, on January 
25th, Jackson County Circuit Court Judge John H. Lucas issued a temporary restraining order 
prohibiting the city from enforcing the new ordinance.
344
  Even the councilmen who passed the 
ordinance expected the action, however, since they knew the restaurant and hotel interests would 
fight the law in court.
345
  The injunction had been sought in a petition by fifteen restaurant 
owners, who argued the law was unconstitutional under both the city charter and Missouri law.
346
  
They claimed that it interfered with “their right to contract as they choose and deprives them of 
their property without due process of law.”347   They also complained that the law only targeted 
hotels, motels, and restaurants and made no mention of “any other merchant, business, or 
occupation in Kansas City.”348  Led by a group of tavern owners with strong backing from the 
John Birch Society, these small businesses tied up the ordinance in the courts for four years.
349
  
Undaunted, CORE, the NAACP, and CCSA launched mass demonstrations and sit-ins 
against Fairyland Park in May 1961 in what would become a three year battle to break the park’s 
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Jim Crow “whites only” policy.350  More than thirty demonstrators were arrested at the park by 
police but would be released when the city failed to press charges.  Marion Brancato, Fairyland 
park owner, sought and obtained an injunction in 1961 against future demonstrations.  However, 
the next year, in June 1962, a similar demonstration lasted for three hours despite the 
injunction.
351
  Thirty members of the NAACP Youth Council, both high school and college 
students, staged a stand-in at the park entrance after they were denied entrance.
352
  They included 
young people from both KCMO and KCK, and the struggle for racial justice at the park would 
energize the fight against Jim Crow on both sides of the state line. Indeed, 1962 would prove to 
be a momentous year as discrimination was confronted on a number of fronts. 
While still fighting for the antidiscrimination ordinance in the courts and to integrate 
Fairyland Amusement Park, activists in both KCK and KCMO took on some additional targets: 
the KCK school system and KCMO employment discrimination. In February 1962, activists in 
both Kansas Cities launched major civil rights campaigns.
353
  The CSSA in KCMO moved first, 
passing a resolution to accomplish four major goals at a meeting at the Paseo YWCA: 1) launch 
a boycott of the Emery, Bird, and Thayer department store over its hiring discrimination;  2) set a 
thirty-day deadline for the Southeast State bank to show “visible evidence” of integrated 
employment policy; 3) speed up efforts to win a breakthrough in the baking industry; and 4) 
adopt a wait and see attitude towards the Avon cosmetics company which denied it had 
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deliberately discriminated in its hiring.
354
    
The second goal was accompanied by a vow to “withdraw all accounts from Southeast 
State Bank” if they did not comply with an integrated employment policy after thirty days.355  
The CSSA made it clear that the Bank could not get away with hiring blacks as janitors, as the 
thirty-day deadline was explicit in its demand that the bank hire African-American tellers, clerks, 
secretaries, and machine operators.  At the meeting, the crowd listened with exuberance over 
details of conferences between CCSA and the baking industry, especially the news that two 
bakeries were close to agreeing to hire truck drivers “very soon.”  This joy turned to anger when 
the crowd learned of Emery, Bird, and Thayer’s failure to make good on a nondiscriminatory 
promise.  Instead of a truly integrated workforce, the store only had “a mere handful of Negroes 
in clerical or semi-clerical jobs.”356  Southeast State Bank, on proverbial thin ice as it was, didn’t 
help its case with the activists with the comments its president made to the Reverend Cecil 
Williams. Bank President James R. Perdew gave a litany of excuses, such as “we might lose our 
customers” and “now is not the time.”357   Worse, Perdew then claimed “Negroes come in, they 
don’t know how to sign checks, they take up a lot of time,” which Reverend Williams correctly 
interpreted as an insult implying “that we were simply nuisances.”358   As if insinuating that 
blacks were a race of incompetents wasn’t offensive enough, Perdew then gave the excuse that 
the bank was “located in an area which has a high Negro crime rate” and then mentioned the 
bank “having difficulties with some of the Negro churches” which Perdew implied were 
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overdrawn and then named three of them.
359
   Disgusted, Williams lambasted Perdew for 
mentioning other accounts, considering it highly unethical behavior.   
A week later, parents of fifteen black children in KCK in the Hawthorne School District 
of KCK filed a lawsuit in a United States District Court charging that the Board of Education 
refused them permission to go to the nearest school to their homes, Northwest Junior High, and 
forced to attend the still existing separate schools farther away, in violation of the 1954 Brown 
decision.
360
  The suit had evidently been making its way through the courts for some time, as it 
originated on September 15, 1960.
361
    US District Court Judge Arthur J. Stanley, Jr. heard the 
case and the testimony of both the plaintiffs and the superintendent of public schools.   
Superintendent F.L. Schlagle testified that he was directly responsible for carrying out 
desegregation policy for KCK schools.
362
  When asked if KCK schools were in full compliance 
with the Brown decision, Schlagle answered that he believed that he and the Board were.  He 
then told the court that “Negro teachers” were in “the predominantly Negro schools; there are no 
colored teachers in the other schools.”363  When asked what was preventing him from placing 
African American teachers in schools with white teachers, he replied “Nothing whatsoever.”364  
Schlagle and the Board’s attorney claimed in his opening statement that segregation in KCK 
schools ended in 1959.  When asked how they could maintain that was true given their own 
admission that no African American teachers taught at schools that weren’t predominantly black, 
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Schlagle offered up Quindaro Elementary as an example of a former “white school” that now had 
“two-thirds Negro enrollment.”365  Schlagle and the board contended that black children were 
denied admission to Northwest Junior High and Wyandotte High School was because the school 
district boundaries had changed rather than any racial bias.  When confronted with the fact that 
the school the Board demanded the fifteen plaintiffs’ children attend used to be an integrated 
school with white teachers before September 1960, Schlagle claimed that it was done merely to 
find work for teachers who had been displaced by urban renewal in the Northeast section of the 
city, causing a shortage of pupils.      
This wasn’t the only case of allegations of manipulation of school district lines and Board 
shenanigans to maintain separation of KCK’s schoolchildren by race in defiance of Brown in the 
early sixties, either. At the end of 1962, Mr. and Mrs. Shanks of Kansas City, Kansas, chose to 
risk prison for their children’s truancy rather than accept their children’s attendance at segregated 
schools in the city.
366
  When seven high school-aged neighbors of the family were denied 
admission to Wyandotte High School in September 1962, the Shanks pulled their children out of 
the school system and began teaching their own children and the seven high school students 
refused admittance to Wyandotte at their home.  Parents of the high school students sued the 
Board of Education in fall 1962.
367
   
George Mansfield, a truant officer for the KCK Board of Education, came to the Shanks’ 
home in November to present a complaint that charging that Mrs. Shanks refused to send her 
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children to school only because she didn’t want them “to go to half-day sessions.”368  Mrs. 
Shanks retorted that regardless of what the school officials had told him, this was a lie, as her 
objection was to sending her children to a segregated school.  Mansfield then served her and her 
husband with warrants for their arrests on November 21, 1962; through their attorney, their 
hearing was set for December 14th.  Shanks noted that no other parents had been served with 
warrants, even though their children were still being taught at the Shanks home.  According to 
Shanks, Mansfield told her that they would have to send their children to Hawthorne “or some 
other Negro schools” or they would go to jail.369  All of this occurred while both of the lawsuits 
against KCK’s Board were still ongoing.  As a result of these incidents, NAACP field secretary 
Leonard H. Carter, who helped litigate the case of fifteen parents in the Northwest District, 
remarked that “the Negro youngsters in Kansas City, Kansas are receiving an inferior brand of 
education as a result of bias in the school board—and this is not Deep Dixie.”370   In September 
1962, during further court litigation, Willard L. Phillips of the School Board let it slip that it was 
his opinion that “it is not in the best interest for a Negro child to go to a school heavily populated 
by whites and vice versa,” claiming that this was the consensus of “some of the best 
educators.”371  In blurting this out, he undercut the Board’s own defense in claiming that the 
boundary line was changed due to overcrowding and urban renewal, not race.    
With school segregation in KCK under litigation, activists there struck on another front. 
In May 1962, KCK’s NAACP began picketing four stores on Minnesota Avenue which refused 
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to negotiate with the committee on Labor and Industry.
372
  The stores picketed included 
Shepherd’s, Joe Vaughn, Dixie Shop, and Wait’s Shoe.  Pickets were recalled from Wait’s when 
management declared the intent to negotiate.  Additionally, the KCK NAACP held conferences 
with Zale’s, Goldman’s, Helzberg’s, Robinson’s, Kresge’s, and Katz.  All of those stores denied 
having discriminatory hiring policies; the Committee informed them that such a position was 
meaningless unless African American were being hired to positions other than menial work.  J.C. 
Penney, Montgomery Ward’s, and The Leader were praised by KCK activists for their hiring of 
African Americans, and they noted that a part-time clerk position that become full time had been 
added by Adler’s.   All stores were put on notice that there would be follow-ups to measure 
progress in employment fairness and if none were found, picketing and boycotting would 
resume.  By May 26, only two stores, Joe Vaughn Clothing Company and Shepherd’s, still 
refused to negotiate with the Labor Industry committee of the NAACP; picketing against them 
continued into the fourth week of the protests.
373
  At the same time, the organization had been 
holding talks with the Dixie Shop, Grant’s, and Woolworth’s.  The Dixie Shop supervisor from 
New York reported that one of three salesclerks was black.  The conferences with Grant’s and 
Woolworth’s were unsatisfactory, so boycotting of Grant’s and Woolworth’s continued, pending 
future conferences.  When Grant’s management mentioned that they had hired a black stock clerk 
since the boycott began, the committee informed them that this action was by no means 
sufficient given that they continued to turn away qualified black applicants for salesclerk 
positions.  To reinforce that point, the group announced that they would hold further conferences 
with The Leader, Kresge’s, and others which had offered only token compliance after the first 
                                                 
372
 Kansas City Call, “NAACP Pickets Stores: Seek Jobs In Kansas Business,” May 18, 1962. 
373
 Kansas City Call, “Picketing In KCK Into Fourth Week,” June 1, 1962. 
 299 
 
conferences.
374
   
Following KCMO’s lead from eleven years earlier, KCK set up its own Human Relations 
Commission on November 14, 1962.
375
  Ordained by the KCK city government, Section 1 read 
in part: “There is hereby created an advisory commission on human relations which shall be 
composed of fifteen members who shall serve without compensation and who shall be broadly 
representative of the religious, racial, and ethnic groups in the community to be appointed by the 
City Commissioners, one of whom shall be designated as chairman.”376  The remaining sections 
spelled out its purpose and what powers the agency had.  
KCK activists, along with African Americans in other parts of the state of Kansas, also 
spoke up in expressing disappointment with Republican Governor John Anderson, Jr.’s failure to 
keep several promises he made on the issue of civil rights.
377
  Dr. Charles R. Roquemore, 
president of the Kansas State Conference of NAACP Branches, wrote the governor that “the 
NAACP is no longer confident” that civil rights matters discussed “have ever been processed 
beyond your promises to ‘do something.’”378  The blistering letter read off a list private 
businesses and state agencies that either only hired whites or hired blacks for the lowest paying 
jobs.  Roquemore continued, telling Anderson that “right under your nose lies racial 
discrimination in its most flagrant forms. We asked you to issue an Executive Order that state 
agencies comply with the 1961 Kansas Act against Discrimination and cooperate with the 
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Kansas Bill of Rights.”379  Exasperated, Roquemore recalled the Governor merely stating “you 
would ‘look into it.’”  The governor had also pledged to appoint two African-Americans when 
confronted by civil rights activists about appointing only whites since he became Governor; six 
months passed, and no such appointments had been made.  The letter continued, with mounting 
outrage, noting that “we asked you to call a conference on housing so that you could determine 
for yourself the great need for a housing law in this state. You promised to ‘look into it.’”380  
Worst of all, Governor Anderson had cut the budget for the Kansas Civil Rights Commission 
after promising his “support.”  
If KCK was experiencing a wave of activism that it hadn’t seen since the wartime 
marches against Jim Crow in the Fairfax defense plant back in 1941, KCMO’s African-American 
community won one of the first major court victories in favor of the 1960 anti-discrimination 
ordinance. In April 1962, the Missouri Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision upheld the anti-
discrimination KCMO ordinance as constitutional.
381
  The majority opinion held that the 
ordinance was a valid use of the city’s power to protect public health and welfare.  This, the 
opinion said, was obvious given that “food and shelter or food and lodging are among man’s 
basic needs.”382  The Call was ecstatic, comparing the ruling to the Brown decision in 
importance for the basic human rights of black citizens of KCMO.
383
  It reiterated how long in 
the making the ordinance had been, going back to 1956 in its latest form.  The editorial 
continued, calling the Missouri Supreme Court decision a “moral” as well as “primarily a legal” 
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victory.
384
  Although it noted that most downtown and Plaza restaurants had been open to 
customers of all races for two years and the major hotels had been for quite a bit longer, the law 
would have the greatest effect on isolated cases where some restaurant owners had stuck to the 
old practices, and on the motels, which had been slower than the hotels in changing their policies 
towards black customers.     
A further sign of the changing times was the fact that Democratic Governor of Missouri 
John M. Dalton called a statewide Missouri Conference on Human Rights to be held in Jefferson 
City on May 4-5, 1962.
385
  Unlike the adversarial relationship KCK activists had with Governor 
Anderson, Governor Dalton of Missouri for the most part tried to placate civil rights activists, 
pushing for passage of the 1961 Fair Employment Practices Law.  However, when he condemned 
“radicals” for the tension around desegregation in Southeastern Missouri in the Charleston 
schools, civil rights activists in both KCMO and St. Louis strongly criticized him. State politics 
on both sides of the state line could and did affect national policy, as was seen negatively when 
JFK’s attempt to create a new Department of Urban Affairs headed by Robert Weaver was 
defeated by the House, including all six Kansas congressmen and seven of Missouri’s eleven 
congressmen.
386
  All but one of the Kansas congressmen were Republican, while of Missouri’s 
congressmen opposed, all but two were Democrats.  All four of the Missouri congressmen in 
favor of Kennedy’s new post were Democrats.  Kennedy himself was not above criticism in the 
new mood sweeping both African American communities in KCK and KCMO in 1962 that could 
be best summed up with the SNCC slogan of the era, “Freedom Now.” In this vein, The Call said 
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that given how tough the President was with the steel industry, it was lamentable that he didn’t 
show such toughness on housing integration.
387
   
Meanwhile, in the off year election of 1962, six African Americans were elected to 
Missouri’s state legislature.388   Until that time, there had never been that many black elected 
officials in the state assembly.  Although five of the state congressmen were from St. Louis and 
the lone Kansas City state representative was re-elected, the election gave a boost to African 
American political influence in the state.  To stress this development is actually to bury the 
proverbial lead story, as what was truly earth-shaking about this election for Kansas City was the 
May 1962 formation of Freedom Inc. by seven black grassroots activists, the first black political 
organization independent of the white power structure in either party.
389
  Activists in KCMO 
including Bruce Watkins, Leon M. Jordan, Earl D. Thomas, police officer Alvin Brooks , and 
three others took the critical step of forming Freedom Inc. in 1962, a political group with the 
goal of electing African Americans to city government.
390
  Jordan had decided by 1960 that such 
a step was in order and the organization was his idea.
391
  According to future Panther and local 
activist Arthur Bronson, Freedom Inc. was the first black political movement in the city that 
working-class blacks felt represented them adequately.
392
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Tired of decades of a paternalistic all-white city council either throwing roadblocks to 
change or giving piecemeal concessions to black citizens’ basic rights, activists decided to form a 
political organization of their own to counter the old remnants of the machine and reformer 
politicians in both parties. With white flight decreasing the city’s white population in every year 
since the 1930s, the feeling of being ruled over by a city government that represented suburbs 
miles away from the city increased and was deeply resented. In addition to trying to fight 
discrimination in private business with an all-white city council whose support for civil rights 
was dubious to nonexistent, activists were faced with a situation where the most responsive part 
of the city government, the Human Relations Commission, was constantly underfunded.
393
  Four 
years before SNCC’s Stokely Carmichael was to nationally coin the phrase “Black Power,” 
Freedom Inc. managed to achieve a degree of black political power by breaking the grip of all-
white nonpartisan “reformers” over city council by electing African-American politicians Bruce 
R. Watkins and Earl Thomas to the council in March 1963.
394
   
CORE organized yet another protest in August 1963 at Fairyland Amusement Park, when 
sixteen CORE activists entered the park at ten o’clock at night and lay flat on their backs until 
police arrived to remove them.
395
  CORE activists’ leaders paid the ten cent a person admission 
fee to the park, were denied tickets, and walked through the gates anyway, leaving their money 
with the cashiers.  Singing freedom songs, CORE activists purchased tickets for the rides while 
singing, and some even rode on the rides before park officials and police intervened.  The police, 
led by Police Chief C.M. Kelley, approached the demonstrators and told them they would have to 
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leave the park or face arrest.  This was when they chose to lay on their backs, and police had to 
lift them out of the park and into patrol wagons; this was repeated at the police station, where the 
demonstrators had to be physically moved out of the patrol wagon.  Kelley snapped, “for the 
record, this demonstration tied up twelve patrolmen who could have been preventing crime while 
on patrol . . . I do not see what C.O.R.E. can accomplish through this.”396  Given this kind of 
insensitivity, it was highly unfortunate for KCMO that Chief Kelley would still be police chief 
when the 1968 riots occurred. 
Park manager Harold Duncan defended the park’s policies by saying it was “private 
property” and that while Fairyland “had reached an agreement with various minority groups that 
we would admit Negroes if they came in groups and made arrangements in advance,” the park 
“will not admit them individually.”397  Like the homeowners’ association and the small business-
tavern owners, the park leadership adopted a private property-based defense of race segregation. 
CORE leader Constance Timberlake said the demonstration was to impress upon both the 
KCMO city council and Missouri Governor John M. Dalton the critical importance of passing 
both city and state public accommodations laws protecting African-Americans’ civil rights.  Nine 
days later, the Park sued Timberlake, claiming damages for having to shut the park and refund 
tickets and touching off a legal battle that wouldn’t be settled until 1964.398  
With the Missouri Supreme Court’s upholding of KCMO’s antidiscrimination ordinance 
in 1962, opponents of integration in downtown businesses had one last maneuver they pulled to 
try to stop the ordinance. The Tavern Owners’ Association successfully circulated petitions to put 
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the ordinance to a vote and deliberately broadened it to include taverns.
399
  They gravely 
miscalculated, as the 1962-63 elections of Watkins and Thomas to the council if anything tilted 
the council in an even more pro-civil rights direction. In September 1963, the council upheld the 
expanded ordinance by a vote of eleven to two.
400
  The ordinance defined public accommodation 
as: “taverns, common carriers, stations, terminals, all places dealing with goods, wares and 
merchandise, and public way and auditoriums, except where restrictive leases have been created 
for any other reason other than to discriminate. Also defined as public are places of amusement, 
relaxation, exercise and relaxation, public libraries, museums, hospitals, dispenseries, clinics, 
and trade and professional schools open to the public and operating at a profit.”401  However, in 
order to pass the measure, one of the compromises had included the exemption of barber and 
beauty shops, apartments and rooms leased on a time-limited basis, and private homes that rented 
to boarders.   The omission touched off a mass sit-in and hunger strike by CORE that lasted for 
several days, in Mayor Illus W. Davis’ office.402  As a result, the committee of the city council 
revised the ordinance to drop the exception to personal services and to revoke licenses of 
businesses after a third violation.  An earnings tax election in December delayed further action 
on the referendum into 1964.
403
  
In contrast, KCK passed a broad public accommodations ordinance late in December 
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1962 that stated racial or religious discrimination was illegal in businesses licensed by the city.
404
  
Unlike in KCMO, the new law was accepted as a matter of course, and KCK avoided the long-
fought court battles that delayed such civil rights legislation for years in KCMO. Specifically, 
KCK lacked a mobilized segment of small business owners backed by right-wing political 
elements determined to fight “the Communist program to destroy the system of free enterprise” 
that propelled dynamics in KCMO between 1960 and 1964.
405
  
Civil Rights activists in both cities, both states, and especially CORE and the NAACP 
won a huge victory in early 1964, when Fairyland Amusement Park finally opened its admission 
to all people after three years of mass protests, arrests, and court battles.
406
  On February 29, the 
lawyer for the owners, the Brancato family, wrote Mayor Davis of their decision to not only 
admit African American customers, but also to drop all six lawsuits the park had filed against 
demonstrators and invalidate the injunction that had stopped the city from enforcing the public 
accommodations ordinance against the park.  The owners concluded that it was in the Park’s best 
interests to integrate, given the negative publicity, their fear of “open strife between citizens of 
our city,” and the fact that there had been no drop in business for amusement parks in other cities 
that had discrimination ordinances.   Lastly, they noted that they had “viewed with concern the 
attitudes and statements of groups opposing this ordinance”; apparently the virulence of some of 
those statements had given them pause.
407
  Most damaging was the admission of three top 
officials of the Association for Freedom of Choice that they were also John Birch Society 
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members and their subsequent remarks.
408
  Two of these individuals, Thurman McCormick and 
James Kernodle, made remarks that damaged the credibility of anyone opposed to the ordinance.  
McCormick first claimed that the city ordinance was “identical” to “the objectives stated 
in the Communist Manifesto.”409  When pressed by the Kansas City media about the most 
outlandish things the group and its founder Joseph Welch said about Presidents Eisenhower and 
Kennedy, McCormick would only say “let’s judge his [a President’s] conduct and decide. 
Whether it be Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson, let’s look at the facts. What position are they 
taking on matters?”410  McCormick dug himself deeper into public scorn by seeing “nothing 
unusual” in a Birch Society article that bizarrely claimed that JFK and the CIA set up a “fake 
invasion of Cuba designed to strengthen our mortal enemies there” and saying further about the 
recently assassinated President, for whom millions were still in mourning, that “if he’s a skunk 
when he’s alive, he’s a skunk when he’s dead.”411  What Kernodle said wasn’t as controversial, 
but he did brag about being a John Birch Society member and called anybody opposed to the 
organization either ignorant of it or “a Communist or Socialist sympathizer.”  They both denied 
any direct connection between the Association for Freedom of Choice and the Birch Society.   
The loss of the Fairyland Park as an ally was a huge defeat for the alliance of the Tavern 
Owners and Association. Charles V. Genova, President of the Kansas City Tavern Owners 
Association, claimed to have turned down offers from unnamed political bosses in the city to 
help fight the ordinance so that the referendum could be “the people’s choice.”412  He 
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emphasized that he wouldn’t fight the ordinance any more after the 1964 referendum, but smugly 
asserted “with a white population majority of nine to one we don’t need political bosses to help 
us.”413  As if demonstrating a textbook case of the kind of “new white language around property 
and race” identified by David M.P. Freund, Genova denied being racist, saying “we are not 
against Negroes as Negroes.”414  However, Genova let the property rights and libertarian 
proverbial masks drop when he said that “the association feels that whites, whiskey, and Negroes 
is a combination that just won’t work.”415  Further remarks during the campaigning for the 
election by Genova exposed racist attitudes behind the opposition to the ordinance, such as 
Genova’s claim that its purpose was “expressly . . . to make it legal for Negro boys to date white 
girls in public taverns, dance halls, and swimming pools.”416  Continuing this line of 
demagoguery, he wrote that “we are not ready for this personal intermixing of the races in our 
places of business, no matter how the rest of the world and the politicians feel.”417  Genova 
earned the ire of a Kansas City Star editorial in April for his race-baiting that the paper called 
pulling “absurd racial issues out of the air.”418  
With openly racist language like that, it was much easier to tie Genova and other 
opponents in Kansas City to the atrocities of Bull Connor and Jim Clark in Birmingham and 
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Selma.
419
  In the lead up to the April 7th vote, both sides used the international context of the 
Cold War, but framed it in very different ways.
420
  On one side, in opposition, was the paranoid, 
rigidly property-rights focused anticommunism articulated by McCormick for the Association, 
the Tavern Owners, and Birch Society which regarded any attempt to regulate private property 
(classical liberalism) in consideration of the public good (republicanism) or the rights of other 
people as “Communist” and against the US Constitution. On the other side, an alliance of clergy 
from Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant denominations from both the white and African American 
communities, labor unions, civil rights organizations, and the board of directors for the Chamber 
of Commerce pointed to the context of American leadership in the world and the damage the 
defeat of public accommodations bills at both the city and state levels would do to the American 
image around the world.
421
  
The clashing discourses also defined freedom and morality very differently. On the 
opponents’ side, freedom was defined in almost entirely property-rights classical liberal 
discourse and any interference for any reason with business was an abridgement of freedom. For 
the civil rights movement, freedom was a matter of basic human rights not constrained to, or to 
be constrained by, property rights. On the side supporting the ordinance, the liberalism 
underpinning it was actually a coalition of the postwar consensus liberalism of interest group 
juggling to maintain social harmony and a left of center discourse that was informed by the 
Social Gospel. Both of these defined liberal notions of freedom far more expansively than did the 
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discourse of their opponents and believed that group rights were as important as individual 
rights.  As for morality, the kind of gendered white middle-class racism that Schirmer had 
identified in the 1910s that obsessed over interracial contact between white women and black 
men was definitely invoked by Genova in the 1964 fight against the ordinance. On the other side, 
it was the newer interracial middle-class morality of the Fellowship forged in the 1940s that 
animated the supporters of the ordinance. These forces would clash again, over housing in 
1968.
422
  
In this fiercely contested referendum, high African American voter turnout finally 
ensured the ordinance remained city law, as it was upheld by one thousand six hundred and 
fourteen out of nearly ninety-thousand votes cast.
423
  At the same time the movement won this 
critical victory regarding public accommodations, one that had been a decade in the making, 
racial segregation in housing had reached such a point in the previous decade that Troost Avenue 
became the de facto dividing line between white and black neighborhoods in the city.
424
   
In a city in which racial movement had been ongoing for decades back to the 1910s, what 
was especially significant about the wave between the 1950s and 1970s was “its extent and 
rapidity.”425  Instead of gradual turnover and marginal expansion, the entire southeastern section 
of KCMO, south of 27th Street and east of Troost Avenue, was transformed from mainly white to 
almost all-black between 1955 and 1970. Ever since then, the inner city African-American 
population has continued to move southeast but never moves west of what locals call “the Troost 
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Wall.”426  This development occurred largely because the KCMO School District was as resistant 
to the Brown decision as the KCK School Board had been, but used a technique to get around 
Brown that proved far more damaging than the games played with district lines its KCK 
counterpart was sued for. The KCMSD used Troost Avenue as a racial school attendance 
boundary between 1955 and 1975, separating white schools to the west and black schools to the 
east.
427
  As a result, real estate agents and “blockbusters” saw an opportunity to use the school 
district boundary to stimulate white flight east of Troost. 
Civil rights activists would find housing and school segregation their toughest battles of 
all.  On June 20, 1963, a group of white and black civil rights activists staged a protest at the 
KCMSD Board meeting charging the district with reinforcing residential segregation through 
“the unwritten law of the Troost line.”428  A month later, CORE launched a series of sit-ins and 
picketing at the Board protesting the use of Troost as a racial boundary.
429
  In July, the 
Superintendent of KCMSD James Hazlett met with the Board to give the position officially held 
on school integration: the board “accepts the principle of promoting integration as one of many 
factors to be considered, but it does not believe that priority should be given to this above all 
other factors.”430  Throughout 1964, civil rights protests continued and were each time rebuffed 
with the district’s variant of the property rights or “market condition” excuse: “neighborhood 
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unity.”431    
* * * * * * * 
Having examined over a hundred years of the history of the Greater Kansas City 
metropolitan area and the origins and development of conditions of urban crisis in the city since 
the 1910s, it is at this point that the 1968 riot in KCMO needs to be contextualized.  It is also 
important to look at the reasons that KCK was spared a similar fate following the assassination 
of Martin Luther King, Jr.  For many white observers, the 1968 riot was the first recognition of 
an “urban crisis.”  But as this work has sought to demonstrate, the crisis itself was a long-term 
process, fed by racial exclusion and overt discrimination in housing, in employment, in 
education, and in public accommodations.  It was moreover a process exacerbated by white 
hostility to black aspirations as well as an agonizingly slow and only partial response to black 
demands.  The 1968 riot in Kansas City, Missouri, was not the crisis:  it was the flash point of the 
explosion of a powder keg that had been packed for years.  
 First, it should be reiterated that KCMO had close calls with large-scale urban riots 
before, particularly in 1919, 1925, and to a much lesser extent, during World War II. Had 
situations in especially 1919 or 1925 gotten past a certain point, KCMO could have easily gone 
through two earlier riots on the order of those suffered in Detroit or Chicago during that earlier 
period. It is very well known that the 1968 riots were national in scope due to the May 4, 1968, 
assassination of Dr. King, with KCMO one city among most US major cities seeing violence 
then. However, as was the case with riots such as the 1992 Los Angeles riots, there is often a 
local cause interacting with a national cause, with the national cause often acting as a catalyst for 
local tensions to explode. 
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Despite the victories of the civil rights movement coalition of the NAACP, COPOD, the 
Fellowship, CORE, and CCSA between 1950 and 1964 and Freedom Inc.’s 1962-63 electoral 
success in electing Watkins and Thomas, KCMO in 1968 was still marked by “social exclusion 
and injustice.”432  Despite integrated public accommodations, there were still only two black 
elected officials on the city council, and whites still excluded blacks from labor unions, real 
estate boards, corporations, and suburban schools and housing.
433
  African Americans were 
twenty percent of the city’s population in 1968, yet they comprised only six percent of the police 
force, less than two percent of all union members (the end of the stockyards and meatpacking 
industry probably helped drive the numbers this low), and less than one percent of all members 
of the Kansas City Real Estate Board.
434
  Until 1968, there had been no blacks on the Kansas 
City school board.
435
  WDAF-TV, the city’s NBC affiliate had only one African American 
newscaster, Lena Rivers Smith.
436
  She had come to the station from working at the Kansas City 
Call, the only former Call journalist hired to work in local television news.
437
  
James Farmer had warned activists four years earlier that the public accommodations 
ordinance, despite making progress, was “too late with too little,” as it still did not cover some 
public places that could continue to practice segregation.
438
  Almost immediately after the first 
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version passed in 1962, reports of violations began flooding the Human Relations 
Commission.
439
  Six years later, the NAACP reported that complaints of discrimination in 
Kansas City were still nearly constant in nature.
440
  In 1965, the Kansas City transit company 
curtailed bus service, prompting protests.
441
  Missouri would also be among the last holdouts 
among those states outlawing interracial marriage following the Loving decision of 1967.  
Both the Kansas City and national white leadership were fully unprepared for what 
occurred after Dr. King’s death in most American major cities, including KCMO. Even the 
Urban League, long the canary in the coal mine between 1939 and 1961 in terms of warning of 
housing conditions, was too busy after 1966 gushing over the promise that the Johnson 
administration’s Model Cities program held for KCMO and basking in the progress that had been 
made for civil rights to pay attention to the warning signs.
442
  As late as the day before KCMO’s 
riot began, the Kansas City Times had cast doubt on the Kerner Commission’s position that white 
racism was the cause of summer urban riots since 1965 by putting the phrase white racism in 
quotes and by noting that “respectable national spokesmen” had been critical of the report.443  
Incredibly, one of the sources the paper cited for “national spokesmen” was Senator Strom 
Thurmond.
444
  Liberal Democrats, too, however, were just as quick to shoot the messenger rather 
than pay attention to the report; Vice-President Hubert Humphrey was quoted as “wondering if 
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white racism wasn’t overemphasized” in the Kerner report.445  In contrast, Brooks not only had 
seen it coming, but had warned the Jewish Community Center earlier in the year that “the wrong 
spark could ignite a situation right here in Kansas City that would cause the same thing that’s 
occurred around the country.”446  
When the terrible news of Dr. King’s murder in Memphis was reported nationwide on 
April 4, 1968, initially neither KCK nor KCMO reacted violently.
447
  In KCK, Wyandotte and 
Sumner high schools held school assemblies on Friday April 5th in which speakers mourned Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., followed by a peaceful march of a thousand black high school students 
through downtown KCK.
448
  The Reverend Maynard Preston of the Eighth Street Baptist Church 
spoke through a bullhorn at city hall, preaching to the protestors not to forget Dr. King’s lessons 
of nonviolence.  About twenty-five officers walked outside Sumner high school for the students’ 
march; half of these policemen were African American.  One of the officers said, “I don’t want to 
give off the impression that we are here expecting violence. We are here today out of 
sympathy.”449  In KCMO, on Sunday April 7, 1968, ten thousand people gathered on Twenty-
Seventh Street and Woodlawn and marched from there to Liberty Memorial Mall.
450
  The march 
was orderly and without incident, as more than fifteen thousand people stood or sat on park 
benches provided by the park department.  
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What changed matters so drastically between Sunday and Tuesday April 9, when KCMO 
experienced its own outbreak of urban violence? The answer largely had to do with the way in 
which KCK and KCMO schools responded to the day of Dr. King’s funeral, Monday April 9, 
1968. Keeping with its tone of deep respect and official mourning set on Friday April 5, 
Wyandotte county schools closed in recognition of the funeral of Dr. King on Monday.
451
  
KCMSD schools, however, refused to close, and like every other school system in the metro 
except KCK, held classes Monday, April 9.
452
  
When schools in the Kansas City MO school district opened at eight am on the 9th, 
Lincoln High School, Manual school, Central Junior High and Central High Schools experienced 
walkouts. They began at Lincoln High School, where a group of students began marching at 
eight o’clock.453  The march then spread to Manual and from there to Central High School, as 
Central Junior High students and staff could see a crowd of hundreds of Central High school 
students marching towards the Junior High.
454
  The principal at Central Junior High had planned 
a memorial for 9:15 am in the auditorium, with two ministers and Curtis McClinton and Otis 
Taylor of the Kansas City Chiefs to read tributes to King.
455
  However, a hundred Central High 
students rushed into the junior high and shouted, “School’s out!”456  When the principal called 
the police and locked the doors, the situation calmed until a second wave of about three hundred 
college-aged adults descended on the school.   
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The second group got in after a junior high girl unlocked the back door, while others 
smashed windows.
457
  The principal claimed that his teachers had been hit in the face with 
wastebaskets by some of the demonstrators; Arthur Bronson later confirmed that some white 
teachers had been attacked.
458
  The memorial ended up being held anyway, with the school 
dismissing at ten fifteen am.  At eight forty-five Mayor Davis was alerted to the possibility of 
disturbances downtown; Police Chief Kelley asked the Missouri highway patrol to come to the 
downtown area at nine fifteen am.  The Mayor reached Kelley’s office at nine thirty five am.  By 
nine fifty seven am, Missouri Governor Warren E. Hearnes called Kelley to discuss the need for 
National Guard troops.
459
  
Meanwhile, the crowd of hundreds of high school and junior high students, activists, 
members of the clergy, and some Kansas City Chiefs players marched up Paseo and then 
marched down I-70 in the direction of City Hall.  Before the marchers got to I-70, police officers 
in a patrol car drove up, and sprayed the crowd with chemical mace.  When the NAACP 
leadership asked them to apologize to the students, the officers would only say they were 
investigating a glass-breaking incident, concluded the noise from the church was vandals 
breaking glass, and threw the canisters.
460
  Mayor Illus Davis agreed to meet with them and 
spoke to them for a while that morning.
461
  When the demonstrators complained to him about the 
use of tear gas, he said that he was very sorry to hear that any tear gas was used.  Police claimed 
this march had been peaceful until twelve forty-five, when “an unidentified person” threw the 
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first canister of tear gas and that police were provoked by “firecrackers” to use tear gas; the 
NAACP claimed that the police had fired tear gas into the crowd at that point and that it was a 
“soda pop bottle” that had been thrown at the police.462  All sources agreed that the crowd left 
after that in busses.   
That afternoon, the marchers met at Holy Name Catholic Church, hosted by Father 
Timothy Gibbons, the white associate pastor of the church, to dance in the church basement to a 
program of rock n roll and soul music provided by radio station KPRS, and its disc jockeys 
Arthur Lee and Larry Anthony.
463
  Without warning, KCMO police officers kicked in the 
basement windows and tossed three canisters of tear gas into the basement.  The two disc jockeys 
witnessed the officers doing this, asked them why, and were told by the officers that police had 
been called to investigate a glass-breaking incident and decided that the noise coming from the 
basement was connected to it.  Raising tensions further, police were reported to have beaten two 
white Episcopal priests marching in solidarity with the NAACP and black school students in the 
area of 12th and Oak Streets near the Jackson County Courthouse.
464
  One of them suffered 
cracked ribs and another was struck on the arm with a club.
465
  
A series of violent clashes broke out between that afternoon and evening and led Mayor 
Davis to issue a curfew from 8 pm, that night to the following morning.
466
  Hundreds of African 
American residents on the eastside neighborhoods ignored the curfew, and the early morning 
hours of April 10, two hundred stores were damaged or looted, including a Katz, a Kroger’s and 
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a Crown drug store.
467
  The next day, April 10, police threw tear gas at Lincoln High School 
students during a repeat of the walkouts the previous day; that only ensured another two nights of 
rioting and looting, from the 11-12th.
468
  When those two days were over, both KCK and KCMO 
had imposed curfews, the Missouri National Guard had been called in from Columbia, six people 
were dead, and nearly one hundred buildings had been damaged or destroyed as a result of 
arson.
469
  KCMSD finally decided to dismiss classes for Spring Break on April 11, after two 
straight days of walkouts and urban violence.
470
  Furious activists blamed Chief Kelley and 
Superintendent James Hazlett for the violence, demanding that both be removed.
471
  Kelley’s 
defiant comments defending the use of tear gas at both Lincoln on April 10 and denial of 
knowledge of the incidents against the Episcopalian priests and teenage dancers in the Catholic 
Church further enraged them.
472
  Meanwhile, those who had actually rioted recalled years later, 
“We burned some buildings all along 31st Street. We didn’t touch Black businesses—only White 
. . . They were white-owned and that’s who we’d been fighting against all our lives and that’s 
who took King’s life. We were mad . . . We wouldn’t let the firemen get to them. One guy would 
shoot at them. We’d say, ‘let it burn.’”473  As former police officer and CORE activist Alvin 
Brooks put it in an interview with Kevin Fox Gotham, “Black residents were fighting for human 
and civil rights, right of employment, opportunity, right as far as housing opportunities, public 
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accommodations, as well as race relations in general. There was firm resistance on the part of the 
White community to all of the above and we therefore had serious difficulties.”474 
The national shift of SNCC to the more militant Black Power phase resonated well in 
KCMO between 1968 and the early 1970s, as anger over the slow pace of change reached a 
crescendo. One of those thousands of black individuals who grew up in the poorest and most 
racially isolated city neighborhoods that were a legacy of redlining and blockbusting since the 
1940s, Pete O’Neal, would transform from a petty criminal into a black revolutionary in 1967 
after reading The Autobiography of Malcolm X and hearing about Bobby Seale, Huey Newton, 
and Eldridge Cleaver’s Black Panther Party.475   O’Neal would found Kansas City’s Black 
Panther Party in 1969; he originally called it the Black Vigilantes.
476
   One of the first political 
acts of O’Neal was to demand a federal investigation of Chief Kelley and the KCMO police 
department. Pete O’Neal transformed the Vigilantes into the Kansas City chapter of the Black 
Panther Party for Self-Defense in 1969 in response to Chief Kelley’s conduct during the riots.  
O’Neal in fact read his manifesto in the Kansas City police department hallway, announcing “We 
want the power to determine the destiny of our black community.”477  One of the Lincoln High 
students who participated in the demonstration and rebellion of 1968 in KCMO, Arthur Bronson, 
would join O’Neal in 1970 after serving in the Air Force between 1968 and 1969. Like Seale, 
Cleaver, and Huey P. Newton in Oakland, O’Neal ran Panther breakfast programs for black 
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children in Kansas City.
478
  Intrigued by Maoism, he memorized whole sections of Mao 
Zedong’s “Red Book.”479  However, he also tried to provoke the police into a war “to show how 
brutal they were” and in particular loathed Police Chief Kelley, whom he believed was funneling 
weapons to white supremacist groups.  His tactics were often highly disruptive, as he stormed 
into an October 12, 1969 US Senate meeting, and started screaming that Kelley was running 
guns to racists.
480
   
On another occasion, he disrupted a white church service to ask for donations to the 
Black Panthers.
481
  Federal agents arrested him on charges of illegally transporting a gun across 
state lines; he and his wife, Charlotte Hill, also a Panther, were convicted in October 1970, but 
they jumped bail.  They escaped by crawling out the back door of their home at 3 am, jumped 
into the trunk of a friend’s car, rode in the trunk to St. Louis, where they caught a plane to New 
York, and were given fake passports by the New York Communist Party they then used to board 
a plane to Sweden.  By 1972, O’Neal surfaced in Algeria, where the party had bases and he 
succeeded Eldridge Cleaver as the party’s head of foreign operations, but the Algerian 
government expelled them over a disagreement.
482
 By 1973, the O’Neals ended up in Tanzania. 
KCK handled the tense national and local situation in April 1968 much better than 
KCMO did, in the end. Much as its public accommodations bill had passed without much of a 
problem and just as its World War II-era Mayor had realized that angry African American 
constituents over segregated munitions plants were not good for him politically, the school and 
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police authorities in KCK were much more careful, responsive, and intelligent in their response 
than KCMO. Mayor Davis meant well, but was undercut by a Police Chief that as far back as the 
Fairyland sit-ins in 1962 gave off vibes of hostility to black people and a school board that was 
an all-white relic of pre-Brown days and clueless about its black students. Moreover, KCK’s 
black population was not subjected to the full brunt of the waves of Great Migration from the 
Deep South that KCMO was between 1910 and 1960 that created crisis in overcrowding and 
hypersegregation when combined with NAREB and FHA housing policies.  
The callous decision of the school board in KCMO would prove the spark that would 
ignite decades of pent-up rage, going back to the 1910s over the following: discrimination, 
overcrowding, poverty, police brutality in the 1920s and 1940s, empty and broken promises by 
Republicans and Pendergast Democrats, urban renewal and inadequate and segregated public 
housing replacing old homes, the loss of black businesses, obstruction and delaying tactics by the 
city council and groups such as the Tavern Owners’ Association that caused the struggle for 
equal treatment in public accommodations to last over a decade, and the murder of Dr. King. Any 
number of these were explosive enough, but when combined with a national climate of mourning 
and rage over the assassination of the leader of the Black freedom struggle, the school board’s 
decision to hold classes despite King’s funeral was seen as one more example of white disrespect 
and racial insult of African Americans collectively. When combined with a rate of racial 
segregation and poverty in the city’s black neighborhoods that had reached a crisis point nearly 
thirty years earlier during the last years of the Depression, the situation was all the more dire. 
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CONCLUSION: GREATER KANSAS CITY AND “THE URBAN 
CRISIS” IN RETROSPECT 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
As the 1960s came to a close, KCMO and KCK had both been greatly transformed.  For 
African Americans in particular, the change fomented by the Civil Rights Movement and the 
overall condition for housing, education, and employment between 1945 and 1968 had moved in 
two very different directions.  For KCMO especially, the fight had been a very long one indeed. 
The African American struggle for civil rights in KCMO actually began in Missouri’s 
Reconstruction period as a response to the denial of voting rights to blacks before 1872 and to 
the segregation of the schools.
1
  Paradoxically, by the time that the long and often excruciatingly 
slow civil rights struggle had successfully ended the Jim Crow segregation of public 
accommodations by law and custom, both cities had experienced a worsening of the housing 
segregation underway since the 1910s. As was true in so some many urban centers across the 
nation, white flight to the suburbs in the greater Kansas City area created two urban centers with 
declining taxes bases, and with majority black populations deeply mired in the conditions of 
poverty, with endemic unemployment and troubled school systems being the most notable.
2
     
Such was the common case for both cities between the 1940s and 1960s, but the details 
varied across the state line. KCK was an industrial working-class town that lacked the high 
bourgeois obsession with social status and the management of urban space that comprised the 
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basis of a very distinct form of racist ideology in KCMO, again tied to the latter’s “city 
beautiful” movement. In addition to the class composition, the differences in the historical roots 
of each city mattered. The two cities had been on opposite sides of mid-nineteenth century 
sectional cultures surrounding slavery and race—“free labor and free soil” as opposed to a 
“northern city with southern exposure”—and this meant that both the characteristics of racism 
locally and the timeframe for development of an urban crisis were different in KCK than in 
KCMO.  As a result, for example, Jim Crow in public accommodations hung on longer in 
KCMO than in KCK. Because it was the bigger city, overcrowding resulting from the Great 
Migration in the 1940s was much worse in KCMO than in KCK, which had experienced most of 
its mass migration of southern blacks in the nineteenth century. Despite these considerable 
differences, the rise of Johnson County suburbs would be heavily implicated in the urban decay 
of both Kansas Cities after the Second World War.. 
A “two-tiered welfare state instantiated in the New Deal” and its postwar “growth 
liberalism” successor had subsidized and engineered the growth of white suburbia through the 
public-private partnership between the FHA and real estate industry.
3
  The national result was to 
create a federal government-subsidized postwar boom that largely created great prosperity and 
upward mobility for whites while freezing out African Americans, especially urban residents 
who had been on the wrong side of redlining and racially restrictive covenants.  The result can be 
charted in the dramatic alteration in racial isolation in KCMO, dating from the 1890s. In KCMO 
in 1890, the percentage of central city residents who were black was 12.7%.  By 1930, it was 
30%.  But by 1970, 75.6% of KCMO’s inner city population was African American.4  KCMO 
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lost, and has continued to lose, white population to the suburbs in every census since the 1930s. 
Much of this dramatic trend can be attributed to redlining, suburbanization, and blockbusting 
between the 1930s and the 1960s.  Unlike the situation in Sugrue’s Detroit where fierce 
competition between whites and blacks for scarce housing was the underlying issue, Kansas 
City’s problem was instead one largely created by real estate industry figures such as J.C. 
Nichols and, later, by federal housing policy.
5
  
Labor unions in both cities had a checkered and contradictory record with African-
Americans from the beginning of the twentieth century right up through 1968.  Highly variable 
depending on which labor union local in which industry one looked at, labor unions ran the 
gamut in their support, or lack thereof, for African American aspirations.  Some union locals, 
notably those in hod carrying, meatpacking, canneries, and laundries, were white allies and 
partners for interracial strikes; many others excluded blacks from membership entirely and 
colluded with management in perpetuating job discrimination between 1900 and 1930.
6
  In the 
1960s, labor unions lobbied hard for the anti-discrimination ordinance and were in the forefront 
of the fair housing struggle in 1966; yet, as late as 1968, less than two percent of union 
membership in KCMO was black.
7
  The Brotherhood of Pullman Porters led by A. Philip 
Randolph was a genuine force as an African American labor union, but the decline of the 
railroads after the 1950s undermined much of the benefits that unionized jobs for African-
Americans in this sector had delivered in the 1930s and 1940s.
8
  In addition, the demise of the 
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stockyards and meatpacking industry between 1929 and 1951 had devastating consequences in 
eliminating unionized jobs for working-class blacks in both cities. 
The shift in transportation between 1930 and 1965 in Greater Kansas City – from 
railroads and streetcars to automobiles traveling on Interstate freeways – undermined the black 
community in two ways, both of which reinforced the damage already done by FHA and private 
real estate practices.  First, as noted,  the decline of the railroads also diminished the clout of the 
only major African American union, Randolph’s Brotherhood, which had been a particularly 
powerful presence in KCMO. Secondly, when combined with urban renewal, urban interstate 
construction destroyed prosperous black businesses and entire neighborhoods. 
In the case of Kansas City, Missouri, the longest and unresolved struggles other than 
housing have been over school segregation and the problem of police brutality, both of which 
date back to the late nineteenth century and the earliest activism of James Dallas Bowser and 
others.
9
  Neither KCK nor KCMO proved cooperative with the 1954 Brown v. Board of 
Education decision, as has been seen, but the KCMSD’s use of Troost Avenue as a de facto 
barrier between white and black after 1955 proved especially exacerbating to an already racially 
segregated housing market beset with overcrowding.  Indeed, it can be said that KCMO was 
reaching a tipping point of urban crisis as early as 1939, but it was not until the 1960s that the 
city’s school district finally pushed the city over the edge into a full scale crisis. Other historians, 
such as Peter Moran, have already examined in much more detail the full extent of the history of 
school segregation and desegregation in KCMO; my purpose here has been to examine how the 
school board’s actions affected the overall trends toward a crisis flashpoint.  As for police 
brutality, in KCMO it seems to have followed a cyclical pattern of peaks where it was 
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particularly brutal, and periods where it decreased in intensity and frequency.  The inconsistency 
may very well have been influenced by the state’s control of the city’s police, a circumstance that 
had made the police relatively immune to local pressures.  Police behavior during the 1968 riot 
appears to have been the worst of a cyclical, recurring problem. 
Ironically, just before the KCMO riots, both Mayor Davis and President Lyndon Johnson 
were starting to make major pushes for legislation that would integrate housing.
10
  Davis’ local 
bill prohibited racial and ethnic discrimination, real estate blockbusting practices, and 
discriminatory lending practices by banks connected to the sale of housing.
11
  The old foes of the 
anti-discrimination ordinance, the John Birch Society and the Association for the Freedom of 
Choice, returned to battle civil rights activists and the Mayor in 1967-68, charging fair housing 
activists and the city council with accomplishing “a major goal of the Communist Party—
confiscation of private property.”12  Davis shot back against this crude red-baiting and appeal to 
“property rights” by stating that “they’re [the Birch Society and The Association] not talking 
about property rights so much as the right to discriminate against Negroes and Jews, and in some 
cases, Catholics.”13  The Association reinforced that perception by making repeated references to 
the “mongrelization of the races” and asserting that “facts prove that the Negro does not qualify 
as a first class citizen, or as a desirable neighbor” in their newsletters.14   
As for Johnson’s bill, it was passed amidst a crisis atmosphere in Washington D.C. after 
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the capital had its own urban riot; at the time, the military was guarding the Capitol building.
15
  
The bill the Democratic Congress passed and President Johnson signed, the Civil Rights Act of 
1968, had provisions that sought to undermine housing discrimination, sharply penalized 
vigilante and hate group racial violence against blacks and civil rights activists, and provided 
stiff penalties for inciting riots.
16
  The three stages of the housing section of the bill banned racial 
discrimination in FHA and VA financed housing and apartments, banned racial bias in apartment 
complexes, and banned discrimination in sale of individual homes through real estate agents.”17  
The Act authorized the recently created Housing and Urban Development program to enforce the 
federal government’s antidiscrimination laws and develop housing subsidy programs to increase 
low-income home ownership.
18
  Davis and the KCMO city council had planned a referendum on 
their local bill for April 30; once Congress passed the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 250-171, the city 
council voted unanimously to enact the housing provisions of the bill and cancelled the 
referendum.
19
  
Unfortunately for liberal and civil rights activists’ hopes, the way in which the FHA and 
real estate companies administered the program between 1968 and 1982 served to reinforce what 
Johnson and civil rights activists had been trying to fight. Between 1969 and 1974 in KCMO, the 
funding for Section 235, which had been intended to attract private lenders and developers to 
participate in providing low-cost housing to poor people, was used to build new housing mostly 
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in the suburbs and to allow African Americans to purchase existing homes in the city.
20
  Only 
twenty-seven percent of inner city black neighborhoods had new homes built. The FHA and real 
estate speculators used Section 235 to relax lending standards and open large amounts of credit 
to neighborhoods known for panic selling and racial turnover.
21
  Often, real estate agents used 
Section 235 to purchase dilapidated dwellings, make superficial repairs to make the building 
look inhabitable, obtain an inflated appraisal from an FHA appraiser, and then sell the home to 
an unsuspecting low-income black family with a risk-free, federally insured loan.
22
  Only later 
would the family discover serious problems with the home, and as repair costs mounted, the 
homeowner would leave the home. It would then return to FHA property to be resold again. 
 But more important than obvious corruption such as this, the 1968 Fair Housing Act 
failed to solve the problem of housing discrimination effectively because, as Gotham has put it, it 
was reactive in nature, “responding to violations of the law rather than attempting to undo 
prevailing discriminatory patterns “ and because it did not “challenge the institutional practices, 
ideology, and everyday activities of real estate agents and firms that create and reinforce racial 
residential segregation.”23   For example, as late as 1977, private real estate appraising manuals 
in both Missouri and Kansas still listed African Americans and Hispanics  as the worst among 
ethnic groups in their negative effects on property values.
24
  Even a 1988 amendment 
strengthening HUD’s enforcement powers didn’t fix these problems.25  In any event, Reagan 
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eliminated funding for new construction of government-subsidized housing in 1982 after 
spending on the program peaked in 1978.
26
   Both attention to, and indifference toward, housing 
issues was a bipartisan affair:  one irony of this era, as G. Calvin MacKenzie and Robert 
Weisbrot note in The Liberal Hour, was that “the greatest fiscal support for 1960s liberalism 
came not from John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson but from Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford.”27  
The story of the civil rights movement in Kansas City, then, is one that is bittersweet at 
best and tragic at worst in that, in spite of decades of activism that included significant victories, 
African-Americans and their allies were up against a deeply entrenched institutional racism, built 
around urban space and status, that resisted all attempts by activists, local politicians, and the 
federal government itself to puncture the residential color line through the city. In the latter’s 
case, this was all the more striking at a time characterized by the zenith of postwar public faith in 
the federal government’s powers to resist the Soviet bloc, build Great Societies, and land on the 
Moon. The truth actually was that when Mayor Davis, LBJ, and the US Congress acted to fix the 
problem, it was far too late. White religious activists in the Fellowship had also awakened to the 
problem far too late, as the tipping point for the urban crisis had already been reached. On the 
other hand, what the movement in KCMO did achieve should not be belittled or dismissed: they 
defeated the most egregious Jim Crow practices in public accommodations and opened up the 
city’s political system, media, places of business, and services to a black middle-class that had 
previously been subjected to humiliating exclusion and discrimination. Anti-Semitic 
discriminatory barriers were also taken down in the process. Sadly, the same could not be said 
for the black working-class and poor who, although they too benefitted from the removal of the 
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most insulting and discriminatory practices of Jim Crow, could not escape the loss of whole 
industries that sustained them nor the pernicious effects of real estate racism that had been locked 
in decades before they were born. 
The Kansas Cities’ stories enrich the current urban crisis literature by providing a case 
study in which key variables common to other case studies, such as migration, housing, and local 
politics, are manifested entirely differently. For example, black migration to the Kansas Cities 
occurred much earlier than in other major northern and western cities; paradoxically, the Great 
Migration itself did not become noticeable in KCMO until World War II and the 1950s, several 
decades after cities such as Chicago and New York City. Moreover, the political pattern of white 
racism in KCMO was almost the exact opposite of Detroit.  Instead of bottom-up white backlash 
expressed by white Democrats voting for Republican mayors, a top-down “clean government” 
group of “nonpartisan” city officials enforced white supremacy as part of an upper-class policing 
of urban space. Similarly, early twentieth century patterns of mutual hostility between African 
Americans and white unionists almost everywhere else were many times stood on their heads in 
both Kansas Cities, despite the fact that unions in both cities varied greatly in their practices of 
racial inclusion or exclusion. 
Even normal regional identifiers in other case studies, such as Kruse’s Atlanta clearly 
being a civil rights and post-civil rights southern city or the strong identification of Sugrue’s 
Detroit with industrial northern cities, is frustrated by both Kansas Cities’—but especially 
KCMO’s—historical roots on one of the mid-nineteenth century fault lines between slave and 
free states and Union and Confederate loyalties.  To reiterate what was stated in the introduction 
this study, no other case study shares these historical conditions with the Kansas Cities. Yet in 
spite of all that made each Kansas City unique from both other major cities and from one another 
 332 
 
as case studies, they nonetheless arrived at conditions of urban crisis that were similar to those 
prevailing in both northern and southern cities in the mid-twentieth century. This was because 
private and public housing policies that drew a color line through city neighborhoods and 
subsidized suburban growth at the expense of central cities happened everywhere in the United 
States between 1910 and 1960. 
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